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ABSTRACT
The current sites-and-services policies used in government
housing projects in Colombia evolved from previous attempts to
lower housing costs through industrialization and aided self-help
techniques. This new policy closely resembles the housing
process found in progressive squatter settlements where families
built their own homes over long time periods. Since 1970,
international development agencies have further encouraged the
use of sites-and-services in larger and more numerous projects.
In 1973, planning authorities in the capital city, Bogota, passed
sites-and-services legislation that allows the policy to be used
by private developers and serves as a model for a national
housing policy.
Both government and private developers in Bogota experienced
initial success with sites-and-services, but then applications
for new projects dramatically declined and homeowner investment
in existing ones slowed. In response, housing authorities have
postulated a new set of capital programs aimed at making future
sites-and-services projects more effective.
This research analyzes one slum upgrading and two
sites-and-services projects to see why recent projects have
failed to meet planners' expectations, to uncover the conditions
that stimulate families to invest in their homes and to
hypothesize the effects of the postulated policy changes.
This research discovers that, although shelter is the reason that
families begin to build in projects, deriving income earnings
through their dwellings is often their governing motivation. The
investments that families make tend to be rational and more
predictable when this dual role of housing is considered. In
view of the observed housing processes, the postulated policy
changes are not likely to make future sites--nd-services projects
more effective because they tend to reduce owner's income and
increase their housing expenditures.
An alternative set of capital programs is proposed that can
better achieve policy goals by recognizing the dual purpose of
homeowner investment. The recommended programs will require
systematic information on investment conditions that are likely
to change during project implementation. A framework is proposed
for systematizing the information required for deciding the best
public investments in a given situation and to detect changes in
conditions that could undermine public capital programs in new
projects.
Dissertation Supervisor: Dr. Lisa Redfield Peattie
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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SYNOPSIS
SITES-AND-SERVICES POLICIES
In Colombia, like many other developing countries,
sites-and-services is rapidly becoming the single most important
policy for creating housing for low-income families. This policy
is based on a self-help model found in progressive squatter
settlements where families build their dwellings over long
periods of time.
Sites-and-services attempts to stimulate home construction by
providing: 1) large blocks of land which are legalized for
residential use 2) serviced building plots for home
construction, 35 credit for building materials and mortgages for
land purchase and 4) technical assistance for building homes.
Sites-and-services shifts the *focus of low-income housing; the
physical housing unit is no longer the responsibility of the
government. Rather, housing agencies are increasing low-income
housing by creating incentives for low-income families to build
their own homes.
Basically there are four levels of capital programs: 1) raw land
subdivided into plots with a common water tap serving a number of
plots, common latrines and unpaved streets, 2) plots, each
serviced by a water tap and with its own latrine, septic tank or
sewer connection, 3) plots, each serviced as above and with a
small out-building containing the core facility and 4) plots,
each serviced and with a partially finished house, which could be
a slab, a slab with supports and roof, or one complete room upon
which additions can be made.
Sites-and-services projects are conducted in tandem with public
works, squatter legalization and upgrading projects. Families
displaced by public works and upgrading in slums may be
compensated with lots in sites-and-services projects.
Settlements are legalized where there has been de facto ownership
of the land but where squatters have not had sufficient
confidence in tenure to risk major capital improvemfents in their
houses. Legalization is important because the limbo status of
settlements prevents them from rece-iving services, inhibits
private home investment, depresses land values, keeps settlements
beyond the control of building codes, and forfeits revenues for
services the city may, in fact, already be delivering.
The sites-and-services policy is different than the
industrialization and aided self-help policies that preceded it.
Instead of planning complete housing units, government agencies
now use capital programs as incentives to stimulate families to
build their own housing.
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The potential risks and failures of this new approach are higher
and more visible than in other policies because there are more
uncontrolled variables than before. Conventional housing
projects fail when units cannot be sold, when occupants abandon
them, when families cannot afford them or when there are not
enough units to be effective. Sites-and-services projects can
fail for the same reasons but they can also fail if owners make
unreasonable investments or fail to invest at all. Running a
successful sites-and-services project depends on providing the
correct incentives and that depends on having a good model of how
public investment affects private investment.
OBJECTIVES OF CAPITAL PROGRAMS
The main objectives of capital programs are: 1) to increase the
supply of very low-cost housing by stimulating self-help
construction, 2) to make home ownership possible for very
low-income families by lowering project entrance requirements, 3)
to increase the efficiency of public services to residential
areas by minimizing infrastructure and maximizing private land
uses and 4) to reduce illegal land speculation and invasions by
offering legal alternatives. Programs also attempt to increase
the coordination of development programs and social services to
low-income groups and to use public works programs to increase
employment opportunities.
Sites-and-services significantly decreases the capital
requirements to start new developments. The costs normally
associated with administering and constructing complete housing
units have largely been eliminated. New minimum utility
standards reduce costs still further by lowering initial service
levels and eventual maintenance. Legislation now allows private
investors to profitably initiate minimum standard
sites-and-services projects themselves. This should result in
enough buildable plots that families will have an alternative to
illegal settlements that now account for one-third of the land
area of Bogota.
PROJECT COSTS AND BENhITS
Although individual projects vary considerably, there is a basic
set of public investments. The main cost items for the
government are: 1) land and site preparation, 2) on-plot
structures or materials to build them, 3) infrastructure and
public facilities like schools or health clinics, 4) project
administration and technical assistance and 5) interest charges
for long term development loans. Some of these costs are born
entirely by the government, others are partially or completely
passed onto project beneficiaries.
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Land costs are the most variable and can account for up to 30% of
the capital costs. Land might be allocated from reserves of
public property, purchased on the open market or expropriated
through pre-emption procedures. If public property is used, the
opportunity costs of using it for low-income housing is estimated
by determining whether the benefits flowing from the use are
sufficiently great to yield an acceptable rate of return based on
the fully capitlized value of the land for its best alternative
use. Generally this use is for middle-income housing.
Determining the proper value of land purchased on the open market
or acquired through pre-emption procedures is complex because
land owners often collude to artificially inflate land values and
because the value of land is itself subject to government policy.
Changes in land use zoning, public facilities planning, public
works and real estate taxation have dramatic effects on land
prices.
The costs of on-plot structures, utilities and public facilities
account for up to 40% of the capital costs and include
administrative overhead, material and labor cost components.
Costing generally considers unskilled and skilled labor, domestic
and imported materials and the expense of maintaining
infrastructure.
The cost of capital is the interest governments pay for long term
development loans. International agencies such as AID and the
World Bank are the main patrons of sites-and-services and
typically grant very low interest loans with 40 year terms.
Only a portion of the project costs are passed onto project
owners. They are usually allocated the majority of the land and
on-plot construction costs. Owners pay these costs through a
series of mortgage payments. Infrastructure installation and
maintenance costs are distributed over time. Owners may pay a
portion of the initial utility costs with each mortgage payment
but most of the infrastructure costs are recovered through
connection fees, user charges and betterment taxation.
On the positive side, sites-and-services projects benefit both
society and individual families. Although they are hard to
measure, the social benefits that planners hope for are: 1)
increased environmental quality, 2) increased private investment,
3) increased employment opportunities, 4) increased coordination
among social service agencies, 5) decreased illegal housing
starts and 6) decreased dependence on the government to provide
housing.
The anticipated benefits to individual families should be: 1)
lower cost housing and 2) increased employment opportunities
brought about by locational advantages or public works and
construction in the project. The benefits flowing to project
households are measured in terms of: 1) imputed rental value, 2)
increased employment opportunities and earning ability brought
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about by the project and 3) in some cases, savings in
transportation costs to and from places of employment because of
locational advantages. Since projects lead to a net expansion of
the housing stock for low-income households there will be minor
benefits from an incremental consumer surplus resulting in slower
rates of rent increase in the low-income housing market.
OWNER COSTS AND BENEFITS
Owners also perceive projects as having costs and benefits.
Their costs tend to be relocation expenses, mortgage payments,
utility connection and service charges, dwelling construction and
land taxes. The benefits tend to be lower cost land, low
interest loans, guaranteed tenure, utilities, public services,
technical assistance and sometimes improved employment
opportunities due to public works and construction. Credit is
particularly important because low income families do not have
significant savings or qualify for standard bank loans.
Mortgages in sites-and-services projects have lower interest and
longer terms than prevailing bank rates. Most do not require
down payments and generally include life and fire insurance.
Owners also derive additional benefits when projects offer
subsidized construction materials, construction training, zoning
variances and property tax deferments.
The eventual home investment that governments expect families to
make depends on selecting incentives which maximize the project
benefits and minimize costs for both the government and owners
alike. But government investments in sites-and-services projects
can only partially influence what families build. Families are
also influenced by the overall market conditions for comparable
housing (legal or otherwise), the prevailing costs for
construction labor, materials and equipment, their own shelter
needs and resources, and their expenditures for other
necessities. Only some of these conditions can be affected by
government capital programs in projects. The object of project
planning is to anticipate the conditions that lead families to
build and to create incentives that meet as many of these
conditions as possible.
PROJEC T EXPERIMENTS
In 1972 the World Bank formally adopted sites-and-services as its
official loan and technical assistance stance for new low-income
housing and squatter upgrading. In 1974, the United States
Agency for International Development (AID) began to incorporate
sites-and-services programs into its mortgage guaranty program
for developing countries. Since 1972, the Bank has assisted in
about 149,000 new home sites and upgraded 742,000 squatter plots
in 17 countries with loans exceeding $1,029 million dollars.
Although AID does not compile country-by-country statistics for
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sites-and-services alone -- the mortgage guaranty program does
not use Congressionally appropriated funds -- it is estimated
that 30% of all AID guaranties since 1974 have gone to this
approach. Typical projects by both the Bank and AID have been
from 5,000 to 7,000 plots with several exceeding 10,000. To
date, a total of 26 countries have experimented with
sites-and-services; most consider these projects to be prototypes
to more permanent national programs. Although the Bank has
become the main patron of sites-and-services, the combined
Bank-AID emphasis has made it the most important low-income
housing policy for developing countries in the past 10 years.
In Colomb'ia, sites-and-services policies evolved from earlier
attempts to lower housing costs through industrialization and
aided self-help techniques. By 1970 the national Territorial
Credit Institute (ICT) and Bogota's Popular Housing Bank (Caja)
recognized that very low-income families in squatter settlements
were already building more housing at a lower cost than their
industrialized or aided self-help projects were achieving. Both
insititutions shifted their investment programs away from total
design and build projects to upgrading and sites and services.
An AID urban sector loan in 1971 and an International Development
Bank loan for project assistance in 1973 provided the resources
for early experiments.
The Caja and ICT together implemented a successful upgrade
project in Las Colinas, a large invasion settlement. From this
experiment, new urban legislation was passed to enable the city
to negotiate capital programs in illegal settlements on a wider
scale and use substantially lower utility standards. Agreement
20 and two subsequent laws formalized upgrading and
sites-and-services as policies at Bogota's District Planning
board. The Caja was authorized to implement a pilot project, La
Manuelita, to pre-test the legislation and the feasibility of
allowing private developers to build sites-and-services. The
project was very successful and resulted in a private development
program and a new and larger Caja project called Las Guacamayas.
This project was to house families displaced by a District
Planning highway and other public works proposed through
Agreement 20 legislation. The highway project was subsequently
defeated but the Caja was authorized to continue to make plots
available with all four levels of capital improvements. Unlike
the Las Colinas and La Manuelita projects this one was the first
real test to sell plots on the open market and compete directly
with illegal pirate and invasion settlements. In effect it was
the first test of the marketability of institutionalizing the
self-help model from the upgrading experience. The demand for
solutions in Las Guacamayas was overwhelming, but it was opposite
to what the Caja had built. Vacant plots could not be sold and
applications for lots with habitable core units were more than
fifteen to one. The Caja responded to the skewed demand by
shifting capital programs in the second sector of the project
back to total design and build approaches. District Planning was
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also experiencing a rapid decline in applications for privately
developed sites-and-services. There was less low-cost sewered
land available than had been forcasted, capital costs were still
high even at the lower Agreement 20 levels and pirate barrios
were offering larger lots for less.
NEW APPROACHES TO REDUCING RISK
The unanticipated demand for Las Guacamayas and the rapid decline
of private sector applications to develop sites-and-services cast
doubts on the validity of the self-help model. Administrators in
Las Guacamayas were also reporting that owners were tearing down
or extensively modifing high-cost core units and that
construction technical assistance was going unused. In some
cases, families were not making any capital improvements either
because they did not believe the city would reciprocate by
delivering promised utilities, didn't have enough capital to
begin building or because they were simply speculating on rising
land values. Public pressure is stopping future projects because
former ones resemble the squatter settlements that government
spending is supposed to eliminate.
These mixed results have raised questions about how the
low-income housing system works and how public investment can
stimulate families to build. When these agencies moved from
total design and build policies -- where they essentially
delivered housing as a complete package -- to sites-and-services
-- where there was an implicit prediction about what families
would do -- substantial risk was introduced because the
open-ended projects now control fewer variables and rely on
incentives to stimulate owners to build for themselves.
Despite the failures of recent projects, authorities believed
that the basic self-help model behind sites-and-services was
still valid and that future projects could still achieve their
objectives if the costs to project beneficiaries could be lowered
still further. Project planners proposed to reduce the two
highest cost items that owners paid for -- land and on-plot core
units. Planners expected that smaller plots without core units
would be significantly cheaper to build and to administer thus
projects would accomodate more families, reach lower income
groups and compete more favorably with pirate barrios.
INVESTMENT PATTERNS IN PROJECTS
One slum upgrading and two sites-and-services projects were
surveyed to see why recent projects were failing to meet policy
objectives, to uncover the conditions that stimulated families to
build in the past and to hypothesize the effects of the planned
cutbacks in future sites-and-services projects. The analysis of
home owner interviews indicates that the unexpected outcomes of
xvi
recent projects resulted from having based investment decisions
on an inaccurate model of the housing process. These
inaccuracies led agencies to overestimate the benefits families
derived from certain programs and the impact of projects on
illegal pirate barrios. They also led agencies to underestimate
the effects of subdivision layout on infrastructure costs and
dwelling use, the ability of owners to pay for housing and the
cost of building a dwelling with self-help techniques. The
following housing processes were observed in projects and stand
in contrast to what the agencies had expected.
1. SHELTER FOR INCOME EARNINGS
The analysis of dwelling usage in one upgrade project and two
sites-and-services projects show that home investments for the
purpose of earning income through the dwelling are at least as
important as investments made for sheltering the owner himself.
The upgrade case and one sites-and-services case show that
between 20% and 30% of the owners have deliberately planned the
construction of their homes to permit renting of rooms,
apartments, store fronts and operating of small warehouses or
manufacturing concerns. It is hypothesized that the failure of
authorities to sell all the plots in the latest
sites-and-services project is due in part to excessively small
lot sizes and zoning restrictions for multi-family dwellings that
reduce income earnings potential.
Renting rooms and apartments is the most common form of income
earnings for owners. The additional rental units are housing up
to 30% more families in projects. Although owners often rent
their shacks the main decision to design a dwelling for these
uses occurs at the point that families begin to build in
permanent materials. At this point foundations, bearing walls,
separate entrances, stairwells and individual utilities and
services must be anticipated. It is difficult to discriminate
families who have not yet built but who are accumulating the
additional capital to build for income earnings from families who
are speculating on vacant land or who are unable to afford any
improvements. Only when construction begins can they be
separated.
Building for income earnings generally delays construction while
owners stockpile the additional materials and accumulate more
capital. Once construction starts, owners tend to rent out units
as soon as they have minimal space for themselves. Although they
change frequently, there will always be at least one family or
individual renting from the time the owner begins the service.
Second and third renters appear much later in the life cycle of
the owner's family and tend to occupy space left by departing
children. Renters are definitely younger and have smaller
families than owners and they generally become owners themselves
before the age of 35. Aside from their age and family size,
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renters are not as significantly different from owners as
commonly believed. Migration, employment and income
distributions are almost identical. For the cases surveyed at
least, projects cannot claim to be indirectly reaching lower
income groups through renting. In fact, it is likely that
renters are better off because they have the same incomes as
owners at an earlier point in their lives. It can be expected
that their permanent life time incomes will be corespondingly
higher too.
Rents charged, housing sales prices and construction planning
demonstrate that owners by and large make rational investment
decisions. No family interviewed was aware that rents were
related to land values or to housing sales prices yet there was
widespread and consistent knowledge of what market prices should
be. The present value of the stream of future rents generated
from a dwelling closely approximates the value of the dwelling.
When owners build rental property, their willingness to postpone
current consumption to make the necessary investments in their
dwelling can be described as an interest rate or time preference
that they expect that investment to yield. Interviews show that
low-income families have very high time preferences, between 15%
and 21%, and that it is inversely proportional to income.
Although self-help construction has produced dwellings with four
and five stories of rentable units, owners will build only to the
extent that marginal revenues from rents (at their time
preference) exceed the marginal costs for adding additional units
The high time preference that families exhibit makes rental
property owners very vulnerable to any policy that affects that
stream of income. Rent freezes or roll backs, changes in
multi-family zoning or limits on "tenant at will" leases will
tend to disproportionately affect lower income groups and lead to
overcrowding of existing dwellings, decreased maintenance, and
the suspension of new apartment construction.
The failure of renting to reach lower income groups is
disappointing but the surprisingly high housing multiplier shows
that projects are more successful than project administrators
have believed. The scope of renting and income earnings through
the dwelling has been overlooked because project records only
monitor mortgage holders -- the original beneficiary -- and not
dwelling occupants as census data bases do.
2. SELF-HELP CONSTRUCTION
All projects surveyed showed a consistent building pattern.
Although owners generally build provisional shacks themselves,
they do not do the major portions of their permanent dwellings
themselves. Only the very lowest income families show
exceptions. Owners build their own provisional shacks because
the materials are relatively cheap when compared to labor costs.
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Light weight materials like bamboo, wood and cardboard are easily
assembled with common hand tools. Structures tend to be simple
post and beam systems and do not need foundations. Poor
construction rarely results in a total collapse. Once
construction begins in permanent materials, the process reverses.
Owners consider income earnings potential and stockpile material.
When enough material is on hand, they contract the next
structural piece like masonry walls, columns, tie beams or a
slab. They then complete the interior painting, partitioning and
carpentry themselves. Labor is a much smaller portion of
construction costs when permanent materials are used. Materials
are not generally reclaimable if construction must be redone and
collapse of a brick and concrete slab building is usually fatal.
Unless the owner already has construction experience, he will
contract the structural pieces as a form of insurance against
doing a poor job himself. Although self-help construction
implies that owners build their homes themselves, it is more
accurate to say they are managing its building.
It is argued that when owners contract it is because they have a
high opportunity cost for doing it themselves. Owners will
continue working at their jobs and hire someone to work simply
because it is cheaper to do so than forego wages by doing it
themselves. This reasoning falsely attributes contracting to
wage trade-offs. Owners do not use written contracts,
specifications or house plans and therefore must be present at
the job site during construction anyway to insure that the
contractor does not steal materials, delay the work or build
something he does not want. Interviews suggest that the
propensity to contract is related to the kind of income stream
that owners have. Owners with salaried incomes show higher
tendencies to hire contractors and build quickly than owners
whose income is on an hourly or piece work basis. Salaried
owners can reduce their work without seriously affecting their
income but hourly workers decrease their incomes directly.
The observed construction processes have several consequences for
project design and monitoring. The level of construction skills
is not a reliable measure of families' potential to benefit from
self-help type housing. Technical assistance should not expect
to stimulate building by improving the construction skills of
project beneficiaries, instead programs that increase competition
among contractors, assist owners in purchasing and transporting
materials and protect disadvantaged families headed by elderly,
sick or women appear to be more appropriate. More reliable
measures of self-help participation seem to be managerial skills
and wage type (salaried or hourly).
3. ABILITY TO PAY FOR HOUSING
Housing expenditure patterns in three projects suggest that the
eventual housing cost is not as important as the form of payment
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and that family income is not a dependable indication of
beneficiaries' ability to pay for housing. Financial terms for
mortgages generally estimate that families can pay between 25% to
35% of their income for mortgage payments. There is a tendency
not to require substantial down payments for the lowest income
groups because they have no savings or worker benefits and may be
admitted to projects as compensation for property losses due to
eviction by public works projects or upgrading in sluma. I.,sing
investment in projects tend to increase with income but at a
decreasing rate. The cases show three significant exceptions:
1) low-income families that invest nothing, 2) those who invest
more than could possibly be accounted for using income and
savings estimates or 3) relatively high income families who
invest much less than expected. Low-income families that do not
invest tend to be speculating or paying double rent. Families
that invest more than expected tend to accumulate capital from
extended family. Owners say that some of these kinds of families
are fronts for speculators who use the family to develop the
property in exchange for the housing they produce and income
support. Non-investing low income families are the most
worrisome. Double rent occurs when families are already paying
their maximum expenditure just to meet mortgage payments. They
cannot get enough capital surplus to begin construction and thus
they continue living elsewhere paying rent along with their
payments.
Inflation is exacerbating double rent. Large sites-and-services
projects suddenly increase the demand for provisional materials.
Accelerated construction in other sectors increases the demand
for and the cost of bamboo, asphalt paper, wood and plastic. At
one time, these materials were the mainstays of shacks; presently
they are being used for scaffolding, and formwork in multi-floor
office and apartment buildings. Owners claim that a
non-permanent shack that can withstand Bogota's cold and rainy
climate costs only about 20% less than building a single
multi-purpose room directly in brick. When families cannot
obtain a plot with a habitable core unit, they tend to bypass
building a shack and will pay double rent while accumulating the
additional capital to build directly in brick.
The double rent phenomenon complicates project administration
because corrective policies tend to be mutually exclusive, that
is, requiring families to build forces owners to invest who might
otherwise speculate on the land but the same policy eliminates
desirable families with legitimate double rent problems.
Policies that subsidize household expen4itures to alleviate the
double rent problem will also increase speculator profits
accordingly.
No systematic review of mortgage arrears was done but social
workers report that families that use their homes for income
earnings have better repayment records. Owners report that they
do not depend exclusively on their homes for income; presumably
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the better repayment is due to some stabilizing effect that
diversified income sources have. With the exception of the
highest income groups, income shows no systematic relationship
with dwelling use. A more accurate indication of families'
ability to pay, therefore, appears to be differences in wage type
(salaried or hourly) and tendencies to use the home for income
earnings. It is likely that lower income families with income
earnings potential can be admitted to projects without seriously
increasing the risk of mortgage arrears.
4. SUBDIVISION DESIGN
The dramatic surge to build minimum standards housing
developments which began in 1971 with new physical design
legislation has largely subsided. Despite the lower capital
requirements to initiate projects, pirate settlements appear to
be increasing their share of low-income housing starts. The
failure of this legislation to make more of an impact was due in
part to overestimations in the amount of low-cost vacant land
that is within the sewered perimeter of the city, unrealistically
high forecasts for public utility extensions and an
underestimation of the costs of developing projects even to
minimum standards. Although initial environmental quality is
low, lot sizes in pirate barrios just beyond the city limits are
almost twice the size of lots in authorized projects and are
selling for less.
The most recent sites-and-services project in Bogota encountered
difficulty in selling its vacant lot solutions despite a city
deficit estimated in 1971 to be near 135,000 units. The demand
for solutions that had at least a one room core unit were more
than fifteen applications for every unit built at that time.
Double rent and income earnings through the dwelling polarize
demand. Homebuilders choose between smaller government plots
with a habitable core unit that eliminates the need to pay double
rent or large illegal plots in pirate barrios that offer income
earnings potential.
Little attempt has been made to lower project costs and increase
revenue producing land uses by increasing the efficiency of
infrastructure layouts and land parcelling. Agreement 20 and
subsequent legislation have only lowered initial requirements.
Pressure to improve legislation by including criteria for overall
design and layout is decreasing as fewer projects are possible in
the remaining sewered land and agencies react to recent project
failures by shifting back to total design and build approaches.
CONCLUSIONS
The observed housing process describe a set of market conditions
and owner responses that are significantly different from what
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agencies had expected. The cases show that the demand and
investments that owners make is far more rational and predictable
than planners had believed. The unexpected results of past
projects show that the implicit self-help model that agencies
were using was inappropriate and, perhaps more important, that
their experience with three projects and new legislation did not
accumulate over time to form a better model.
The case studies show that the inter-relationships between lot
sizes, income earnings, rental units, ability to pay, subdivision
layout and technical assistance are far more complex than
believed. The cases also show that the policy changes they are
proposing are unlikely to reduce overall costs per household,
make wider use oT the policy, reduce loan risks to beneficiaries
or reach lower income groups by simply reducing initial
utilities, decreasing plot sizes and eliminating on-plot core
units. These policies will not make future projects more
effective because they tend to reduce families' income and
increase their housing expenditures. Instead, the observed
housing process suggests an alternative set of capital programs
that can still achieve the objectives of sites-and-services if
different capital programs are used.
The continued increase in pirate barrios and the high demand for
plots with habitable core units suggests that new projects can
better obtain their objectives if plot offerings are polarized,
assignment-income practices are reversed and project scale is
reduced. Projects should offer only two kinds of solutions: 1)
small plots with habitable core units and 2) large vacant lots
with high potential for income earnings. Double rent,
speculation and the propensity of owners with salaried incomes to
contract indicates that the small lots with cores should be
targeted to the lower income families while the large vacant lots
be targeted to the higher income families. This policy is the
opposite of current practices that assign higher solution levels
to higher income groups.
Rent levels in invasion and pirate barrios indicate that small
plots with cores are affordable by low income groups that
normally fail to build because of double rent. The cases show
that this group is not likely to overcome double rent or make
high investments in permanent construction until later in their
lifecycle when their incomes are more stable and higher. This
group can be expected to pay near the maximum affordable amount
because their mortgage payment more closely approximates their
total housing expenditures. Large vacant lots with sites that
favor income earnings through the dwelling should be targeted to
the higher income groups with salaried incomes and construction
management skills. The profile of this investor is similar to
the entrepreneur found in Las Colinas that built rapidly once
tenure was guaranteed. This group is likely to be able to
overcome the short term double rent problem that starting off
with a vacant lot implies and still make the higher initial
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investments required when building for income earnings. By
polarizing plot sizes, increases in land values that result from
public investments will affect the large plot holders more than
the smaller ones. Owners will capitalize on this increase by
tending to build quickly, construct in permanent materials and
invest in rentable units. Requiring families to build will avoid
land speculation without the undesirable side effects of
eliminating low income families with double rent problems because
this latter group is now allocated to habitable core units.
Building small lots with core units for lower income families and
targeting large vacant lots to higher income families is the
opposite of what agencies are now proposing. Agencies argue that
costs per household are best reduced by eliminating the highest
cost items -- land and on-plot construction. This policy was
used to some degree in Las Guacamayas and it resulted in
decreased income earnings through the dwelling and double rent
expenditures for the lowest income groups. This policy might be
appropriate under different market conditions but, in Bogota,
there is an active private market for illegal building sites and
the difference between building a provisional shack and a
permanent habitable core is not much. If these conditions did
not exist, the proposed change might lead to more effective
projects.
Technical assistance in new projects must focus on increasing
access to low-cost materials and increase utility service levels
to vacant lots. Programs that obtain lower cost materials by
purchasing them in large quantities and services that transport
materials to building sites are appropriate. The increased
emphasis on income earnings implies higher demands for service
connections and street paving. Technical assistance should
increase competition among contractors, encourage building
cooperatives and help small construction related businesses such
as materials depots.
The new policy approach requires two different kinds of lots.
Cluster subdivision layouts offer a hierarchy of plot locations
suitable for integrating small lots with larger ones. This
cannot be achieved with the current gridiron designs. The exact
mix of small and large lots is determined by the level of cross
subsidy required to finance the additional on-plot construction
that is not covered by their mortgage financing. Cluster designs
tend to maximize revenue producing land. They are inherently more
efficient than traditional designs and offer more flexibility in
lowering development costs by allowing network extensions to more
closely approximate the capital recovery rate. Minimum standards
are already low and it is unlikely that project costs can be
lowered any more by affecting initial utility levels. The
appendices to Agreement 20 legislation should include criteria
that reduces infrastructure costs because more efficient designs
are being used.
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The decline of Agreement 20 projects and the inflationary effect
that -large projects have had on construction costs suggest that
smaller projects like La Manuelita are more appropriate.
Relaxing legislation that requires sites to be within the sewered
perimeter will increase the number of elgible sites, lower the
amount spent for land and increase the chances of finding sites
near employment sources
FUTURE RESEARCH
The current sites-and-services policy in Bogota evolved from
upgrading Las Colinas but the mixed results of subsequent
projects indicate that the experience has not been cumulative.
This research drew on only a small fraction of the same data that
was available to project administrators yet the conclusions are
significantly different from what these agencies are now
postulating. The unexpected results in Las Guacamayas and
Agreement 20 projects not only question agencies' view of the
self-help process, it also questions their real ability to learn
from their own projects and to apply what is learned to the next
one.
The policy changes recommended above require systematic
information on market conditions which are likely to be changing
during implementation. But if housing agencies have not learned
from the information they already have, adding more information,
per se, will hardly reduce the risk in new projects.
Insufficient information is not the problem; it is the processing
capacity of administrators to attend to what's collected and
effectively use it in evolving investment strategies. Conserving
attention requires: 1) that the model of the housing process
explicitely show where public investments affect the
benefit/costs for the agency and families, 2) that the model be
structured enough that it can be tested, and 3) that investment
decisions with deadlines attached, or whose initial consequences
are high because they are costly or who limit future choice be
attended first.
The three most important decisions in new projects will be
subdivision design, selecting beneficiaries and readjusting
technical assistance once projects begin. Decisions about
subdivision layout, lot mixes, core construction and
infrastructure must be made early on. They are the most
expensive components in projects and determine the costs that
beneficiaries pay, the kind of demand that can be met, the level
of cross subsidy that is required and the subsequent investments
that families can be expected to make. The information problem
is two fold -- to determine the market characteristics for
housing outside the project and to produce design configurations
given various objective functions and cost trade-offs. The
observed housing process is a heuristic for eliminating
alternatives. Many design decisions are structured in that there
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are clear criteria for measuring efficiency, cost and service
quality. Information tends to come from sources within the
housing agency itself, have a well defined scope and benefit from
computational techniques. Systems can usually demonstrate
immediate improvements in cost/benefit because of their ability
to produce timely, accurate and detailed information.
Applicants for new projects will likely exceed what agencies can
provide. The information problem of selecting beneficiaries is
first to determine which families are admissible and then to
determine which type of families are appropriate for the two
kinds of lots. The objective is to maximize the number of
low-income families that can be accommodated by the project. The
assignments can not exceed the project budget, exceed certain
levels of mortgage risk or allocate more lots than were built.
Setting income targets, admitting families as compensation for
housing losses elsewhere, judging ability to pay and subsidizing
housing for groups in need but unable to pay are policy decisions
only partially influenced by rationalizing information. Here, an
information system acts primarily to forecast risk and measure
the liability for choosing a particular mix of beneficiaries.
Predicting the future is the main source of uncertainty.
Information tends to originate outside the agency, depend on the
applicant and be in forms and quantities beyond its control.
Selectively obtaining it, testing its validity and converting it
to useful formats are the main systems design problems.
Information tends to be historical in content and have a very
broad scope. High accuracy is rarely achievable.
The new policies deliberately use technical assistance to
encourage contracting and income earnings through the dwelling.
The information problem here is basically one of tracking or
monitoring project advance. System design problems tend to be
data structures, indexing and summarization. Sources draw from
internal project records, service inputs from other agencies and
samples of beneficiary progress. Sustaining inferences which
span more than one data source, establishing meaningful units of
measure for construction and investment and detecting market
changes are important. The new approach to technical assistance
generally will not require instantenous reaction times and
accuracy is not as stringent a requirement as subdivision layout.
Assistance programs can benefit in much the same way that the
case studies did from information that is highly aggregate,
historical in nature and routinely collected for other uses.
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CHAPTER 1
SQUATTING AND THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING PROBLEM
2
INTRODUCTION
A great deal of what is known about squatter settlements results
from deliberate institutional attempts to formulate housing
policies for them. The earliest views of the slum were
diagnostic-perscriptive; the slum was a cancer in the city whose
growth and presence must be stopped and eliminated. Early
housing policies attempted to eliminate the slum altogether.
Most of these attempts have failed because slums were more
integrated into the urban economic, policital and social system
than had been thought. After trying to build complete houses for
the poor, officials recognized that the poor were a labor force
that could further reduce costs by impelementing government
projects. This required close supervision and good plans for
people to follow as well as collaboration from settlers if
projects were to succeed. Most of these conditions could not be
sustained on a large scale unfortunately. More recently,
officials have observed that many slums are progressively
evolving into high standard housing with a minimum of
institutional intervention when settlers have certain tenure,
employment and service delivery conditions. Based on these
observations, officials attemped to lower housing costs still
further by turning over all housing design and construction
responsibility to the dweller.
This newest policy called sites-and-services, is very similar to
the self-help model of the progressive slum. The main focus of
planning is now on legalizing land ownership, developing public
services, and providing building credit. According to the
policy, governments make capital investments that basically
stimulate private sector investments in housing. There is an
implicit prediction about what beneficiaries will build based
upon what was observed in the progressive slum. After numerous
projects in dozens of countries, the observed results, however,
have differed frequently enough from what was expected that the
assumed relationship between public and private investment is now
in doubt. This chapter briefly reviews the low-income housing
situation in Colombia and the evolution of the policies that have
led to sites-and-services. What is interesting about this
evolution is the fact that policies are more and more like the
development processes found in the squatter settlements that the
former policies tried to eliminate.
SQUATTING
In 1950, 40% of Latin America's 161 million inhabitants lived in
cities, while the remaining 60% were farmers thinly dispersed in
rural areas. Within the next ten years, these percentages would
begin to reverse. By 1960, 48% of the population lived in
cities; 52% in the country. This reflected an urban growth rate
of 64%. In 1975, the continent's total population exceeded 290
million with 57% in urban centers of more than 2,000 people. (1)
Before 1930, Buenos Aires was the only city of one million. By
1950, Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Havana, Lima and
Santiago had joined the list. Ten years later, Recifie, Bogota,
Caracas and Montevideo had also reached a million. In 197Q16
cities had reached a population of one million or more, an' by
1980, at least ten more will do the same. The International
Labor Organization has predicted that Mexico City will be the
world's largest city with 32 million persons by year 2000; and
that Sao Paulo, Brazil will have 26 million while Bogota,
Colombia will triple in size to over nine million people by that
time. (2)
Until the natural growth rate of cities took over, migration was
the single most important cause of the growth of Latin American
cities. Migration studies repeatedly show that the most
important reason for migration to cities is economic improvement.
In most Central and South American countries, there is a large
rural-urban wage differential. Even when there is high urban
unemployment and modern sector jobs are not likely to be created
fast enough to accommodate migrants, migrants will still come to
the city because they know that they will eventually be better
off than their rural kin.
Migration studies in Colombia by Joan Nelson and William Flinn
show that communication with friends or kin already living in the
city is the most common way migrants learn of potential
destinations and that migrants often rely upon friends for help
until they get established. (3) (4) Flinn's study also shows
that migrants to Bogota's slums are as likely to be from a city
or from towns over 2,000 population as from rural areas and that
migrants come relatively short distances (less than 200 miles)
from neighboring departments. He states that migrants are not
all campesinos but that many are young males who have made
(1) Summary calculations made from Table A in Kingsley Davis,
World Urbanization 1950-1970 Volume I: Basic Data for Cities,
Counties and Regions (Berkeley: UniversiTy of~CalfZi-nTa~ 1969),
pp. 64-69
(2) "ILO: Mexico City to be World's Largest," Boston Sunday
Globe, 29 October 1969, Sec. A, p. 77
(3) Joan Nelson. "Sojoirners versus New Urbanites: Causes and
Consequences of Temporary versus Permanent Cityward Migration in
Developing Countries." Economic Development and Cultural Change
24(July): 721-757
(4) William Flinn. ."The Process of Migration to a Shantytown in
Bogota, Colombia." Inter-American Economic Affairs, 22(Autumn,
1968): 78-88
several smaller moves before. (1) Thus migration is not simply a
peasant escape from agriculture and violence in the countryside
as was previously thought but it is a rational and purposeful
search for better economic conditions.
Migrants have characteristics that are important to the urban
housing problem. When migrant income is compared to locational
patterns, the less affluent settle immediately in center city
rooming-houses. These apartments or inquilinatos used to be
older town mansions until they were subdivided, resubdivided and
rented at exorbitant profits to accommodate four to ten times
their original number of occupants. Inquilinatos were effective
reception areas because they provided access to center city
service sector employment without long term commitments to
leases. Both are a necessary prerequisite for housing when
finding work requires mobility. Today inquilinatos are less
effective because the buildings are now being replaced by more
expensive office and commercial space and their access to center
city jobs is less important as cities decentralize service sector
jobs.
More affluent migrants and those unable to find cheap rooms in
inquilinatos move to squatter settlements where they pay rent.
Migrants will rent until they have found stable jobs and begin to
raise families. At this point they are well acculturated to
urban living, integrated into at least the informal economic
sector, and begin looking for a house they can afford or land
where they can build. Public and commercial sector housing has
been almost non-existent for low-income families. Government
housing agencies, hard hit by inflation, high administrative
costs, and rising urban land prices have not met more than about
2 to 3 percent of the low-income housing demand in Colombia.
Private contractor housing has been even less accessible because
units cost almost 30 times above rental thresholds. Faced with
these realities, many urban poor resort to illegal means of
finding housing for their families: they become squatters
themselves.
Squatting is a logical consequence of the explosive population
growth within a city and has a profound effect on the city's
physical, economic and social development. According to a
conservative estimate, it provides shelter for more than 30
million people in Latin America alone. It accounts for about one
fourth of all housing in Latin America, and in certain cities,
three quarters of all human dwellings fall into this category.
Squatting is as much a problem as it is a solution. It has
contributed to urban sprawl and it has pre-empted government
planning. But it has also achieved housing for the very poor; it
has channeled individual and community energies into productive
(1) Ibid., p. 81
self-help.
Squatters evoke images of desperately poor people living in
shacks on steep slopes overlooking the city or along the highways
in its peripheries; images of violence, crime, broken homes and
political radicalism. The truth, of course, is different.
Generally conservative, squatters form tightly knit family groups
looking for ways to become home owners.
Almost every country in Latin America has its own term for
squatter settlements. The most common are tugurio, barriada (not
to be confused with barrio which means neighborhood), favela,
barrio pirata (pirate neighborhood), paracaidista (literally
meaning parachutist or one who drops in from the sky), invasion,
and casas brujas (witch houses). These Spanish words,
descriptive as they are do not recognize that many squatter
settlements improve, community organization and immense self-help
takes place, and that the slum is often a transitory phenomenon
in a continuum of upward mobility. These words do, however
identify several important characteristics of squatting:
illegality of tenure, disregard for governmental processes
through individual action, and a committment to build a dwelling
without proper services or without regard for environmental
standards.
In a pioneering study of the world's housing problems, Charles
Abrams has categorized squatters according to the form of tenure
they hold. The most common are: owner, tenant, landlord,
speculator, semi, and invader squatter. The owner-squatter owns
his shack but not the land; he erects the shack on any vacant
plot he can find - public lands and those of absentee owners
being the most prized. The tenant-squatter pays rent to another
squatter. His goal is to advance to squatter ownership. A
landlord-squatter is usually more established and has rooms to
rent or shacks to rent. Speculator-squatters consider squatting
a buisness venture for the tribute they expect the government or
the rightful owner or even a new "owner" to pay them to move off
the property. The semi-squatter has clandestinely built his
shack on private land and subsequently comes to terms with the
owner but continues to ignore the local building regulations. An
invader-squatter is part of a group which after the invasion will
join the rest in protecting the property against intruders --
both private and public. (1) In Colombia, these tenure classes
are broadly aggregated into two general squatter settlements or
tugurios: invasion barrios and pirate barrios.
T1) Reworded and edited from Charles Abrams, Man's Strugle for
Shelter in an Urbanizing World (Cambridge, MIT Press, 19647, pp.
21-22
INVASION BARRIOS
Invasion barrios are the most dramatic of the squatter
settlements. They are outright seizures of land by an individual
acting independently or by a large number of people acting
through an invasion promoter. Some invasions are rooted in
political demonstration such as the invasions of Centro
Pro-Vivienda in Colombia, while others are purely buisness
ventures. Other invasions are prompted by the land owner himself
to sell plots on land not likely to be approved for such use,
capture a low wage labor pool, and even collect additional
tribute from the government for damages suffered. In Cali,
Colombia, it is believed that a large invasion, later called El
Rodeo, was arranged by the owners of the flood plain where the
invasion took place. Knowing that the city would not approve any
plan for residential subdivision - the cost of utilities would be
too high - the owners arranged for an invasion organizer to steal
the plans from the Municipal Planning Office and to sell plots
for them to prospective invaders. After the invasion, the owners
petitioned INVICALI, a low-income housing agency, to indemnify
them for their losses. Through INVICALI, each family was
required to pay the owners in order to get official title. The
owners had now collected twice for the same parcel of land --
once through their invasion promoter and again through INVICALI.
The double payment scheme brought the price well above the market
value for the land because the city did most of the collection
and legal work for them.
The best documented invasions are in Peru. Case reports often
use paramilitary metaphors to describe how squatters organize in
anticipation of official and private reaction. Target sites are
reconnoitered, lots often staked out beforehand, and invasions
timed to occur when the land owner or the police are least able
to counter. Often several "ripple attacks" are required to
overcome police seiges or to rebuild torn down beachheads. (1)
Police may cordon off the site permitting people only to leave;
and since persons attempting to enter the site would be arrested,
invading families often bring sufficient supplies to survive a
seige of several weeks. Invaders often recruit old people, women
and children to help out because police will not generally attack
them.
In Colombia, invasions follow one of several general strategies.
If a few families are invading, they try to attract as little
attention as possible. They attempt to negotiate directly with
the land owner for some kind of agreement to sell the land or at
least to give them permission to remain in exchange for some kind
of service such as work or guarding the land against other
T1) Barrio El Rodeo in Cali, Colombia was totally burned to the
ground 11 times but the invaders persisted until the barrio was
won over in 1968.
squatters.
An alternative strategy uses techniques similar to the Peruvian
cases and tries to popularize the desperate housing situation and
the lack of governmental concern for the people. City officials
are usually forced into a compromise between the invaders and the
land owner requiring the former to make at least token
remuneration for the land and to agree to some form of community
organization and control for carrying out public works projects,
administering technical assistance and loan programs as well as
maintaining environmental and health standards. When hundreds
and sometimes thousands of people invade, their sheer numbers,
along with the support of sympathetic press, militant university
students, and sometimes opposition groups, assure success in
getting land.
According to Colombian law, invasions come under a set of codes
that relate to "complication of the process of eviction with the
passage of time". (1) From the beginning, invasions on either
public or private land are under the jurisdiction of- "Public
Order" and the municipal police. They continue to be soley a
public order problem for the first thirty days. If the police do
not manage to evict whithin this period, invaders cannot be
evicted by force without individual subpoenas from a civil judge.
Since the legal entanglement requires time, invaders usually
stay, because the new invaders attracted to successful invasions
often double or triple the original invasion size. Ironically,
not only do the new invaders decrease the danger of eviction,
they also complicate future attempts to upgrade the settlement's
services and legalize tenure, because they were not part of the
original invasion plan.
Colombia's Civil Code protects squatter's rights with the
"passage of time". Articles 2528 and 764 of the Civil Code state
that living on the land for twenty years is sufficient to qualify
for title. Families often save very detailed receipts from
utilities and construction materials to accumulate proof that
their time has been served.
Most of the significant invasion settlements in Colombia were
started in the late 50's and early 60's. The growth rates in
cities of 200,000 or more were at their highest. (2) Many
vacant, small sites were still available adjacent to center city
service employment. The land -- swamps, tidal basins, or steep
slopes - was not considered buildable, but it was close to
(1 ) Ramiro Cardona Las Invasiones de Terrenos Urbanos (Bogota:
Tercer Mundo, 1969), p.75
(2) Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (DANE), 8
Censo Nacional de Poblacion: Resumen General (Bogota, Imprenta
Nacional, 1967) -___ ___
developed areas with schools and transportation as well as
possibilities to pirate water and electricity. Spectacular
invasions such as Siloe and El Rodeo in Cali; Barrios Juan XXIII,
Las Colinas and Policarpa Salavarrieta in Bogota; Barrios
Candelaria, Boston, Fredonia, Olaya Herrera, La Magdalena and the
infamous Chambacu in Cartagena; and Barrios El Bosque, Carriza,
Primero de Mayo, and Santo Domingo in Barranquilla attracted
researchers to find out more about invasions and the self-help
process.
The primary function of the invasion is to secure land for
housing. Land speculation is a secondary motive. John Turner
argues that settlers' inability to qualify for loans, find
government housing, or substitute non-monetary resources are the
main reasons that people resort to invasions. (1) Even when
families can afford it, they are reluctant to buy a long-term
mortgaged house, because the title will not be secure for years.
Though invasion squatters do not possess legal title to the land,
they are unlikely to be challenged unless the land is very
valuable. This is one reason why well-organized invasions often
select public property and marginal land when development costs
in the normal land market would be prohibitive. (2)
Case studies of invasion barrios have shown that the proportion
of those rural migrants who invade has decreased over the past 15
years while the sons and daughters of first generation urbanites
are becoming the larger proportion of ihvaders. Turner
attributes shifts in historic squatter settlement patterns to the
changing growth rates in the economy and the population of
cities. (3) In "early transitional cities" with low growth
rates, settlements are often in the center city and inhabited
largely by rural migrants. They tend to serve as reception areas
for "bridgeheading" settlers when they are looking for jobs and
getting acculturated to urban life. As cities grow, the
proportion of the low-income migrants from smaller towns and
T1) John F.C. Turner. "Uncontroled Urban Settlements: Problems
and Policies" University of Pittsburgh Conference, Pittsburgh
Pa., 1966
(2) The Colombian invasion group Centro Pro-Vivienda has changed
its tactics over the last five years. They no longer pick sites
near the mountains surrounding Bogota. Their full time lawyers
have found that the Sabana de Bogota has many abandoned or tax
delinquent sites that are easier to build upon and not likely to
be challenged by the police. Their last three invasion barrios,
Nuevo Chile, Clas and Soacha used this new technique.
(3) John F.C. Turner. "Housing Priorities, Settlement Patterns
and Urban Development in Modernizing Countries" Journal of the
American Institute of Planners, 24(November, 1968:~34T-363
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pueblos grow. In this "mid-transitional city", the low-income
settlements are generally near peripheral industries mid-way to
center-city service employment. Squatters in these settlements
usually work -- even if for minimal wages. If they also have
threshold tenure, they undergo "consolidation" rather than
"bridgeheading" development and will substantially improve their
homes and the infrastructure.
In Bogota, most of the available inner-city sites (with the
exception of several large and well guarded sites owned by the
Catholic Church) were occupied by the late 60's. In the "late
transitional city", population growth is beginning to level off,
and there is a gradual decline of invasions and increased
participation in pirate barrios. Turner's pioneering model of
how squatter settlements form was based on initial field work in
Peru in the late 50's and early 60's. Other researchers like
Anthony Leeds, William Mangin, William Flinn, Lisa Redfield
Peattie and Orvill Grimes have broadened squatter research to
include a wide variety of developmental circumstances.
Recent work by Georges Vernez shows that in the case of Bogota,
the center city is beginning to lose its unique receiver and
stepping stone function for migrants. He argues that: 1)
although migration to cities is decreasing, Bogota's natural
growth caused an excessive demand for cheap rental houses which
could not be satisfied fast enough by conversion of old
center-city mansions into high-density tenements and cheap
hotels, 2) the supply of cheap inner-city housing was constrained
by the low residential mobility of those dwellers occupying that
stock, and 3) the change in land-use in the center-city from
residential to commercial and office uses, has lead to a growing
predominance of pirate barrios as the principle form of illegal
housing in Bogota and other large Colombian cities. (1)
Unlike other cities in Colombia and even Latin America in
general, Bogota has had relatively few invasions. While
invasions account for 5, 16, and 22 percent of the population of
Cali, Barranquilla and Cartagena respectively, it is less than 1
percent in Bogota. (2) Vernez speculates that Bogota is unique
bacause: 1) it has a scarce amount of public or low value land,
2) the police and army have been efficient in removing or
arresting would-be invaders, and 3) Bogota's climate at 9,000
feet is cool and rainy year-round requiring a more substantial
commitment to the first invasion hut, and low-income families may
(1) Georges Vernez "The Residential Movements of Low-Income
Families: The Case of Bogota, Colombia" (New York: New York City
- Rand Institute, 1973), pp. 4-10
(2) Jaime G. Valenzuela, "Barrios Populares en America Latina",
in Ramiro Cardona (ed.), Migracion y Dessarrollo Urbano (Bogota:
Associacion Colombiana de Facultadesde Nediina, T9T, p. 208
10
be reluctant to make this investment given the high probability
of removal. (1) The pirate barrio has become an important
alternative to invasion barrios.
PIRATE BARRIOS
Pirate barrios differ from invasions. In most urban areas,
governments try to control the subdivision of land for
residential construction with zoning ordinances which reflect the
planned expansion of the city. Pirate barrios appear when land
owners subdivide and sell building plots without prior permission
from city authorities. Because of the high demand for housing
sites, people are willing to buy land and construct houses with
the hope that the city can be coerced into providing the required
services. Basically what happens is: 1) lots are purchased from
a person who has conventional title, 2) some "color of title" is
given to the purchaser, often in the form of an installment
contract with a promise of recordable title at the end of the
payment period, 3) the division of the property has not been
approved by the proper authorities, hence the word "pirate", 4)
urban services (water, electricity, sewers) required in
conventional subdivisions are partially or completely lacking,
and 5) housing built by purchasers is without required building
permits. (2) Thus, pirate barrios are formed by legal
transactions of land at market prices but are developed by
illegal construction which is sometimes below standard and
without services before construction.
Not only do pirate barrios pre-empt the government's planning
authority, their developers reap substantial profits with could
more than pay for the water, sewage, and power connectups with
reasonable profits to spare. Instead they start large
developments and then abandon them leaving the new owners to
coerce the services from the city.
Two published reports recently estimated the magnitude of pirate
barrios in Bogota where the phenomenon is the most common.
Georges Vernez in 1970 estimated that 45.3% of the total families
of Bogota live in pirate barrios or about 204,182 families out of
451,000 in the city. This contrasts with only 1.1% of the
(1) Georges Vernez, "Pirate Settlements, Housing Construction by
Incremental Development and Low Income Housing Policies in
Bogota, Colombia" (New York: New York City - Rand Institute,
1973), pp. 7-8
(2) William Doebele "The Private Market & Low-Income
Urbanization" The American Journal of Comparative Law, XXV (No.
3): 542
families in Bogota that live in invasion barrios. (1) A second
study in 1972 by the Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion
Distrital in Bogota estimates that 38.4% of the total area of the
Special District of Bogota is illegal and that 59% of this area
is direct result of pirate barrios. (2) Although both studies
report their statistics differently and were done at different
times, one can state that at least half of Bogota's population
lives in illegal barrios. More recent estimates indicate that
this percentage is increasing and that 70% of all new housing
starts are now illegal. (3)
As a result of the World Conference on Human -Settlements,
Habitat-76, The ICT undertook an inventory of sub-normal housing
in the major cities of Colombia. They found that when invasions
and pirate barrios are combined, 61.2%, 46%, 10.9% and 36.2% of
the housing stock in Barranquilla, Cali, Medellin and Cartagena
are sub-normal. When the top 69 cities are included, 695,012
houses or 44% of 1,586,030 units illegaly house about 4,952,165
persons. (4)
Pirate barrios differ from invasions in other ways. Most
dwellers are not as poor as invaders, nor as desperate. Most
private land owners retain the titles to the plot and dwellers
are particularly aware of the consequences of defaulting on
payments.
Settlers usually do not have the initial social cohesion that
invaders have to organize against land specul'ators. Often they
fear loosing their investments if they default or complain to
authorities. Families who buy into barrio piratas often suffer
abuses from land owners, the most common have been: 1) changing
T ) Georges Vernez "Bogota's Pirate Settlements: An Opportunity
for Metropolitan Development" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California, Berkeley, 1973), p. 24 and pp. 188-191. Also
reported in coauthored article with Jaime Valenzuela, "La
Estructura del M-.rcado de Vivienda en Bogota y la Magnitud de la
Actividad Constructora Popular", Economia Colombiana, 93 (Junio,
1972): 8-21.
(2) Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Distrital "El
Mercado de Tierra en Barrios Clandestinos de Bogota" (Bogota:
Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Distrital, 1972)
(3) J. D. McCallum "Bogota: Urban Development Realities and
Plans" (Geneva: World Employment Program, International Labour
Office, 1975), p. 26
(4) Instituto de Credito Territorial Inventario de Zonas
Subnormales de Vivienda y Proyectos de Desarrollo Trogresivo
TBogota: Instituto de Credito Territorial, 1976) Tabulations from
un-numbered city summaries.
the total price of the lot by increasing the down-payment,
monthly-payment or the number of total-payments; 2) selling lots
that overlap each other, are located on public ways or have
already been sold to another buyer; 3) not delivering promised
utilities like sewerage, streets and water taps; and 4) failing
to complete contracts to sell the lot or to turn over the deed
after receiving full payment for the lot. (1)
Government officials often make two arguments against pirate
barrios: 1) that they perpetuate a land-use pattern that is
inefficient because the capital costs for services are always
higher when houses are built before infrastructure, and 2) that
the growth of pirate barrios leads to poor construction standards
and low environmental quality.
Although land speculators make considerable profit by creating
pirate barrios, they have generally been aware that making
subdivision plans that reflect surrounding densities, and respect
street and block patterns of neighboring barrios will increase
the possibilities that the city will eventually provide full
services. In terms of the first argument, these facts show that
pirate barrios are a significant improvement over the ad hoc
planning often found in invasions.
In Colombia, as in many other developing countries, there are no
financial mechanisms to capture the savings of low-income
families and to redirect the money to more productive
investments. The second argument claims that the provision of
public services increases much more rapidly in pirate barrios
than in other types of housing. It often follows that the
relatively low-density pattern of the one- and two- story homes
built through self-help over-extends basic services and creates
long range maintenance problems for the city. Preliminary
studies do not substantiate this argument. Densities are close
to prescribed levels, and quality often exceeds government
produced units. (2) Housing units themselves and the overall
urbanization patterns seem an unlikely source of planning
difficulties.
(1) Rodrigo Losada Lora and Hernando Gomez Buendia La Tierra en
el Mercado Pirata de Bo ota (Bogota: Fundacion para la ucacion
~Bnperior y eT es-arrlTo7junio, 1976), pp. 137-145
(2) Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Distrital "Mercado
de Tierras en Barrios Clandestinos de Bogota" (Bogota:
Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Distrital, 1972), p. 75
"Cuadro No. 20 Tamano de Lotes Regularizados en Urbanizaciones
Clandestinas de Bogota"
SUMMARY
The most important forms of illegal housing in Colombia have been
invasion and pirate barrios. In both cases there is an illegal,
often clandestine process, that incrementally develops housing
stock over long periods of time, perhaps as long as 10 to 15
years. Invasion and pirate barrios are similar to the extent
that families are consolidating their positions and channeling
their investments to build a new housing stock. In both cases,
home owners must have minimum guarantees of tenure and employment
to continue building. The dwelling, be it a cardboard shack or a
partially constructed brick house, is fully occupied before
completion of the final structure. The incremental development
is a gradual housing investment, a form of forced savings, in
which the house is a hedge on inflation and an opportunity to
diversify income through renting and small businesses. Although
the term self-help is used to describe the construction process,
surveys indicate that very few people actually build their
houses. Families do spend considerable time stockpiling
construction material, contracting bits and pieces when they can
and doing the lighter interior finishing work. Construction is
essentially self-financed. There have been no savings and loan
mechanisms to support self-help construction. Perhaps the most
important overlap is that the total decision process for
determining the design, rate of construction, and finally the
maintenance of the house is made by the dweller/occupier himself
rather than the government.
COMPETING WITH SQUATTING
Squatting creates a dilema. On one hand, low-income families
have made substantial improvements in both their homes and
community environment through self-help. There is no doubt that
they have built affordable housing, offered an alternative to
large scale welfare programs, and created an asset that can be
productively included in the city's tax base. Community action
programs, outgrowths of the community spirit and organization
often develop to a high degree in squatter settlements, create a
mechanism for mobilizing and focusing self-improvement. On the
other hand, squatter settlements cause problems for city
authorities. They place unscheduled demands on urban services,
sometimes block necessary public works projects, and perpetuate a
tradition of planless urban sprawl. Even minimal planning could
vastly increase initial health standards and avoid starting urban
layouts which make future services impossible or costly. In some
cases, squatters develop land that might better be used for
something else or not developed at all. This is particularly
true in cities where available squatting sites are already
occupied and prime agriculture land is becomming the target.
When 44% of the urban housing stock for the top 69 cities in
Colombia is classified sub-normal, it suggests that housing
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policy has not been particularly effective. Policies have rangedfrom unsuccessful attempts physically to eliminate slums bybulldozing or burning them to a laissez faire permissiveness
towards them. There is no single solution to squatting. It is
instructive, however, to see what institutions have learned about
low-income families and the housing system by trying to formulate
policies and programs for them. It is suprising how earlypolicies that viewed squatting as a negative phenomenon are now
using it as the model for new policies.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER POLICIES
Some of the earliest low-income housing policies - 15 to 20 years
ago - saw the slum as a completely negative phenomenon, one that
should be eliminated by providing the poor with low-cost housing
units. Housing shortages were thought to be the reason whylow-income families could not get housing at a price they could
afford. Planners thought that shortages were caused bybottlenecks in the production process, by the lack of central
management control, by insufficient capital mobilization, and byinadequate market organization. They assumed that subsidizing
the capital or running costs of public housing, freezing rents atbelow market levels, or creating artificially low-cost repayment
schemes would solve the problem.
Technology transfer solutions to public housing were particularly
common in the late 50's and throughout most of the 60's.
Significant research and development work was done at agencieslike the Interamerican Center for Housing and Planning (CINVA)
sponsored by the Organization of American States. This
international agency, in conjunction with national housing
agencies such as Colombia's Territorial Credit Institute (ICT),
was responsible for the training of hundreds of architects,
planners, and engineers in the problems of pre-fabrication,
project management, construction, new building materials, and
overall design of suburban developments.
In Colombia, the ICT began the production of public housing in
1956. From 1960 to 1975, the ICT built about 105,319 units all
over the country. (1) The ICT Annual Reports from 1975 to 1977
show that the total production of housing "solutions" has
steadily increased each year from 33,095 to 54,129 units but that
the proportionof- low-cost solutions each year has steadily
(1)Jacques- Mosseri ."La Vivienda Como Factor del Desarrollo
Urbano: Hacia una Nueva Politica de Vivienda", in Ramiro Cardona(ed.), Miraciony Dessarrollo Urbano (Bogota: Asociacion
Colombiana-de FaculTades de Me icina, 1970), p. 263
decreased from 44% in 1975 to only 29% in 1977. (1) This
industrialization program was one of the most substantial in
Latin America. After almost 20 years of attempts to increase the
production of low-cost housing, only about 3%-8% of the demand
had been met. Government housing had failed, not because it was
less attractive (the ICT received 40-60 requests for each
dwelling it offered in 1970), but because the total resources
allocated from the national budget were so small. The ICT and
similar agencies in other countries continue to operate, but they
serve mostly middle class families.
The philosophy behind the industrialized approach was partially
correct. The housing industry functioned under capacity, was in
bad need of management, and lacked funds. Technology transfer
managed to reduce the cost of finished units but unfortunately
not enough to make a difference to squatters. The units were
still 2 to 5 times above low-income rent thresholds, while
commercial sector housing was almost 30 times more expensive. (2)
What happened? Why did industrialization not work for housing
when it worked for so many other consumer goods? Policy planners
did not realize that even the most optimistic projections for
cost reduction and production increases would not be enough.
Invasions and pirate barrios would still remain the only options
for prospective home builders. The low-income housing market
simply did not act the same way other markets did. Detailed cost
analysis of government housing shows that significant portions of
the final cost of a unit goes into administration, contractor
profits, and labor. Squatters generally avoid these costs
altogether. Industrialization did more than add on these costs;
it created an economic system which excluded those systems more
common to slums, i.e. small scale contracting, second hand or
indigenous building materials, and local small scale industries.
Government housing not only competed with the squatter's basic
ability to build for himself, it promoted high image,
ready-to-move-into projects with unrealistic standards. Families
were often disoriented by single family living especially if they
had been previously renting in inquilinatos. (3) When low-income
(1) Production totals and low-cost unit percentages calculated by
combining sites-and-services with minimum soultions and combining
basic, intermediate and maximum solution categories for each
reporting year. Data sources: Instituto de Credito Territorial
Informe 1975, Informe 1976 and Informe 1977 (Bogota: Instituto de
Credito Territorial, T975, 1976, 19TT unnumbered charts
entitled "Realizaciones del ICT" for the corresponding year.
(2) Georges Vernez "A Housing Services Policy for Low-Income
Urban Families in Developing Countries", Ekistics, 242(January):
8-14
(3) See John F.C. Turner, "Housing Issues and the Standards
families were deliberately recruited for projects, their unstable
income streams could not sustain uninterrupted loan repayments.
Eventually, wealthier families took over many projects as
low-income families were forced to sell and return to
inquilinatos, invasion or pirate barrios.
Technology transfer policies have generally delivered housing
units as total finite packages. Their success is often measured
by lower construction costs, increased production rates, rapid
recovery of investment costs, and the replication of housing
schemes at other sites. Retention of low-income target groups is
rarely a goal if it jeoperdizes recuperation of capital costs or
project implementation. Projects assume complete control over
the housing design, construction sequence, and sometimes even
maintenance. Generally people move in only when the dwelling
unit or subdivision is completed. Time for development tends to
be short (1 to 3 years) with high emphasis on rapid cost
recovery. Recipients tend to be risk free clients who can
demonstrate the ability to pay.
The technology transfer approach contrasts sharply with the
squatter process where the owner/dweller develops a house over a
long period of time (about 10 to 15 years) on a
do-it-yourself-pay-as-you-go basis. The family lives in the home
during the process and may obtain income by renting rooms,
operating small shops or even by creating small scale industries.
Much of the second hand building materials and labor in squatter
settlements is also provided within the economic system of the
settlement itself. Housing investments remain flexible subject
to priority spending for food, education for children, clothing
or periods of sickness. The basic achievement of technology
transfer policies has been to lower the cost of housing rather
than creating low-income housing.
AIDED SELF-HELP POLICIES
As squatting continued to grow, planners started to realize that
the total design-build approach was not the right one. Policy
makers were caught in a double bind. On one hand, if squatting
was ignored, it created serious long range growth and service
delivery problems. On the other hand, official attempts to
provide even minimal shelters were failing. It was necessary to
retain the standards of public housing and at the same time
significantly reduce the costs. Governments wanted to avoid
policies which artificially write-off costs by usin
non-recoverable subsidies or transfer payments to ow-incoms
families. The idea of aided self-help emerged in which labor
Problem" for a concise statement of the conflicts between
planning with limited resources and the use of housing standards
to control environmental quality.
costs and contractors' profits in public housing could be largely
eliminated by using the housing client's labor as a substitute
resource.
Aided self-help projects are less common to Colombia but have
been used extensively in Peru, El Salvador, Bolivia, and several
non-Latin countries. Essentially, approved housing applicants
are pooled into teams to build several homes for themselves and
others. They may build the entire unit, roofs only, or just
basic bathroom-kitchen units. The future owner is basically an
unpaid labor source. Project management, dwelling unit design,
building construction, and all materials are controlled and
specified by the housing agency. Costs are lowered by decreasing
the initial outstanding principal on the eventual mortgage the
home owner pays.
Much of the experience and research developed for the
industrialized schemes were transfered to aided self-help.
Essentially, subdivision layouts, infrastructure systems, home
designs, and construction techniques were transferable with
appropriate concessions to the skill level of clients and the
available materials. Many innovative pre-fabricated core houses
designs and construction techniques such as the CINVA-Ram block
making machine and soil-cement were developed. Although aided
self-help did manage to achieve partial cost reductions, this
approach was unable to eliminate the need for vast initial
capital investments such as infrastructure or the high
administrative costs associated with such detailed supervision.
Aided self-help was a step in the right direction. The dweller
can move in during construction, he can develop his housing unit
over a long period of time, and finally he can reduce the costs
through his own labor. Although aided self-help involves user
participation before the housing stock is completed, it still
carries over many of the paternalistic and disfunctional
relations present in technology transfer approaches: design and
construction are still dictated by the government.
Owing in part to the dominance of architects in government
housing agencies, it was assumed that the solution to the housing
problem lay in the dwelling unit itself. The high political
imagery associated with "building for the poor" reinforced the
architect's commitment to physical housing design even when the
squatters had already demonstrated that they were capable of
doing better by themselves. But the squatters were missing
something more basic. In addition to better paying jobs, they
needed land that was near employment sources, a guaranteed land
tenure scheme, basic infrastructure, and loan programs to
accelerate their own building. Case studies of invasion and
pirate barrios show that if minimal thresholds of employment,
land tenure, and services were available, families could and
would make long term capital investments to build their own
homes.
SITES-AND-SERVICES AND UPGRADE POLICIES
Faced with increasing housing deficits, government officials
began to consider more fundamental policies that would raise
environmental standards in settlements and regain control over
the planning of new housing. Within the past five years, two
different but related policies have emerged that show great
promise: sites-and-services and upgrade.
Sites-and-services policies are primarily aimed at restoring
formal planning control over zoning, residential building, and
subdivision layout that have been eroded by squatting. They are
concerned with future housing stocks. Sites-and-services
policies vary greatly, but all attempt to stimulate owner
building by increasing the supply of serviced building lots,
credit, and technical assistance. Programs support urban land
banking, savings and loan plans, infrastructure, and technical
assistance to stimulate home building. 'Policies tend to
emphasize family consolidation, long term development, self-help
construction, and community formation. The success is measured
by reduced subsidies to the poor, decreases in squatting, high
rates of construction in permanent materials, increases in health
and environmental standards, retention of the low-income
population, and priority consumption (food, health, education and
clothing), as well as diversity in income and capital formation.
Unlike technology transfer and aided self-help, home design and
construction are determined, within certain limits, by the
owner/dweller himself. In this sense, sites-and-services is very
much like the squatting development model we have already seen.
Upgrade policies are primarily concerned with legalizing and
renewing existing settlements and are the basis for much of the
urban land reform legislation. Policies are usually directed
towards making vacant urban land developable or legalizing
existing squatter settlements where there has been de facto
ownership of the land but where squatters have not had sufficient
confidence in tenure to risk major capital improvements in their
houses or infrastructure. Legalization is important because the
limbo status of settlements prevents them from receiving services
from the city such as trash collection, fire and police
protection, paving and storm drainage, sewers, and water
connections. Although most settlements "pirate" electricity and
water (usually paid for by a central metering point and barrio
bill collecting committee), public works agencies will not
provide full services without official recognition of the
settlement. (1) The city also sees legalization as an important
(1) Before the passage of Acuerdo 22 of 1963, Bogota's public
agencies were prohibited by law to supply illegal barrios with
services. Medellin, Colombia passed a municipal ordinance
(Acuerdo 83 of 1964) authorizing the city to extend water and
sewerage services to any dwelling unit in the city irregardless
way to bring the settlements under the control of existing
building codes and health standards and to receive revenue for
services they may in fact already be delivering. Land tenure
programs sometimes accompany sites-and-services programs where
the former may cause displacement of settlers due to changes in
land use, redensification, or public works projects. Tenure may
range from complete ownership of the land to rights to build,
lifetime ownership, or 99 year leases. Land tenure programs tend
to be evaluated much the same way as sites-and-services 'programs
are.
A CLOSER LOOK AT SITES-AND-SERVICES
The idea behind sites-and-services is simple. Governments
purchase large areas of land, prepare it for building, install
starter infrastructure and sell plots to qualified home builders.
In this respect, the policy resembles the pirate barrio. In much
the same way as squatters had previously done, families erect
temporary shelters gradually replacing them with more permanent
structures over 10 to 15 years. The essential differences
between squatting and sites-and-services are guaranteed tenure,
immediate infrastructure thus improving health standards, and
sometimes loans for small businesses or building materials.
Mortgages are usually paid off in 15 to 20 years and builders
have rights to sell their properties before this time or use
improvments as collateral for other loans. In theory, residents
should be able to increase the value of their ptoperty as a hedge
on inflation, diversify their incomes by renting rooms and space
for small businesses, or use their property as a stepping stone
investment to obtain other housing. In Colombia, municipal
legislation now permits private developers to build
sites-and-services projects. (1) Project specifications are
basically the same as for government ones.
Sites-and-services changes the basic role of planners; the final
housing unit that was the focus in technology transfer and aided
self-help approaches is now under the control of the dweller.
This shift introduces a new level of unpredictability about what
settlers will do in response to government programs. Planners
establish suburban layouts reserving correct amounts of land in
correct locations for lots, schools, parks, commercial, and other
communal uses. Individual lot sizes, proportions and locations
within neighborhoods are determined from overall target
of legal title but fully legalized settlements always have
priority in capital improvements programs.
(1) Agreement 20 of 1972 and subsequent Decrees 1259 and 1260 of
1973 in Bogota enable private developers to establish minimum
standard urbanizations with progressive capital improvements for
public utilities.
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densities, efficiency of infrastructure, desirable variances in
lot prices, level of initial utilities, and particular advantages
lots may have for combined commercial uses. Essentially the
government is involved in land banking to acquire the required
land resources, capital improvements programming, screening
applicants, enforcing codes, and collecting for public services
and land payments. Generally settler selection is based on their
ability to pay although projects may draw from special pools of
applicants such as municipal employees or disaster victims.
Selecting settlers has become a problem in itself. Some project
administrators point out that settlers must prove their ability
to pay by showing stable employment or by demonstrating their
capacity to make regular payments. Potential applicants may be
required to open a savings account for a year to show that they
can make payments regularly. The accrued savings is then applied
directly against the principal of the loan thus lowering the
outstanding mortgage. Loan defaulting is a serious threat to
sites-and-services schemes. An effective collection system isimportant in maintaining sufficient cash flow to allow the
project to be replicated at other sites and to insure that
complete utility connect-ups can be made to each house.
The basic idea behind sites-and-services is not new. Small scale
projects were implemented in Puerto Rico as long ago as 1935, in
Uganda in 1950, and in Kenya in 1955. United Nations housing
experts had recommended similar approaches for Liberia and
Somalia in the late 50's and early 60's. (1) Colombia had
attempted sites-and-services as long ago as 1958. What is new,
however, is the strong impetus this approach is now receiving
from governments as well as the international development
agencies for large scale use as an alternative for technology
transfer and aided self-help approaches.
Although Colombia has no national sites-and-services policy,
Bogota has created municipal legislation to create one. (2) In
addition, the ICT has provided about 12,000 plots nationwide
through its Minimn Urbanization Program during the mid 60's with
an additional 35,000 sites being developed with the urban sector
assistance loans from the United States Agency for International
Development (AID) in the early 70's. (3) The International Bank
(1) William Grindley and Robert Merrill, Sites and Services: A
Preliminary Study of the Experience and ~Rilevant sues
(Washington: International Bank for -eWonstruction and
Development, Special Projects Department, 1971)
(2) Agreement 20 of 1972, Decrees 1259 and 1260 of 1973 provide
the legal framework for sites-and-services in the Special
District.
(3) United States Agency for International Development
"Urban/Regional Sector Loan 514-L-063 1972 Performance" (Bogota:
for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) has underscored
the importance of sites-and-services approaches by recently
adopting it as their official loan and technical assistance
stance for countries seeking help in low-income housing. (1)
Table 1.1 suggests the importance of slum upgrading and
sites-and-services projects by showing the World Bank's
commitment in 15 countries. (2)
PROJECT EXPERIMENTS
In 1972 the World Bank formally adopted sites-and-services as its
official loan and technical assistance stance for new low-income
housing and squatter upgrading. In 1974, the United States
Agency for International Development (AID) began to incorporate
sites-and-services programs into its mortgage guaranty program
for developing countries. Since 1972, the Bank has assisted in
about 149,000 new home sites-and-upgraded 742,000 squatter plots
in 17 countries with loans exceeding $1,029 million dollars.
Although AID does not compile country-by-country statistics for
sites-and-services alone -- the mortgage guaranty program does
not use Congressionally appropriated funds -- it is estimated
that 30% of all AID guaranties since 1974 have gone to this
approach. Typical projects by both the Bank and AID have been
from 5,000 to 7,000 plots with several exceeding 10,000. To
date, a total of 26 countries have experimented with
sites-and-services; most consider these projects to be prototypes
to more permanent national programs. Although the Bank has
become the main patron of sites-and-services, the combined
Bank-AID emphasis has made it the most important low-income
housing policy for developing countries in the past 10 years.
United States Agency for International Development, Table 11-2,
1974), p. 7
(1) World Bank. Housing Sector Policy Paper (Washington: World
Bank, May, 1975)
(2) Abstracted from "Bank-Assisted Basic Urbanization Projects",
The Urban Edge(1, 1) p. 5
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COUNTRY $US M DATE
Malaysia 72.0 7/72 Sites-and-services for 1,400
households and 150 businesses;
squatter upgrading for 2,100
households and; creation of a Sites &
Services Unit for the Kuantan Urban
Project.
22.0 9/72 Project includes preparation of 14,000
sites in Dakar and 1,600 in Thies and
criteria study for slum improvement in
Dakar.
Nicaragua 30.0 6/73 Provision of 5,900 lots serviced with
individual connections; sanitary and
shelter core units and industrial
sites and services for employment
generation.
45.0 5/74 The project consists of 6,000 serviced
lots, related infrastructure and
community facilities; sanitary core
and shelter units, materials fund for
self-help construction; and upgrading
of two existing squatter settlements.
Botswana 44.4 5/74 Project includes: preparation of about
800 sites-and-services plots and 1,000
traditional plots; and upgrading of
squatter areas affecting 1,000
households.
Tanzania I 17.6 7/74 The project consists of about 8,700
new serviced plots in three cities and
improvements to basic services in
existing squatter settlements totaling
nearly 10,000 households.
Table 1.1 Bank-Assisted Basic Urbanization Projects
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Senegal
Jamaica
DESCRIPTION
COUNTRY $US M
El Salvador
Indonesia
15.5 11/74
152.0 9/74
Development of 18,000 serviced lots in
San Salvador and four secondary cities
involving provision of water, sewer,
drainage, unpaved streets, footpaths
and optional electricity at two
service levels. Provision of building
materials loans to expand core units,
off-site infrastructure, community
facilities.
Improvement of 5,500 Ha. of kampung
settlements with roads, footpaths,
storm drainage, water, sanitation,
primary schools, health clinics.
25.0 1/75 The project consists of: 1,893
serviced plots and related commwnity
facilities in Gwangju, Mogpo and
Yeosu.
Zambia
Kenya
Philippines
41.3 12/74
29.05 5/75
Servicing of 17,000 dwellings in four
squatter settlements; preparation of
12,000 residential plots, 7,600 in
three overspill areas adjacent to
upgraded settlements; and 4,000 in six
sites designed for sites & services.
Project consists of preparation and
servicing of 6,000 residential lots
with individual water supply and sewer
connections; construction of 6,000
sanitary core units, trunk sewers,
stabilization ponds and access roads.
65.0 6/76 Upgrading of Tondo foreshore area of
Minilla with sanitation,
infrastructure, health, education and
social services. Servicing of sites
in adjacent Dagat-Dagatan,
construction of commercial/industrial
sites and loans for cottage
industries.
Table 1.1 Bank-Assisted Basie 'Urbanization Projects (cont.)
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Korea
DATE DESCRIPTION
COUNTRY &US M DATE
Peru 43.2 6/76 The project includes basic and
productive support infrastructure -
water, sewer and electrical networks;
7,200 water and 11,300 sewer
connections; 16,300 electrical
connections; 86 Km of access roads;
and 5 health centers.
Ivory Coast 122.3 12/76 Project includes 380 Ha. of slum
upgrading 70 Ha. of
sites-and-services, community
facilities, low cost housing programs,
housing credit and two trunk sewers
and technical assistance.
India 90.1 9/73 The project consists of 39 subprojects
in water supply; sewerage and
drainage; garbage disposal;
environmental hygiene; transport; and
area development.
India 52.0 4/77 Upgrading and 13,500 serviced sites.
Table 1.1 Bank-Assisted Basic Urbanization Projects (cont.)
In Colombia, sites-and-services policies evolved from earlier
attempts to lower housing costs through industrialization and
aided self-help techniques. By 1970 the national Territorial
Credit Institute (ICT) and Bogota's Popular Housing Bank (Caja)
recognized that very low-income families in squatter settlements
were already building more housing at a lower cost than their
industrialized or aided self-help projects were achieving. Both
insititutions shifted their investment programs away from total
design and build projects to upgrading and sites and services.
An AID urban sector loan in 1971 and an International Development
Bank loan for project assistance in 1973 provided the resources
for early experiments.
The. Caja and ICT together implemented a successful upgrade
project in Las Colinas, a large invasion settlement. From this
experiment, new urban legislation was passed to enable the city
to negotiate capital programs in illegal settlements on a wider
DESCRIPTION
scale and use substantially lower utility standards. Agreement
20 and two subsequent laws formalized upgrading and
sites-and-services as policies at Bogota's District Planning
board. The Caja was authorized to implement a pilot project, La
Manuelita, to pre-test the legislation and the feasibility of
allowing private developers to build sites-and-services. The
project was very successful and resulted in a private development
program and a new and larger Caja project called Las Guacamayas.
This project was to house families displaced by a District
Planning highway and other public works proposed through
Agreement 20 legislation. The highway project was subsequently
defeated but the Caja was authorized to continue to make plots
available with all four levels of capital improvements. Unlike
the Las Colinas and La Manuelita projects this one was the first
real test to sell plots on the open market and compete directly
with illegal pirate and invasion settlements. In effect it was
the first test of the marketability of institutionalizing the
self-help model from the upgrading experience. The demand for
solutions in Las Guacamayas was overwhelming, but it was opposite
to what the Caja had built. Vacant plots could not be sold and
applications for lots with habitable core units were more than
fifteen to one. The Caja responded to the skewed demand by
shifting capital programs in the second sector of the project
back to total design and build approaches. District Planning was
also experiencing a rapid decline in appli ations for privately
developed sites-and-services. There was less low-cost sewered
land available than had been forecasted, capital costs were still
high even at the lower Agreement 20 levels and pirate barrios
were offering larger lots for less.
INVESTMENT UNCERTAINTY IN NEW PROJECTS
The unanticipated demand for Las Guacamayas and the rapid decline
of private sector applications to develop sites-and-services cast
doubts on the validity of the self-help model. Administrators in
Las Guacamayas were also reporting that owners were tearing down
or extensively modifing high-cost core units and that
construction technical assistance was going unused. In some
cases, families were not making any capital improvements either
because they did not believe the city would reciprocate by
delivering promised utilities, didn't have enough capital to
begin building or because they were simply speculating on rising
land values. Public pressure is stopping future projects because
former ones resemble the squatter settlements that government
spending is supposed to eliminate.
These mixed results have raised questions about how the
low-income housing system works and how public investment can
stimulate families to build. When these agencies moved from
total design and build policies -- where they essentially
delivered housing as a complete package -- to sites-and-services
-- where there was an implicit prediction about what families
would do -- substantial risk was introduced because the
open-ended projects now control fewer variables and rely on
incentives to stimulate owners to build for themselves.
Despite the failures of recent projects, authorities believed
that the basic self-help model behind sites-and-services was
still valid and that future projects could still achieve their
objectives if the costs to project beneficiaries could be lowered
still further. Project planners proposed to reduce the two
highest cost items that owners paid for -- land and on-plot core
units. Planners expect that smaller plots without core units
would be significantly cheaper to build and to administer thus
projects would accomodate more families, reach lower income
groups and compete more favorably with pirate barrios. Chapter 2
will review the details of how sites-and-services policies intend
to achieve these goals.
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CHAPTER 2
UPGRADING AND SITES-AND-SERVICES POLICIES
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INTRODUCTION
The sites-and-services policy is different from the
industrialization and aided self-help policies that preceeded it.
Instead of planning complete housing units, government agencies
now use capital programs as incentives to stimulate families to
build their own housinj. This chapter will detail the four main
policy instruments: 1) land banking and legalization, 2)
infrastructure and utilities, 3) technical assistance and 4)
loans programs. The purpose is to see how capital programs are
supposed to increase the supply of housing, to reach lower income
families, to improve the efficiency of land use and to reduce
illegal housing by offering legal alternatives. The
international development agencies, particularly AID and the
World Bank, have promoted sites-and-services in many countries as
well as in Colombia. Their projects in other countries will
provide a basis for comparing the Colombian experiencs.
LAND BANKING
The basic objective of land banking is to consolidate sufficient
land stores and to parcel it into building lots that provide
families with the area they need for building their homes. For
most projects, there is a threshold number of building lots
needed to justify the administration and capital start-up costs.
Sites-and-serices projects are becoming larger and larger. The
most recent one in Bogota is more than 2,500 lots. Because of
their size, sites have been limited to peri-city locations which
make employment accessibility a serious planning consideration.
Often there is poor regulation of land use in these areas and
prime agricultural land is sold off for low-density housing or
small scale industries. Lima, Santiago and Bogota have already
experienced these transformations. In these contexts, land
banking is a policy instrument for increasing the productivity of
land by maintaining high quality agricultural land or by
replacing it with efficient residential layouts.
Although the term banking is commonly used, pooling might better
describe the process of consolidating building sites because
public purchase, pre-emption proceedings with compensation or the
use of public lands for sites usually does not imply the scale
that land banking does. Out of the 10 countries that had World
Bank financed projects by 1975, only Senegal with 400 hectares in
Dakar; 1225 Ha. in combined sites-and-services and squatter
upgrading in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; and 470 ha. combined
rojects in Lusaka, Zambia approached the size of land banking.
1) The scale of these projects have been exceptional. Some
caution should be used in equating project size with the scale of
(1) World Bank Housing: Sector Policy Paper (Washington: World
Bank, May, 1975, Annex 11), p. 70
intended development. The above figures comment only on the
total size of land acquired in a single project. A project of
134 Ha. in El Salvador has 8,000 lots with 60 to 120 square
meters each while in Lusaka, Zambia, a 470 Ha. site accommodates
4,000 lots of from 210 to 324 square meters. In rounded figures,
the smaller lot size in the El Salvador project yields almost 7
times the number of building plots per hectare than does the
Lusaka project.
Although implementors of sites-and-services hope that projects
will be an attractive alternative to squatting and illegal
speculator developments, the size of typical projects are not
such that they act as regulatory instruments in the private land
market. In fact, in some countries, cities are prohibited by
constitutional law from engaging in land banking.
Land costs constitute from between 15% to 45% of the total cost
of a single family dwelling. The overall location of the project
with respect to employment, urban services and environmental
amenities account for most of the variability. Physical planning
greatly influences where a project falls in this range. Site
preparation, platting charges and initial service levels have
secondary effects on land cost. Regulation of density, lot sizes
and proportions, the existence and mix of residential support
land uses, and the general circulation and access routes through
the site are other sources of cost variability These costs are
important because they determine the lower threshold of the
families admitted to projects, the number of projects the
government can build and the ongoing costs to the city for
maintaining service delivery.
VALUATION
Pooling land either by market purchase, transfering public lands
to commercial markets or compensation payments under pre-emption
procedures creates many practical problems. It is difficult to
measure what the market prices for land are and the effect that
collusive practices may have on inflating it. The pricing
problem is complicated by the fact that the use to which land can
be put is also a planning policy and subject to legotiation.
Using public land does not avoid the valuation problem because
land is a project input whose cost is a capital investment with
an expected rate of return. Since land is a scarce resource, the
social justifications for using it for housing must still be
weighed against the opportunity costs of alternative uses that
such land could be put for the same goal.
International development agencies have been in a worse position
than national agencies with respect to estimating and valuating
land prices. As a result, the largest underwriter of
sites-and-services, the World Bank, has taken the following
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disbursement policy: (1)
- exclude land costs from disbursement eligibility
- obtain assurances that land prices used are reasonably
comparable to existing local levels
- include land costs (with a comparable valuation for land
already held) in total project costs for purposes of
economic evaluation and the allocation of costs between
public authorities, commercial interests and families
- agree that reimbursement of land costs by families can be
channeled into a rotating fund which may be used, inter
alia, for future land purchases for sites-and-services
programs
Recognizing the valuation problem, the land banking component of
sites-and-services projects will require that a financial plan be
developed which includes the basic purchase of the land, overhead
costs of the agency and its operations attributable to the
project, and reserves for uncollected payments from families,
delays in sales, rentals or leases. Since land is one of the
most significant project costs, governments may choose to
artificially lower it as a means of indirect subsidy to
prospective families; that is, land already held by governments
may in fact be sold to families at below market value.
LAND TENURE
Owning land is the most basic incentive for families to build.
Tenure is the combination of property rights by which private
persons and organizations can hold and control land (and the
building improvements) under government protection.
There are two main tenure schemes in today's projects. Freehold
schemes empower the landholder to control the use and
development, the subdivision, the leasing and the sale of his
land subject to statutory planning controls and subdivision
regulation. In leasehold schemes, the ground landlord controls
the use and development of the land while the landholder has the
use of the land on the terms and conditions set out in the lease
contract.
Tenure can range from rental or long term leases to complete
ownership. In rental schemes, the user pays a fee for the use of
the dwelling and/or the rights to occupy the site. Land leases
are longer term uses of the dwelling or site and are for periods
up to 99 years. In full ownership, the owner retains complete
hold in the dwelling and the land upon which it is built. Other
(1) World Bank. Sites and. Services Projects (Washington: World
Bank, April, 1974 p. 15
tenure combinations are possible when authorities stipulate that
resale of lots must be to the government or can only be
transferred to blood relations. Depending on the location of the
site, titles may spell out the way land holders are to be
compensated if their land is ever pre-empted for public works or
other uses. This usually applies only to upgrading cases where
portions of existing settlements may be blocking public works
projects.
Case studies of squatter settlements and illegal subdivisions
frequently make the generalization that along with employment,
secure land tenure is the main condition which encourages
families to make long term capital improvements. John Turner,
and early proponent of tenure's importance, showed that there is
a direct relationship between the level of physical development
in a settlement and the level of tenure of the settlement's
residents. (1) His research showed that squatter settlements
tend to evolve from a transient occupancy with no initial or
permanent tenure and easily removed shelters to legal occupancy
with institutionally recognized forms of tenure with complete
structures and utilities of modern standards. He concludes that
increased tenure always precedes increased housing investment and
that a certain threshold is required before home builders will
use permanent materials and build complete structures.
Few proponents of sites-and-services question the importance of
tenure. What is surprising, however, is that very little
research has been done relating kinds of tenure to levels of
housing investment. William Doebele's research in Bogota's
pirate barrios has found that low-income families are willing to
make rapid and substantial capital investments in building a home
in illegal settlements with no more assurance of tenure than a
promise of purchase-sale or "promesa de venta" (a contract to
make a contract) from the seller. (2) Since an estimated
1,682,000 persons out of Bogota's 1972 population of 3,250,000
persons live in pirate settlements, there is serious doubt as to
whether complete guaranteed tenure is always required in the
short range to stimulate home building. (3)
(1) John Turner, "Uncontrolled Urban Settlements: Problems and
Policies", Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Prepared for the United Nations Center for Housing Building and
Planning Seminar on Development Policies and Planning in Relation
to Urbanization, October, 1966 (Mimeographed)
(2) William Doebele "The Private Market & Low-Income
Urbanization" The American Journal of Comparative Law, XXV (No.
3): 542
(3) Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota Mercado de Tierras en Barrios
Clandestinos de Bogota (Bogota: Departamento AdminisTrativo de
Planeacion Distrital, Abril, 1973)
Land banking and tenure programs work differently in upgrade
projects. Here, land banking supplements undercapacity
residential support land uses rather than creates new sites for
home construction. Squatter settlements generally lack overall
planning. Invasion organizers often reserve land for future
schools, markets or roads only to have these areas taken over by
accretion or by families recruited to reoccupy sites where the
police have forcibly evicted people. In either of these cases,
land banking refers to annexing additional land or consolidating
under-utilized land for these purposes.
Legalized settlements become part of the city's tax base. Often
it is the only means that city's have for collecting for services
they may in fact already be providing. Legalization formalizes
the relationship between the settlement and the city authorities.
In Bogota a settlement cannot qualify for local or national
government programs until it has formed a community action group
Junta Directiva de Accion Comunal) and registered itself with
the city. Upon registration, the settlement is assigned a tax
number which is used in all subsequent legal transactions. A
Junta is necessary if the settlement wants to obtain water,
electrical or sewer connections, qualify for technical assistance
programs, or simply to solicit bus service.
SITE SELECTION AND PLANNING
Land is generally the single most expensive capital investments
governments make in sites and services projects. It is also a
significant part of the home builders investment too. The three
major factors that influence site selection are: 1) the location
, 2) the amount of land needed and 3) the way land is utilized.
LOCATION
Accessibility to employment is one of the commonly cited reasons
for why families like or dislike a project. One reason is that
low-income families spend disproportionatley higher amounts for
daily work trips to overcome poor location than does the urban
population as a whole. (1) It's common to see several working
members in a family commute from home to work twice a day to have
mid-day meals at home.
In the past, most of Bogota's service sector jobs were located in
center city. This is less true today because there has been z-
trend to decentralize commercial enterprises. Jobs such as day
maids, construction laborers or manufacturing are associated with
(1) Simon Fass Families in Port au Prince: A Stud of the
Economics of Survival TWashington: Agency for International
Development, September, 1977)
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middle and upper level residential areas or with peri-city
industries. On one hand, this relieves the pressures for center
city sites but on the other hand it introduces uncertainty into
sites selection because: 1) lower income groups may not have
stable employment patterns, 2) settler recruitment may take place
while sites are being evaluated, or 3) employment may be related
to heavily urbanized areas in which there are no available
building sites.
Employment accessibility is still an important factor in today's
projects but other constraints like zoning and the project budget
are becoming more important as project size increases. In
Bogota, recent legislation restricts sites-and-services projects
to the land area already serviced by the municipal sewer network.
This constraint alone eliminates all but about 10% of the open
space within the sewered area of the city.
Choosing a site within the sewered perimeter is subject to a set
of financial constraints; the land cost, preparation and off-site
infrastructure costs are the main ones. Typically, project
planners will assume a basic set of land use and infrastructure
standards that are within the municipal codes. Basic
infrastructure costs and affordable plot size can then be
calculated. The final selection of a site thus implies the
selection of physical standards that are affordable by the group
to be housed.
LAND UTILIZATION
New sites-and-services legislation in Bogota specifies two
general sets of guidelines. One regulates the engineering
aspects of public utilities like the sizes of water mains, the
level of electrical service and the kind of sewer systems that
can be used. The other set of regulations, and the most
important for site planning, specifies what kinds of residential
support land uses are required. Generally, the cost of the
non-residential land like vehicular and pedestrian circulation,
parks, schools and markets must be paid for by the occupants of
the residential portions. In terms of sites-and-services
projects, the three variables that distinguish all land uses are
the end user, the implementating agent and the placement of
control or legal tenure. From this perspective, all land uses
fall into one of four categories: (1)
1) Private land is residential, commercial and small
industries. Land is essentially under the control of
individual users defined in a legal tenure agreement.
Property development is totally under the control of the
(1) Abstracted from Horacio Caminos and Reinhard Goethert,
Urbanization Primer (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978). p. 92
owner and only partially influenced by building codes orproject regulations as to what can be built. Use of private
land is limited to relatively small numbers of individuals.
In terms of the local and national government, private land
is revenue producing, that is, there is direct taxation and
THe possibilities of recuperating betterment.
2) Semi-private land is held in joint ownership through
condominium or cooperative arrangement. Court areas and
shared access ways to lots are typical examples. Generally
the project tenure system defines who is responsible for its
development and maintenance. Users are generally limited to
the groups sharing the resource. Like private land, it too
is revenue producing for local and national governments.
3) Semi-public land is generally land and facilities used by
the community itself. Open s aces plavfield schools and
to some extent markets are eamplMs. emi-putic lan does
not produce revenue for public authorities except in cases
where there is a user fee levied such as in cases where
stalls are rented in commercial structures used as markets
or small scale manufacturing. The design and regulation of
these areas is done by public authorities.
4) Public land is basically streets and pedestrian ways that
have unrestricted public access and use. Individual tenure
rights do not extend to public land and public authorities
have maximum control over its design and regulation. Public
land does not usually produce direct revenue but may
indirectly when nearby private and semi-private land
increases in value and betterment taxes are levied.
How much land is needed for a sites-and-services project? For a
flat or moderately sloped site (under 20% or 1:5 rise over run),
the total area is derived from a gross density based on what
families can afford to buy; the amount of semi-private,
semi-public, and public land needed to support that density; and
the efficiency of utilities. Case studies by the Urban
Settlement Design in Developing Countries Group at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology indicate from 250 persons per hectare
(p.p.Ha.) to 500 p.p.Ha. is optimal. (1) Below this range,
utilities become disproportionately expensive for the service
population. Above this range, self-help technologies are not
feasible. These figures are generally consistant with those used
by the international agencies. AID recommends from 250 to 300
(1) Gross density is the density of the overall site including
lots and streets. Net density includes only the lot area.
while the OAS uses 600 p.p.Ha, about twice this amount. (1) (2)
The amount of land that is needed is also affected by the type of
subdivision design employed. Pedestrian and vehicular
circulation patterns are the most influential. The land area
used for circulation through the project typically ranges from
between 20% at the lower densities to 30% at higher densities.
Pedestrian and vehicular circulation can be either public or
semi-private depending on the block design and the tenure system.
In cluster blocks, a distinction is made between circulation
through the project and access to individual lots. The latter
does not require a dimension for vehicular traffic and may be
considered semi-public area in which the lot owners that front
the access way bear part of the development and/or maintenance
costs. In certain cluster designs, up to 30% of the circulation
area may become semi-public.
Surprisingly enough, a wide range of physical layout studies show
that density and circulation area have very low positive
correlations and that circulation is almost constant at about 25%
of the total project area. For example, going from a low gross
density of 50 p.p.Ha. to 1000 p.p.Ha. (a 20 fold increase in
density) only increases the total circulation area from about 20%
to a little over 30%. Changes in the gross density of
residential areas have much more effect on the total site area
however.
Residential area is the proportion of private land used for home
building lots. This area is under the maximum individual control
defined by the legalization terms of tenure. The percentage of
residential area within a project decreases as the effective
density range increases. Going from a low density of 50 p.p.Ha.
to 1000 p.p.Ha. decreases residential land from 60% to 50% of
the total site area. Efficiency studies indicate that when these
proportions are exceeded, lower public responsibility (area under
public domain) and cost result (more taxable land for supporting
public areas) but at the expense of less efficient utilities and
service delivery. (3) When proportions are below these ranges,
insufficient private areas mean greater public responsibilities
(1) Agency for International Development Proposed Minimum
Standards (Washington: Department of Housing and Urban
Development Ideas and Methods Exchange No. 64, May, 1966)
(2) Organizacion de Estados Americanos Propuesta Sobre Normas
Minimas de Urbanizacion (Bogota: Centro Interamericano de
Vivienda y~Planeamiento, July, 1968), p. 7
(3) Caminos and Goethert Ibid., and George Gattoni and Praful C.
Patel in Residential Land Utilization, Case Study, Nairobi,
Kenya, Masters in Architecture Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1973
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and higher supporting costs.
Schools, commercial and open space also influence the total
project area. Schools are the most significant semi-public land
use because they imply large recreation areas as well. When
schools are included, site area ranges from about 15% at the
lower densities to 30% at higher densities.
SUBDIVISION AND UTILITIES
The basic objectives of subdivision design are to: 1) maximize
the number of building lots in the project and the variablility
of lot cost to accommodate the widest possible income
distribution among families in the project while 2) minimizing
the capital and operating costs for installing and maintaining
utilities and 3) providing all families with as equal access to
public and semi-public areas as possible.
Once a site has been selected a number of overal design problems
must be dealt with. Through-site circulation is considered
first. If the site is adjacent to existing urbanization, roads
will be largely dictated by established patterns. More typically
however, projects are located on the periphery of the city where
through-site circulation must be determined from estimates of the
longer range development of the area as well as projected public
works implemented by non-housing agencies. In cities where
zoning and subdivision is guided by a master plan, this plan may
in fact have already committed the location of major circulation
routes.
There are several reasons why through-site circulation is done
first. In most cases, sites will require at least minimum
preperation such as leveling or recontouring for drainage
control. Initial infrastructure such as sewer and storm trunk
lines are usually placed under the streets and in high rain
climates, the streets themselves may be the drainage conduits.
Construction vehicles require at least minimally conditioned
surfaces to move equipment, workers and materials from point to
point on the site.
Roads and accompaning drainage account for the highest proportion
of on-site utility costs, thus it is particularly important to
minimize the number of roads in any project. A common technique
in Colombia is to establish a hierarchy of streets and the
utilities that are associated with them. Streets at the highest
level are wide, asphalt paved, well lit, and have curbing, storm
drains and may include sidewalks. At the lowest level, they are
narrow and not likely to have sidewalks or storm drains. The
houses that front these roads or paths may be the only source of
lighting and paving may be no more than compacted gravel or soil.
A hierarchy of roads, paths and utilities is an efficient way to
match public expenditure with the expected use. (1) Once overall
through-site circulation is established, secondary roads within
the site are considered. Block designs establish the frequency,
width and class of roads needed. Cultural travel norms will
also play a part in determining modes of travel, travel times for
particular trips, speeds and frequency of trips.
The block is the basic unit of residential subdivision. The
choice of what design to use profoundly affects the initial and
the longer term operating costs. Inappropriate block designs
waste land, reduce taxable property and lead to higher service
charges for the utilities families use.
Theoretically, a block could consist of as few as four lots
grouped around some common point such as a well or sanitary unit.
More typically, however, a block is a double row of lots
back-to-back. Figure 2.1 shows several gridiron block designs
found in Western countries, the overall length and width is a
function of the area, proportions and the number of lots it
contains. Blocks of this kind are usually bounded on all four
sides by public circulation. The distances between streets in
either direction is called the circulation interval. (2)
The interval or spacing between lines of circulation is a
compromise between small intervals which maximize pedestrian
accessibility to various points on and off-site and large
intervals which reduce the total number of streets and thus the
overall proportion of the project area used for circulation.
Accessibility and circulation intervals are inversely related;
high accessibility results when intervals are small and there are
more streets, but so do costs and the proportion of land not
available for home construction. In Colombia, municipal
ordinances regulate the maximum circulation interval. Often the
distance is related to the maximum distance that fire equipment
can pump water. This is around 100 M which means the maximum
block length is about 150 M to 200 M; water could be pumped 100 M
from either end cf the block and still reach all points.
For simple gridiron designs with back-to-back lots, circulation
intervals are very sensitive to changes in lot proportions. To
illustrate how sensitive they are, consider the differences
between two block designs in which the only change is the
(1) Instituto de Credito Territorial Estudio de Normas Minimasdce
Urbanizacion, Servicios Publicos Servicios Comunitarios
(Bogota: Instituto de Credito Territorial, Agusto, 1971,3
unnumbered illustration p. 310 entitled "Perfiles de Vias"
(2) See Horacio Caminos and Reinhard Goethert, Urbanization
Primer. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978) p. 88 for a complete
analysis of circulation types.
proportion of the lot. The first block design contains 22 square
lots each 100 M2. The second design contains lots of 100 M2 but
the proportions have been changed from 1:1 to 1:2.7. By changingjust the lot proportions while holding the lot area and block
length constant, the second design yields 36 lots while the first
design only yields 22 lots. The interval spacing of the
circulation parallel to the short side of the block has increased
with the deeper lots. The block width has increased from 20 to
33.32 meters while the block length and the width of the streets
were held constant in order to compare the results. This means
the second design has 30% fewer streets parallel to the long axis
of the block than the first design; a significant cost reduction
right off. Figure 2.2 shows the two block designs side by side.
An index of efficiency of lineal utilities (e.g., streets, water
and sewer lines or electrical networks) results when the ratio of
the block circulation length is compared to the block area. (1)
This index, called the R Factor or the Unit Circulation Length(UCL), is computed by dividing the total circulation length by
the block area. Block length for the first case is 220 N (half
the perimeter of the block, the other half belongs to the
adjacent blocks) and 140 M for the second. Block areas are 4,000
M2 and 8,000 M2 respectively. This results in UCL's of .06
meters of utilities per hectare for the first design and .03 for
the second. The second is therefore twice as efficient as the
first because only half the amount of lineal utilities is needed
to service the same area.
Figure 2.3 shows an alternative block design called the cluster;
it is common in many non-Western cultures. Unlike gridiron
blocks where the circulation interval is a function of the lots,
cluster designs are independent. (2)
(1) Horacio Caminos. "A Method for the Evaluation of Urban
Layouts", Industrialization Forum, 3 (December, 1971).
(2) Cluster plan abstracted from Fundacion Salvadorena de
Desarrollo y Vivienda Minima. "Urbanizacion Popotlan - Sector 2,
Apopa Departamento, San Salvador." (San Salvador: Fundacion
Salvadorena de Desarrollo y Vivienda Minima, Division de
Operaciones, Departamento de Proyectos, 1979)
Figure 2.1 Typical Gridiron Blocks
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1:1 Lots 1:2.76 Lots
Figure 2.2 Comparative Gridiron Block Designs
Figure 2.3 Typical Cluster Blocks
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Cluster designs divide circulation into two classes instead ofjust one: 1) circulation through the site and 2) access to
individual lots. With this distinction, a constant but
considerably improved index for Unit Circulation Length and
percentage of private and semi-private land utilization results.
Horacio Caminos and Reinhard Goethert show that 'all cluster
designs for a constant density of 600 p.p.Ha that result from
varying lot proportions from 1:1 to 1:4 and areas from 20 M2 to
400 M2 result in UCL's of 150 M/Ha and %Res's of 62.5%
respectively. (1 ) This is a considerable improvement over the
232 M/Ha and 55% values for the mean 160 M2 lots in gridiron
designs.
Although the block is the basic unit of subdivision, the lot is
the single most important input for the beneficiary. Its size
and proportions dictate what he will pay, what he can build and
on some sites, the kind of construction technology that he must
use. The improved efficiency of lots with narrow fronts and
deeper setbacks has already been shown but there are limits too.
For small lots, under 100 M2, almost all of the site will be
built unless they are on steep slopes. As lots get longer
relative to the fronting circulation, utilities become more
efficient (more lots are being served per lineal meter of pipes,
wires, etc.) but the house plans themselves becomes less
efficient due to long and wasteful corridors. The smaller the
lot, the more serious the lost space. Home builders may have to
go to multi-floor construction to get the necessary space.
Adding floors requires structural flooring, bigger foundations,
stair wells and load bearing walls.
Small narrow lots have other problems when the site is sloped.
If the street fronting the lot is the principal axis for
utilities like sewerage, and it is in most cases, it is more
feasible to run the long axis of the block parallel to the
slope's contours to get proper drainage angles. This means the
long axis of the lot is perpendicular to the slope contours and
will require the maximum amount of cut and fill to excavate a
flat building site. What may be an efficient block design from
the standpoint of utilities may in fact be a very inefficient use
of the lot's area.
How big should lots be? A World Bank survey of 80 proposed and
completed sites-and-services projects in 27 countries found that
most lots were above 150 M2. Table 2.1 shows the distribution of
lot sizes in the surveyed projects. (2)
(I) Horacio Caminos and Reinhard Goethert. Urbanization Primer.(Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press, 1978). p. 113.
(2) Praful C. Patel Sites and Services: Survey and Analysis of
Urbanization Standards and On-Site Infrastructure Washington:
PLOT SIZE
2 COMPLETED PROPOSED % OF COUNTRIES
M PLOTS PLOTS TOTAL
0-100 15 41 23 Colombia, El Salvador,
Guinea, Jamaica, India,
Indonesia, Korea, Morocco,
Pakistan
101-200 69 21 55 Colombia, Chile, Guinea,
Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya,
Nicaragua, Pakistan,
Senegal, Zambia
201-300 8 14 8 Colombia, Kenya, Senegal,
Tanzania
301-400 1 24 9 Botswana, Kenya,.Zambia
------------------------------------------------------------
Table 2.1 Distribution of Lot Sizes in World Bank Projects
When lot sizes are weighted by frequency within projects, 12
World Bank projects in 10 countries and 54 non-Bank projects in
54 countries have mean values of 160 M2. The standard deviation
(SD) for each group differs however. Bank projects are less
variant in lot sizes at 56 SD while non-Bank are almost three
times as variant at 139 SD. (1)
Table 2.2 shows the lot sizes recommended by the international
development agencies. (2)
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Transportation and Urban Projects Department, August, 1974), P.7
(1) Ibid., Mean and standard deviation for grouped data performed
on "Data Matrix: Survey of 10 Bank Sites-and-Services Projects",
Annex A, p.10 and "Scanning Survey of Sites-and-Services: Summary
Chart", Annex A pp.2-3
(2) William Grindley and Robert Merrill, Sites and Services: The
Experience and Potential (Washington: International Bank for
construction and Development, International Development
Association, May, 1973), p.16
LOT DIMENSIONS AND ASSUMED
INTERNATIONAL AGENCY AREA MINIMUM FRONTAGE FAMILY SIZE
United Nations Relief 2 7.5M X 14M 5
and Works Agency (UNRWA) 105 M 1 : 1.9
US Agency for Interna- 2 5M X 16-7M 5
tional Development (AID) 100 M 1 3.5
Organization of American 2 5M X 8M 6
States (OAS) 40 M 1 : 1.6M
Table 2.2 Lot Sizes Recommended by International Agencies
What is interesting about these recommendations is that not only
are lots undersized when compared to implemented projects, their
size and proportions will yield very poor efficiency ratings in
gridiron block designs, the most common design in current
projects. In the last few years, sites-and-services projects are
increasing in scale. The tendency is to cut project costs by
using smaller lots. When the lot area falls below 100 M2, the
advantages of cluster over gridiron designs are very dramatic.
UTILITIES AND COSTS
The basic utilities in every sites-and-services project are
water, sewerage, roads, storm drainage, street lighting and
electricity. These utilities are reasonably permanent
installations, and once designed and installed are not often
affected nor changed by growth. In most cases these utilities
are extensions of a much larger service network installed and
maintained by non-housing agencies. Regulating the initial level
of public utilities to lots is the most common way project
planners adjust the standards and costs of lots to match
families' ability to pay.
Surveys of World Bank projects show that on-site infrastructure
is about 33% of the total site cost. (1) Table 2.3 shows the
utility costs per lot for 18 world wide sites-and-services
projects. Table 2.4 shows the utility costs per lot for another
18 projects that did not include street lighting or full
electrical service to each lot. For projects not including
street lighting and electricity, water costs remain relatively
( ) World Bank. Housing Sector Policy Paper (Washington: World
Bank, May, 1975), p. 40
constant with fully serviced projects, although there were higher
costs for sewerage and roads with drainage. Costs for these
later two categories of utilities had significantly higher
variance in individual project costs, however, as indicated by
the higher standard deviation for these means.
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STREET
ROADS & LIGHTING-
WATER SEWERAGE DRAINAGE ELECTRIC TOTAL
16.01% 33.26% 34.94% 15-79% 100.00%
5.11 7.16 9.84 9.72
Table 2.3 Mean and Standard Deviation of Utility
Costs per Lot for 18 Sites-and-Services Projects
ROADS &
WATER SEWERAGE DRAINAGE TOTAL
Mean % 17.98% 37.74%
SD 7.8 16.03
44.27% 100.0%
12.72
Table 2.4 Mean and Standard Deviation of
Utility Costs per Lot, 18 Project Without
Street Lighting or Electricity
(2)
(1 ) Praful Patel Ibid., mean and standard deviation for grouped
data performed on "Data Matrix: Survey of On-Site Infrastructure
Costs per Plot", Annex A, p.5. Percentage cost figures weighted
by total number of lots within each project. Total of 50,784
lots included in survey.
(2) Praful Patel Ibid., Annex A, p. 5, performed only for
appropriate projects (45,535 lots).
Mean
SD
(1)
Most of the projects that did not have the full complement of
services were located in Senegal and Zambia where the total
development costs per capita are the lowest of any of the 10
countries included in the World Bank survey. (1) Unit
Circulation Length tables and percentages of land for private and
semi-public use have been constructed for lot areas from 20 M2 to
400 M2 and proportions 1:1 to 1:4. When lot area is used as the
independent variable, analysis shows for a constant density of
600 p.p.Ha that almost all the variance in Unit Circulation
Length can be explained by changes in lot area in gridiron plans.
The relationship of lot area to Unit Circulation Length is best
expressed as a negative power function where the dependent
variable is Unit Circulation length (UCL) and the independent
variable is Lot Area (LA). Table 2.5 summarizes the relation for
four lot proportions. (2)
LOT UNIT
PROPORTION CIRCULATION LENGTH
-. 23
1:1 UCL = 1020.3 (LA )
-. 25
1:2 UCL = 914.2 (LA )
-. 25
1:3 UCL = 837.6 (LA )
-. 25
1:4 UCL = 827.3 (LA )
Table 2.5 Unit Circulation Length
The object of subdivision design is to lower the value for UCL,
or the total lineal utilities needed to serve an area. Comparing
the above functions, lots with proportions 1:4 will always be
more efficient than 1:1, that is, will require less utilities per
area. The earlier example of block design verified this. What
(1) Praful Patel Ibid., Annex A, p. 13 "Comparison of DevelopmetT
Costs for Sites-and-Services Plots in 10 Bank Projects - Adjusted
to per Capita GNP of US $200"
(2) Summary power curves derived from geometric analysis of lot
areas from 20 M2 to 400 M2 and proportions 1:1 to 1:4. UCL
tables first constructed by the author in "Supermanzana: the
Orderly Subdivision of Land", Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Department of Architecture, December, 1969 and
reported in Caminos and Goethert Ibid., pp. 114-115.
Coefficients of determination (r2) for UCL functions are .92,
.99, .99 and .99 for proportions 1:1, 1:2, 1:3 and 1:4
respectively.
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isn't so obvious is that even when lot sizes exceed 400 M2, which
is already 2.5 times the mean value for current
sites-and-services projects, the value for UCL in gridiron
designs will never be less than 155 M/Ha. More likely UCL values
will be around 232 M/Ha.
Adjustments to lot area and proportions also affect the
percentage of land for private and semi-private uses. When lot
area (LA) is again used as the independent variable and the
percentage of land for residential use (%Res) is compared for a
constant density of 600 p.p.Ha, almost all the variation in %Res
can be explained by changes in LA. Table 2.6 summarizes this
relationship. (1)
LOT PERCENT OF LAND
PROPORTIONS FOR RESIDENTIAL USE
.17
1:1 %Res = 20.35 (LA )
.13
1:2 %Res = 26.93 (LA )
.11
1:3 %Res = 30.82 (LA )
.10
1:4 %Res = 33.20 (LA )
Table 2.6 Residential Land Use
The object of subdivision design is to maximize revenue producing
land,; the amount of site area used for home building. From the
above equations it can be seen that lots with proportions 1:4
provide more usable residential land area than lots with
proportions 1:1. For the mean lot area of 160 M2 the difference
between 1:1 and 1:4 is 48.22% and 55.15% respectively or about
15% more residential area for the narrower shaped lots. Using
1:4 proportions, the maximum percentage of residential land will
not exceed 60% even with large lot areas like 400 M2.
(1) Summary power curves derived from Caminos and Goethert Ibid.,
pp.114-115. Coefficients of determination (r2) for %Res
functions are .97, .97, .98 and .97 for proportions 1:1, 1:2, 1:3
and 1:4 respectively.
SUMMARY
Two general subdivision layouts have been discussed, gridiron
blocks with individual lots and clusters made up of lots in
condominium. The lot in a gridiron block fronts a public street
that is both circulation through the project as well as access to
the lot. Street layouts are a direct function of the lot size
thus street length and utilities can only be partially influenced
by changing the lot. In clusters, lots and dwellings are grouped
around semi-private courts or paths. These access ways are held
in condominium by those who share it. Unlike the street in
gridiron layouts, cluster access ways allow for several kinds of
tenure arrangements maximizing user control over land that will
produce revenue for the city.
The following rules of thumb summarize what has been said about
subdivision design:
1) Longer blocks increase efficiency no matter what the lot
area or proportions are because they eliminate streets. As
the circulation interval increases, there is a corresponding
decrease in accessibility throught the site.
2) Lots with proportions 1:1 produce the least efficient
subdivision layouts while those approaching 1:4 are more
efficient.
3) Larger lot areas are always more efficient than smaller
ones.
4) The minimum (most efficient) realizable Unit Circulation
Lengths for standard sized lots (160 M2) and 1:4 proportions
will only be about 232 M/Ha in gridiron designs; for
clusters, it can be as low as 150/Ha.
5) The maximum (most desirible) private area in a project site
for standard lots of 1:4 proportions will not exceed 55%.
STAGING INFRASTRUCTURE
One feature of the sites-and-services policy is the ability to
commence large scale projects with significantly lower initial
capital costs for infrastructure. This is accomplished in two
ways. First, dwellers may be responsible for substantial
portions of the infrastructure. They may install or maintain
portions of it through different levels of community action and
mutual help. Cluster designs are well suited for this because
lot clusters are convenient administrative units. Secondly,
projects can be implemented in stages. Irregardless of whether
or not the community participates in the installation of
infrastructure, the fact that it can be progressively installed
over much longer terms offers more flexibility in scheduling and
financing.
Sites-and-services projects thus far show an enormous range of
infrastructure staging. In minimal projects, only community
water stations, pit latrines, public showers and unpaved streets
are offered. In more advanced projects, lots have electrical,
water, and sewerage connections to each lot. The ability to
offer such a wide range of service levels is a way to increase
the variability of lot prices to accommodate the widest possible
income distribution among families.
The World Bank uses a generalized physical typology to classify
projects. (1) This typology identifies four prototypes, each
according to initial infrastructure and construction: 1)
subdivision with basic services, 2) subdivision with basic
sanitary core, 3) subdivision with built sanitary core and
minimal living area and 4) subdivision with fully developed
dwelling. In the first type, plots have communal services or
with communal water and individual pit latrine or with individual
water and sewerage connections. The second type has all services
connected to the sanitary core unit. Type 3 is the same as 2 but
there is also a built living area which may be a completed room,
a shell structure or just a roof. In type 4, there is a built
dwelling. Given the fact that sites-and-services projects leave
the home building decision to the user, this typology overly
skews the importance of physical construction on the plot. Bank
projects indicate that type 3 projects are not common and type 4
are even less so.
Alfred Van Huyck offers an alternative 4 class typology which
more adequately describes the sites-and-services experience thus
far: (2)
Type 1 - Raw land, subdivided into plots with a common water
tap serving a number of plots, common latrines, and
unpaved streets
Type 2 - Plots, each serviced by a water tap and with its own
latrine, septic tank or sewer connections
Type 3 - Plots, each serviced as above and with a small
outbuilding containing the core facility
Type 4 - Plots, each serviced and with a partly finished
house, which could be a slab, a slab with supports
and roof, or one complete room upon which additions
can be made.
This scheme has two advantages over the former. Each type
discriminates on the basis of sewerage and water service levels.
(1) Praful Patel Ibid., un-numbered figure adjacent to page 3
(2) Alfred Van Huyck Planning for Sites and Services Pro rams(Washington: Department of'Housing and Urban Development, Ideas
and Methods Exchange, 1971), p. 23
These services, when combined, account for over half of the
initial infrastructure costs. The typology is also in line with
the policy intention to maximize the beneficiaries control over
the implementation of his house. When authorities do construct
on the lot in Types 3 and 4, it is more for health purposes than
for dictating house design or construction.
From 1972 to 1978, World Bank assisted projects have
progressively moved from Type 1 to Types 2 and 3. In 1972,
Senegal was the earliest Bank assisted project. This $22 million
dollar project called for a Type 1 design with communal stand
pipes and pit privies for 16,000 lots. Two years later, a large
project in Tanzania called for similar initial service levels for
10,000 lots but added open ditch storm drainage. More recently,
however, Bank assisted projects have definitely shifted towards
Type 2 and 3. In the two latest reporting years, 1976 and 1977,
the Bank participated in 8 new projects totaling 75,775 lots of
which 69% were Type 2 or higher while only 31% were Type 1. (1)
This same trend is also occuring in Colombia's sites-and-services
programs.
STAGING AND BLOCK DESIGN
Staging infrastructure is related to block design. In earlier
sections it was pointed out that cluster designs differentiated
between circulation through the site and access to individual
lots, this leads to better private and semi-private land
utilization and to lower infrastructure costs. In terms of
staging, clusters are considerably more flexible than gridiron
designs because they offer more possibilities and options for
separating public authority and individual responsibility for
implementation. For example, the access way is semi-private land
held in condominium or cooperative ownership. This arrangement
allows several staging options: 1) a full one third to one half
of all project utilities, those associated with the access way
can become the responsibility of the dwellers abutting it thus
the timing and sequencing can be governed by a small group
consensus, 2) the access way connection to through circulation
routes offer a way to anticipate future service connection
points; there is the option of aggregating costs such as
materials, technical assistance or even service billing in larger
units, and 3) important infrastructure costs such as sewer
man-holes, cleanouts and water meters can be drastically reduced.
(1) International Bankfor Reconstruction and Development.
"Sites-and-Services Upgrading: A Review of World Bank-Assisted
Projects." Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Urban Projects Department, January, 1978
(Mimeographed) Attachment 1
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Staging affects both utility costs and the total buildable area
of the lot. Basically there are two overall approaches for
laying out the sewer system irregardless of block design: sewers
can be either put in the center of the street and connected to
lots by way of smaller drain pipes or they can be put in the
center of the block and connected to lots in a similar way. When
the street or access way is used, home builders frequently build
their bathroom, kitchen and laundary rooms nearer the front of
the lot to reduce the amount of connect pipes.
Another approach frequently used in gridiron designs is to run
the sewer line down the middle of the block serving up to four
lots with a single connection. In the mid-street approach, the
sewer network is entirely on public land; for the cluster case,
it is on semi-private land. There are two reasons for this:
accessibility and structural integrity. Pipes must remain
accessible for maintenance, extension and meter reading.
Normally, load bearing walls and foundations cannot cross nor be
located any nearer than about a meter if the pipe alignment and
structural integrity are to be preserved as adjacent buildings
settle over time.
The mid-block approach is becoming more widespread in use as
projects begin to shift from Type 1 to Types 3 and 4. It is
generally argued that when core sanitary units are included in a
project, it is cheaper to service four units placed back-to-back
around a common connection point than it is to service only two
units back-to-back with feeder lines running from the center of
the street. When detailed plans are prepared for cost
estimating, however, it turns out that both approaches cost about
the same and that mid-street loactions are more flexible to
implement, maintain and enlarge.
Building codes in Colombia require separate network connections
for each dwelling unit connected to the system. For health
reasons, the effluent from one unit must not require the
servicability of another unit's system to discharge into the
network. One reason is that if one unit's system becomes
clogged, it does not in turn clog up others further back on the
line. In some cities, there are additional requirements that
each unit have their own cleanout facilities. In practice, a
single point connection cannot be made for four units. A number
of "Y" connections are requried even for the most minimal of
network connections. When the detailed construction plans for
both approaches are compared, the extra joinery costs required by
the mid-block design lose their real cost advantages over the
extra piping needed in the mid-street approach.
If the differences in costs are minimal, why is it an issue?
Returning to the need for an easement in the mid-block design,
from 1 to 3 meters at the rear of each lot on one side of the
block will be unusable for construction for the lots traversed by
the easement. An average lot of 160 M2 and proportions 1:2.5 or
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an 8 M X 20 M lot, will lose about 15% of its buildable area just
to maintain the easement. The greatest difference between the
approaches is the complication of trying to repair, enlarge or
maintain the the system as the project matures and lot owners
build up their homes. What is curious is the fact that all Type
3 and 4 Bank assisted projects in Latin America have promoted
mid-block designs. Mid-block designs with grouped sanitary core
units were implemented in Jamaica for about 40% of that projects
6,000 lots, for five projects totaling 8,000 lots in El Salvador,
and for 6,4000 lots in Nicaragua's earthquake reconstruction
project.
PROJECT COST COMPONENTS
The main cost components in projects are land, site preparation,
on-site infrastructure and plot development. Figure 2.7 shows
the approximate distribution in projects assisted by the World
Bank.
UNWEIGHTED
COST ITEM MEAN RANGE
Land 21% 14-28%
Site Preparation 13% 0-19% (1)
Topo/Survey Work
On-Site Infrastructure 33% 10-27%
Water Supply
Sewerage
Surface Drainage
Roads and Footings
Public Lighting
Electricity
Plot Development 33% 4-62% (2)
100%
(1) In one case 61%
(2) In four cases 0%
Table 2.7 Percentage Distribution of
Development Costs for World Bank
Assisted Sites-and-Services Projects
A World Bank survey of 19 projects underway in 10 countries shows
that when land cost is included in the lot purchase price,
families pay from 13% to 22% of the mortgage principal for the
unimproved land alone. (2) The wide variance results from
(1) World Bank Housing Sector Policy Paper (Washington: World
Bank, May, 1975, Annex 12), p. 72
(2) Praful C. Patel Sites and Services Projects: Survey and
Analysis of Urbanization Standards and On-Site Infrastructure(Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, August, 1974, Annex A), p. 11
different levels of initial lot development such as partial
dwellings like sanitary core units or minimum shelters and
materials loans for construction. These inputs depress the
proportion that families pay for the land.
RECOVERING COSTS
There are three main ways to recover costs from project
beneficiaries: 1) mortgages, 2) taxes and 3) user charges.
Mortgages recover the largest portion of project costs. Mortgage
accounting is subject to a number of conditions each of which can
be used as a policy instrument to align cost recovery with the
beneficiaries' ability to pay. Taxation has always been a major
land use policy instrument. In the broad context, there are four
general types: land value incremental tax, betterment levy, tax
on speculative short term capital gains and penal tax on vacant
land. The first three aim at recovering public investments which
change land value while the last one encourages development of
unimproved lots.
MORTGAGES
Mortgage accounting is relatively simple. Capital improvements
charged to beneficiaries are recovered through a stream of
payments. Normally, mortgage holders make a down payment against
the debt and follow it with regular monthly payments which pay
part of the principal and an interest charge on the outstanding
debt. Payment terms are typically from 10 to 20 years. A
mortgage accounting example is shown in Figure 2.4 and Table 2.8.
Mortgages have three policy variables: the down payment, the
payment period and the interest rate on the outstanding debt.
Down payments are not always required but when they are, they are
designed to: 1) lower the amount that the family will pay in
interest charges over the years they are paying off their debt,
2) reduce the risk that borrowers will default, and 3) create a
higher cash flow when projects are being occupied. Some argue
that down payments are unreasonable barriers to entry in social
interest housing. Low-income families traditionally have little
or no savings. Down payments create economic stratification in
projects by creaming off the wealthier families while passing
over the neediest. Others argue that without this barrier,
selecting families would be even more complicated and that banks
would not lend to project authorities because the preceived risk
of arrears or defaults is too high.
The mortgage period is really two variables in one: how often the
payments are made and for how many years. The most common
practice is to amortize the debt over 10 to 20 years with a
stream of monthly payments. Interest is basically the rate of
return on capital or simply the price of borrowing money.
Low-income families generally cannot qualify for conventional
bank loans and the lower down payments and interest charges in
projects is a major benefit for them. In the past, most interest
rates in Colombian projects were fixed; the mortgage holder
continued to pay the same rate for the entire term of the loan
and payed a fixed amount each month. The first and last payment
may be higher than the others if there are closing cost and title
transfer fees. Today, the trend is towards lower down payments
and longer term loans because low-income families generally have
no savirags. A survey in a recent sites-and-services project in
Bogota found that families applied for project housing based on
the down payment and monthly quotas. The total cost of the lot
and core unit was not very important to them. Longer term loans
are higher risk. Lowering down payments reduce the cash flow
when projects first start and there is less of a financial
committment to the government. If inflation is high, the buying
power of the money that families repay with will decrease.
Governments may hedge their capital recovery by using a variable
interest rate that is adjusted upward as future payments are
made.
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MORTGAGE ACCOUNTING EXAMPLE
A family buys a lot with sanitary core unit in a
sites-and-services project valued at P$27,800. The family cannot
make any down payment but can meet monthly payments of P$300
(25% of their P$1,200/Mth income) for 15 years (180 payments).
The lending agency charges 10% interest on the outstanding
balance. The direct reduction loan amortization schedule for
this loan:
Monthly
Payment
P$300 +-------------------------------------+
Payment to Principal
P$200 +
Payment to Interest
0 -------- +------------------------------
60
(5 Yrs)
120
(10 Yrs)
180
(15 Yrs)
Payment
Number
Figure 2.4 Payment for Interest and Principal
--------------------------------------------------------
PAID TO PAID TO REMAINING TOTAL INTEREST
PAYMENT INTEREST % PRINCIPAL % BALANCE PAID TO DATE
27,782.08
26,769.62
25,546.03
24,160.23
22,590.75
20,813.18
18,799.99
16,519.92
13,937.61
11,012.99
7,700.67
3,949.26
0.00
232.08
3,419.62
6,696.03
9,810.23
12,740.73
15,463.18
17,949.99
20,169.92
22,087.61
23,662.99
24,850.67
25,599.26
25,850.56
Table 2.8 Direct Reduction Loan Amortization Schedule
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1
15
30
45
60
75
90
105
120
135
150
165
180
232.08
232-72
213.60
202.15
189.18
174.49
157.85
139.01
117.67
93.50
66.12
35.12
0.00
77
75
71
67
63
58
53
46
39
31
22
12
0
67.92
76.28
86.40
97.85
110.82
125.51
142.15
160.99
182.33
206.58
233.88
264.88
300.00
23
25
29
33
37
42
47
54
61
69
78
88
100
In addition to longer term loans, there is a trend toward
increasing the ways in which families can pay off their
mortgages. Usually there are combinations of down payments and
term years. Picking one establishes the other. The mortgage
schedule in Table 2.10 shows the value in pesos for four types of
solutions in a recent Colombian sites-and-services project. The
solutions are very much like the typology suggested by Alfred Van
Huyck. For each solution type in the first column, the table
states its approximate value (1974 prices), qualifying income
levels, the interest rate being charged and the monthly payment.
To suggest the effects of inflation, each solution's price in
1978 and the compound yearly increase that occured in four years
has been footnoted.
Table 2.10 was calculated by using two different interest rates
and several combinations of down payment and term years. Once
the monthly payment is determined, the minimum family income is
calculated. The policy here is that the family should not pay
more than 30% of their income for housing payments. Banks
generally will not lend mortgage money when monthly payments
exceed 20% to 30% of the family's total income. Case studies of
low-income rents indicate that lower income families spend
disproportionately higher amounts of their income for rent than
higher income groups. The example schedule assumes the maximum
proportion of income paid to rent. Although the schedule appears
to offer payment flexibility, the difference between the choices
does not indicate it. When inflation is high, it is better for a
family to get the most expensive solution they can qualify for,
to pay it off over the longest term allowable and not to make any
down payment if possible. Notice, for example, that for Type 1
solutions, a family making P$800/Mth will pay twice the down
payment that a family earning just P$20 less per month will pay.
Similar discontinuities exist between other income groups.
Prospective families are quick to perceive these inconsistancies
and will inflate or deflate their declared incomes to avoid them.
Note also that lower-income families have fewer long term choices
while higher income groups tend to get the shorter terms. This
distribution implies that poorer families are higher loan risks.
If the price increase between 1974 and 1978 is indicative of the
true increase in value of the solutions, then there is much less
risk associated with Type 1 soultions than Type 4 because there
is less to loose should there be a default.
How can mortgage be brought into line with the risks and the
families ability to pay? If the 1974 solution costs, interest,
minimum income levels and monthly payment are held constant for
the sake of comparison, the maximum affordable loan can be
determined for each income group. This is the maximum mortgage a
family can get and thus the maximum solution a family can qualify
for without a down payment. Table 2.11 shows a revised
amortization schedule based on this approach for 10, 15, and 20
year terms. To arrive at these figures, all that was done was to
assume the corresponding monthly payments for each of the three
terms at the given interest rate. Notice that based just on
monthly payments and a fixed rate of interest that most of the
lower income families can pay off their housing solutions with no
down payment at all (column 4). Notice too that none of the
higher income groups can afford their homes without a down
payment.
What can families afford if they also have savings for a down
payment? In addition to borrowing money from extended family,
there are two institutional alternatives for accumulating down
payments -- through the "social loans" system or through personal
savings. Social loans or prestaciones sociales are a series of
non-taxable forced savings programs for employees with regular
salaried jobs. The first is called the prima de servicios. When
the employer has more than P$200,000 fixed cEpital, he must pay
one month's salary extra each year to his employees. Smaller
employers pay half this amount. The ima, in essence, is a free
months wage. Another type of "loan" isthe auxilio de cesantia.
The normal rule is for each year of employment, an employee
accumulates one month's salary based on the average salary for
that year. The employee can collect his cesantia when he: 1)
quits his job or 2) wants to buy a house or make additions to an
existing one. If one assumes that the employee has had a minimum
wage job with a large employer for at least five years, he would
have accumulated about P$13,500 in forced savings programs even
if one assumes that the employee will always spend his prima on
other things.
Personal savings is another important source of down payment
capital. In order to quantify how much savings can be expected
from different income groups, the marginal propensity to save
must be estimated for the groups included in the project. If one
assumes that savings is a function of income, the question is for
each additional peso of income, how much more will the family
save? Table 2.9 approximates the marginal propensity to save in
Bogota in 1974. (1) For each level of monthly income, the chart
states the likely amount the family could save in one year and
what percent of the yearly income would be saved. Essentially,
as income rises, so does savings bit not in a lineal way. The
more a family earns, a higher the proportion of that income could
be saved. It follows that higher income families are in a better
position to make down payments than poorer families. If one also
assumes that families can save for at least two years towards
their down payment, the savings indicated in Table 2.9 can be
doubled. Adding this new increment to the affordable capital in
Table 2.11 (column 4) results in a revised set of affordable
housing levels (column 5). Table 2.11 also shows the resulting
value of the solutions that each income level can now afford.
(1) Estimates for the marginal propensity to save were derived
from home interviews in 1975
Note that some of the income groups in Type 4 solutions still do
not have enough of a down payment to qualify. It is likely that
families with this level of income will also be using their
prestaciones sociales as part of their down payments. The
revised schedule offers several advantages over the former: 1)
lower income groups have more long term choices without down
payments, 2) down payments are now based on likely savings levels
rather than arbitrary mixes of down payments and term years, and
3) there is a smoother transition between trade-offs than before.
INCOME SAVINGS PERCENT
(MTH) (YEAR) INCOME
700 1136 14%
800 1384 14%
900 1635 15%
1000 1890 16%
1100 2148 16%
1200 2409 17%
1300 2673 17%
1400 2939 17%
1500 3207 18%
1600 3478 18%
1700 3750 18%
1800 4024 19%
1900 4301 19%
2000 4579 19%
2100 4858 19%
Table 2.9 Estimated Savings in Pesos
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----------------------------- +-----------------+-----------+------------------------------------------------- - ----------
MINIMUM| PERCENT DOWN PAYMENT ' TERMS ' INT '
TYPE OF SOLUTION 1974 VALUE INCOME I NONE 10% 20% 30% 10 15 20 RATE I PMT/MTH1
+---------------------+-----------------+-----------+---------------------------------+----------------+------------+
1. Lot 60M2 with sever con- 780 1,840 X 15% 231.77
nection, communal water * 800 3,680 X 15% 237.48
tap, electrical connect- $18,400 810 X X 15% 242.28
ion, concrete sidewalks 860 X x 15% 257.62
and paved vehicular ways 900 1,840 X 15% 267.16
1,000 xI 15% 296.85
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 268
2. Type 1 plus electrical 1,025 5,515 X 16% 1 307.00
connection to lot and * 1,220 2,757 X 16% 1 364.50
10M2 core unit $27,580 1,230 5,515 x 16% 1 369.60
1 , 300 1x X 1 16% 383.70
1,400 2,757 X 16% 415.75
+----------------------------+-----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------
3. Type I plus 15M2 sanit- 1,200 6,302 X 16% 350.70
ary core unit and one * 1,320 3,115 X 16% 394.50
small room electrical $31,500 1,400 3,115 X 16% 416.50
connection to lot 1,500 X X 16% 438.40
1,600 3,115 X 16% 475.00
+----------------------------+-----------------+-----------+------------------------------------------------- - -----------
4. Type 1 plus 18M2 living 1,500 13,800 X10 16% 448.00
room, bath and kitchen 1,600 13,800 X 16% 473.00
unit, installed sewer, $46,000 1 1720 9,200 X 16% 512.00
water and electricity to 1,800 9,200 X 16% 4 5 0 . 0 0
the dwelling 1,950 4,600 x 16% 576.00
2,050 4,600 x 16% 608.00
-------------------------------------- +-----------+---------------------------------+----------------+ ------------ +
* $22,000; $39,000; $45,000 & $75,000 Respectively in 1978
4.5% 8.6% 8.9% 13.0% Yearly Increase
Table 2.10 Direct Reduction Loan Amortization Schedule
for a Typical Sites-and-Services Project
(1) Caja de la Vivienda Popular, "Formulario de Solicitude de Vivienda Plan: Las Guacamayas" (Bogota: Caja de
la Vivienda Popular, 1974), p. 2
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TAXATION
Taxation is an additional way to recover costs from
beneficiaries. The most common taxes are general levies,
betterment and capital gains taxation. General Levies are
annualized charges associated with the costs for maintaining
public services like public education and health facilities or
fire and police protection. Tax rates can be fixed but more
commonly they are fractional amounts of the assessed value of
real property. The increased value of real property that results
from private investment in a project is called the "earned
increment" and can be approximated and used as a basis for
charging for public services not recoverable through direct users
fees like'utility bills or by taxing property when it is sold.
Not all increases in land value result from investments made by
the owner himself. Government action, whether positive (eg. by
executing public works of other land improvements), or negative
(eg. by the imposition of restrictions on other land) can
substantially change property values. Taxing the increased value
that results from government action is the principle of
betterment levies. (1) (2)
Unlike capital gains tax which occurs only when the property is
sold, betterment levies can occurs anytime. The basic principle
of betterment argues that: 1) only a small part of increases in
land values are due to improvements made by landlords or tenants,
and 2) increased value results from direct capital inprovements
in the project site and an overall development effect in the
off-project area. Capturing the "betterment" accuring to land
and housing owners from public inputs therefore requires that
this "unearned increment" is taxed or otherwise obtained for
public use. Betterment taxation attempts to recoup the costs of
public investments through user fees and service charges rather
than through a general tax revenue system. In Colombia,
betterment taxation is called valorizacion and it is a major way
of recovering public works investments. (3)
(1) Orville Grimes "Urban Land and Public Policy: Social
Appropriation of Betterment" (Washington: International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, Bank Staff Working Paper No. 179,
May, 1974), p. i
(2) When land development results in decreased land values, it is
called "worsement". For a complete presentation of the
theoretical differences between betterment and worsement, see R.
Turvey Economics of Real Property (London: George Allen and
Unwin, 1957)
(3) See William Doebele. "Valorization Charges as a Method for
Financing Public Works in Bogota, Colombia." (Washington, World
Bank, June, 1975)
Non-project forces also effect the value of land. Rising demand
resulting from increased population and the expectation that
future land prices will be even higher than current ones. Land
supply is relatively inelastic, constrained by the physical
limits of metropolitan land areas, market witholdings by owners,
and the shortage of resources for servicing new areas.
Capital gains taxes are levies against the difference between the
market value and the base assessed value of real property when it
is sold or transferred to another person. Since this tax occurs
only when properties are sold, it can be deferred indefinitely.
Capital gains taxes do two things - they increase revenues from
projects and they make short term speculation more difficult.
The major sites-and-services projects in Colombia require
occupants that have clear titles, to first offer to sell the
property to the implementing agency. If the occupant does not
yet have clear title, he must sell to the agency or at least
transact the sale through that agency. There are several reasons
for this practice. When homeowners make improvements to their
lots and construct dwellings, the market value at the time of
sales is usually substantially higher than the base assessed
value of what the family originally purchased. The implementing
agency can recuperate part of its costs by taxing a portion of
this gain in value. Another reason for controlling the
transaction is to recuperate any outstanding debts from the
seller before he gets his money from the buyer. Given that
agencies coordinate the transaction, the seller receives some
measure of protection against-buyers who are poor credit risks.
In some cases, original project beneficiaries may have had
deferred property tax exemptions. By controling the transaction,
the agency can release the property from exemption status and
update the assessed value for property tax purposes.
Unlike income tax which taxes 100% of wages and salaries, capital
gains taxes are levied only on a fraction of the gain. This
makes capital gains a regressive tax because higher income groups
generally derive more of their wealth through non-salary or
non-wage means. Since the tax rate is lower for this kind of
income, the wealthier tend to benefit more from capital gains
taxation than do the poor.
CHAPTER 3
PROJECT CASE STUDIES
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INTRODUCTION
Ten years of experience with sites-and-services shows that the
relationship of public to private investment is still unclear.
Lots go unsold despite high demands for plots in illegal
settlements, projects repeatedly serve higher income groups than
desired and many forms of technical assistance have doubtful
effects on improving environmental conditions. Chapter 2
reviewed the scope of typical upgrade and sites-and-services
projects and showed that there are a number of key decision
points in every project: selecting beneficiaries, determining
physical design, allocating costs and supplying technical
assistance. It also showed that not all project planning
decisions are made under uncertain conditions.
This chapter will look at three projects -- one upgrade project
and two sites-and-services -- to see what the effect of
government capital programs have been on private homeowner
investment. Unlike the theoretical approach of Chapter 2, the
emphasis here will be on the way families actually build, finance
and use their homes and how those practices differ from what the
project planners' had anticipated. Project analysis is
important. First it shows the responses that home owners have;
many are surprising to administrators. Their surprise is, to
some extent, an indication that they did not fully understand the
progressive squatter settlements that they modeled these projects
after. Second, the projects demonstrate that much of the
investment uncertainty and surprise is a product of poor planning
practice. Obviously hindsight is clearer than foresight but
project experience is seldom cumulative and rarely transfers.
Projects simply don't keep close enough track of their own
interventions to be able to know what the circumstances were that
led to success or failure. The problem, oddly enough, is too
much information. In all projects, significant amounts of
information was gathered to support critical decisions, yet many
decisions were still incorrectly made. Successful designs and
administrative practices in one project are totally ignored in
the next. The project experience does not become cumulative or
transferable to the institution as a whole. While project
administrators complain that there is inadequate information on
which to base investment decisions, project records and
interviews with the beneficiaries themselves demonstrate the
opposite. Information is available, analytical models do exist
and it will make a difference to the project success to model the
interaction of.investment. What the case studies show even more
is the need to organize and structure the information already at
hand.
The agency that implemented these projects produced a very
successful prototype that could have served as a model for future
ones yet those principals were abandoned. The lapse of
institutional memory did make a difference, not only was their
latest project less successful than the prototype, the experience
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led them to abandon that line of self-help projects altogether.
This was an unfortunate outcome because the reasons for the
failure were never researched and it's just as likely that the
same errors will continue in the new line of projects. The point
of the cases isn't that the agency was incompetent or special --
it is neither. The point is to show how important adequate
information and structure are to improving policy and where
projects themselves can provide that information. In the next
chapter, the information needs for the main project decision
points are analyzed and an overall information framework is
proposed.
Two of the case studies are large projects with more than 1,000
families. All are located in Bogota and were projects of the
Popular Housing Bank (Caja de la Vivienda Popular-CVP or Caja).
Las Colinas is a ten year old invasion barrio that was the first
significant upgrade experiment in Colombia. The apparent success
of this project led to numerous legislative changes that allowed
Bogota's District Planning office and the Caja to transfer the
self-help and minimum standards model used in Las Colinas to
projects where new housing would be built. The legislation was
first pre-tested in a small pilot project called La Manuelita.
This project was very successful and encouraged the Caja to apply
the sites-and-services model to a significantly larger project
called Las Guacamayas.
The idea behind Las Guacamayas is to use sites-and-services to
offer a range of physical housing solutions that could attract
and socially integrate the widest low-income range possible. The
scope of capital investments in the projects are very similar to
those described in Chapter 2 though the physical layout of Las
Guacamayas ignores most of the principles discussed. The Caja
assumed that families would invest in the new project in a
certain way. Once implementation began, however, families
invested very differently and undermined many of the Caja's
programs. In some cases, the Caja simply failed to recognize
that the "unexpected" investments were not any different than
what had already taken place in their earlier projects. Theydidn't structure their past records in a way that they could
recognize patterns when they reappeared. As a result, the newer
projects made it difficult for families to earn income through
their homes, forced some families to rebuild government built
units, delayed the occupation of some units for more than a year
and left many plots unsold or abandoned. Most of these problems
could have been avoided had policy planners kept better records
of their previous projects and reviewed them before undertaking
new ones. Other "unexpected" investments were the result of poor
engineering practices for which good solutions had already been
worked out but were not integrated into the ongoing planning
process. These histories can show what information is critical
to projects, identify its sources and show ways to structure it
so that the policy-to-program-to-project experience will be
cumulative and more rational than it now is.
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CASE 1: UPGRADING
A BRIEF HISTORY OF BARRIO LAS COLINAS
Las Colinas is a large, mature invasion settlement built on two
steep slopes overlooking Avenida Caracas and southern Bogota. A
handful of families organized by the socialist group Centro Pro
Vivienda first invaded the site in August of 1960. After being
quickly removed by the local police, they regrouped for a
re-invasion in September of the same year. This time
approximately 800 families invaded the flood plain just below the
twin slopes while 200 more families occupied large lots further
up. The plain area was occupied mostly by families who were
renting in what was then peri-city barrios like San Carlos,
Claret, Las Cruces, Belen, Veinte de Julio, San Jose and
Tunjuelito. These families were not directly affiliated with
Pro-Vivienda but took advantage of the occasion to obtain land.
A combined army and police assault soon removed them but was
unsuccessful in evicting the 200 families up on the slopes.
These families were not only difficult to reach on the steep
slopes but they were organized into tight mutual defense
committees and had brought enough food to sustain a month long
seige. After repeated attacks against their shacks, power lines
and invaders entering and leaving the occupation site, the police
guard began to decrease. Slowly new families joined and by 1963
Las Colinas swelled to 700 families. Most of the newer arrivals
were renters from center city barrios but others were coming from
neighboring departments where they were escaping the aftermath of
the "Violencia", Colombia's civil war. Today, Las Colinas has
more than 2000 families only 270 of which are original invaders.
Unsuccessful attempts to evict invaders from another large
Pro-Vivienda invasion at Barrio Policarpa and the high visibility
that Las Colinas had from a major highway made upgrading more
politically feasible than eradication. In 1963 first steps were
taken to legalize the land tenure when Bogota's mayor bought the
land from the San Carlos Foundation, a non-profit entity
representing government, church and private social development
agencies. The approximate cost to the city was P$290,000. For
three years, little seemed to happen until the Caja de la
Vivienda Popular (Caja), a low-income housing bank, was given the
legal mandate "to prepare plans and programs for housing designed
to replace slums". Las Colinas would be their first upgrade
project.
The first systematic attempt to study Las Colinas was made in
1967 by the Colombian Center for Construction (Centro Colombiano
de la Construccion-CCC) at the request of the Caja. Their survey
was to provide the basis for the Caja's upgrading program. The
CCC census counted 6,236 inhabitants, over 67% were under 20
years of age. The barrio contained 940 families with an average
family size of 6.5 persons. (1) All of these figures were far
above anything expected by the authorities.
Employment among residents was very low. Only 15% of the
residents had permanent employment while 10% more had a least
part-time jobs. Although the CCC study does not state the size
of the labor force, define who is considered "economically
active" or give the age groups included, it's clear from the
reported income distribution in Table 3.1 that incomes were very
low and that charging for eventual upgrading and services would
be difficult. (2)
INCOME
(MTH) FAMILIES PERCENT
1- 200 37 4.02
201- 400 153 16.63
401- 600 212 23.04
601- 800 119 12.04
801-1000 112 12.17
1001-1200 53 5.76
1201-1400 25 2.72
1401-1600 19 2.07
1601-1800 9 .98
1801-2000 10 1.09
2001- UP 25 2.72
NO ANSWER 41 15.87
TOTAL 920 100.00
Table 3.1 Family Income Prior to
Upgrading Las Colinas (1969)
Las Colinas' land area is 12.16 Ha. and, since the first
invasion, has been densely settled. By 1967 the average was 77.5
dwellings/Ha or 512 persons per Ha. Ten square meters per person
is considered the minimum for healthy living but less than 2% of
the residents had this much space while more than 80% lived in 5
square meters or less. Although the original invaders secured
large lots for themselves, they quickly subdivided them and sold
(1) Centro Colombiano de la Construccion, Las Colinas, (Bogota:
Caja de la Vivienda Popular, 1969)
(2) Ibid., Un-numbered table entitled "Ingresos Familiares y
Numero de Personas por Familia", p. 31
parcels to new arrivals. By 1967, 40% of the lots were from 70
to 100 square meters while 60% were only 10 to 30 square meters.
The larger lot sizes are less desirable in Las Colinas because
reclaiming the full area requires enormous cut and fill. Even
today, houses on the steeper slopes occupy less than 50% of the
lot. None of the design standards referred to in chapter two
advocate lots smaller than 60 square meters; World Bank projects
have been averaging 160 square meters.
Although the CCC survey never stated how they determined a
building's condition, they reported that 69% of the houses were
in a dangerous state, 16% were marginal, 8% were poor and only 7%
could be considered standard in any way. (1) Most of the shacks
were reported to have had dirt floors, open fires inside for
cooking and were made of combustible, non-permanent materials
like wood, cardboard, bamboo or tar paper stretched over pole
frames. Before the Caja initiated its upgrading program, 63% of
the houses had outside latrines and 17% were using septic fields.
High densities, substandard construction and the total lack of
utilities contributed to Las Colinas' extremely poo.r health
conditions. Between 1964 and 1967, there were more than 800
recorded cases of illness largely due to flu, bronchitis,
tuberculosis and gastro-intestinal disease. In these four years
alone, over 540 children died. In an emergency move to alleviate
the severe health problem and to gain support in an upcoming
election, the muncipal government installed 40 public water
faucets in 1968. Health improvements later became the first
priority of the Caja's upgrade program.
Pro-Vivienda, which oganized the Las Colinas invasion, was also
organizing others as a means of getting political support to win
City Council appointments. Original invaders supported
Pro-Vivienda by paying as little as P$3 or as much as P$800 a
month dues for the "rights" to their lot. Families also paid
five pesos a month for clandestine water and light connections.
Pro-Vivienda's income could have been as high as P$5,000 to
P$8,000 a month.
Within three years of the invasion, dissatisfaction with
Pro-Vivienda began. There was no evidence that they had or would
invest any of the dues in barrio improvements. By 1965 there was
a decisive split between Pro-Vivienda loyalists and more moderate
families who eanted to form a Community Action Group (Junta de
Accion Comunal) for the purpose of negotiating with the city.
Many families stopped paying their dues despite pressure from the
more militant loyalists. Prior to the Caja's interve-ntion in the
barrio, almost all of the families were against any collaboration
with the city whatsoever. By the time the CCC survey was
conducted in 1967, the situation had reversed and Pro-Vivienda
(1) Ibid., p. 37
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was withdrawing its program. ?amilies had begun to realize that
without legalization and land titles, neither the city nor the
residents would make any significant capital investments to
improve the situation. It was also becoming clear that Las
Colinas was evolving a chaotic land use pattern. Neither
Pro-Vivienda's original plan, the invaders who subdivided their
lots nor the post-invasion arrivals made future utilities any
easier to implement. Families were also becoming more concerned
with the degrading health conditions.
In addition to the home interview survey, several other data
gathering efforts were underway. A team of CCC surveyors
prepared a detailed map of the settlement. The map consolidated
land uses, equalized lot boundaries and indicated where roads and
stairways up the slopes should be located. A number of lots were
to be removed from under high tension lines and from the base of
a cliff in danger of collapsing. Later, more houses would be
removed to make room for a school and a community center.
Compensation to these families took the form of relocation to one
of the Caja's other low-income projects.
Students from the National University hastily implemented another
survey to determine family needs for housing, infrastructure,
education and social services. Although the survey design was
criticized by both the Caja and the CCC, several important trends
appeared:
- 88% of the residents wanted to stay even though only 7%
of the houses were in good condition
- 77% said they would contribute labor and/or money to
the rehabilitation of their housing
- 88% had built their current house alone or with the
help of their family
- 55% would be satisfied with material and technical
assistance from the government
- 79% wanted to buy their land from the government
- 56% gave the first priority to the improvements of
sanitary conditions
- 80% said a sanitary unit with water should be provided
before construction of the housing unit itself
- 53% said they would spend P$26 to P$50 a month for
improvements in their house, 10% would spend P$51 to
P$75 a month and the rest no more than P$25
By early 1968, data gathering was completed and preliminary
upgrading in three areas had begun: 1) provision of
infrastructure using new minimum standards (later known as Normas
Minimas and the basis of sites-and-services legislation), 2)
construction of self-help housing, and 3) construction of a
community center to coordinate socio-economic programs.
Implementation of the upgrading was to last five years from
January 1969 to December 1974.
UPGRADING AND GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT
Infrastructure was the first program and received the highest
priority. Residents wanted an immediate improvement in health
conditions and the Caja agreed that it was easier to install
utilities before construction on the lots began. Installing
utilities demonstrated the city's commitment to upgrading and
involved the residents in the process. Vehicular roads,
essential for initiating garbage collection and moving equipment
from point to point on the site were built by direct contract
between the Caja and private companies. Paving, drainage and
sidewalks on the main lower-slope roads cost approximately
P$888,OOO. (1) Pedestrian roads and stairways were built by the
barrio residents themselves at a cost of P$183,000 for materials.
The World Food Organization donated food rations for the Caja to
disburse to the residents as payment for their labor
contribution. Poor accounting and seemingly arbitrary
reimbursement created considerable antagonism between the Caja
and working families. The Electric Power Company installed
pre-cast concrete poles and strung lines along the major roads at
a cost of about P$230,500. Water and sewer lines were installed
down the back of each lot making connection to free-standing
sanitary units to be built by each lot owner. For technical
reasons, already pointed out in chapter 2, the Caja thought that
this was cheaper than running them down the center of the street.
The cost of the water and sewer system was about P$673,000(P$486,500 for sewers and P$186,500 for water). Not all lots
would have the full complement of services. Families refusing to
sign with the Caja did not get water and sewer connections to
their lots. Lots in the steepest areas received only water and
light. The decision to use free standing sanitary units was
based on the CCC survey which showed that more than half of the
houses already used free standing kitchens and sixty percent had
separate latrines. Both of these decisions turned out to be
wrong.
The CCC estimated that the cost of the average lot, basic housing
materials and infrastructure would amount to Pt56 a month if paid
over 20 years. Utilities would cost about P$24 a month.
Residents would be expected to pay slightly more when service
connections and maintenance are included. Only 34% of the
families could afford this, another 32% could with longer term
loans. The remaining families would receive construction loans
to the extent that they could make payments or they could "rent"
the land and have monthly payments applied to an eventual title.
(1) Joshua Nelson, "TIe LasColinas Plan: CaseStudg Tof an Urban
Rehabilitation Plan in Bogota, Colombia." (Bogota: Ford
Foundation, 1970). p. 25
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Based upon the results of the home interviews, the Caja initiated
its second program by developing two housing prototypes. the
first was a multi-family five story structure for housing
families displaced from the "danger area" (the cliff base and
from under the high tension power lines) and from the planned
school site. The second prototype was a small two room house
with a detached sanitary core unit at the back of the lot. This
design portrayed three stages of expansion with collective
back-to-back core units despite the impossibility of building it
on Las Colinas' 30% to 50% slopes. Early CCC and Caja proposals
promoted prefabricated building components. They believed that a
reduced number of standard components would simplify project
administration and make construction training easier by limiting
the number of necessary skills people had to learn. Much of the
planning assumed that self-help construction meant that families
would do the actual construction just as they reported they had
done in the National University survey. By the time mortgages
were being signed, a more conventional construction approach was
taken because it was feared that contractors would charge more
for erecting these unfamiliar systems. The Caja and the Peace
Corps drafted plans for families who couldn't formalize their own
designs. The prototype idea was apparently abandoned by the time
any construction began.
A typical "loan package" included the price of the land(subsidized at P$24 per square meter), construction materials,
labor and technical assistance. Loans would be administered in
two stages: P$6,000 for purchase of the lot and materials for the
sanitary unit and up to P$11,000 for dwelling construction.
Families had to begin repaying the first loan and initiate the
sanitary unit to qualify for the second loan. Terms were 8 years
at 4% for the first stage loan and either 15 or 20 years at 6%
(2% included for life and fire insurance) for the second loan
depending on its amount and the family's income. A typical loan
package for a family of three and an income of P$900 per month
was as follows:
STAGE I A) Lot and Land Preparation 2,800
B) Sanitary Unit 3,400
STAGE II A) Construction Materials 7,920
B) Labor 3,430
C) Technical Assistance 240
TOTAL LOAN P$T770~O
Mortgages would be typically paid off in 15 or 20 years at PT115
or 20 per month. Initial resistance to signing long term loans
with the Caja have totally disappeared today. Colombia's
inflation rate has been above 25% for the past eight years and
families now consider their $150 to $200 peso a month payment a
gift.
The Caja planned to have several materials depositories in the
barrio as outlets for common bricks made in their own factories.
Cement, sand, reinforcing steel, water tanks, roofing decks and
wood were also available. Caja architects determined the minimum
amount of each material needed to implement the family's house
plan. Homebuilders simply ordered what they needed as they went
along. Delivery was made to their lot or to nearby queuing areas
on the steeper parts of the slope. Periodic inspections by Caja
architects insured that families met construction standards,
followed their plans and were not selling materials on the black
market. The architects issued promissory notes to contractors
and laborers up to the loan elgibility of each family. Notes
were redeemable at the Caja's central office where some control
over wage' rates and fees could be exercised.
The third upgrade program focused on improving the social and
economic conditions in Las Colinas. Day care and social work
centers were proposed in addition to the school. Staff and
equipment was promised by a myriad of agencies.
The three upgrade programs were estimated to cost about
P$5,796,400 though some project studies suggest it was closer to
P$9,276,500 when the costs for the preliminary studies and
community organization were figured in. In January of 1969, the
Caja finally requested $7.5 million pesos from the Bogota City
Council. The CCC estimated that the Caja itself could pay about
P$1,978,000. The mayor's office would donate the land it bought
from the San Carlos Foundation for P$299,856 plus another
P$309,600, the value of the site for the proposed community
center. The utility companies investment of P$1,442,400 would be
recuperated in monthly service fees and connection charges.
Residents' labor for installing utilities was estimated to
contribute an additional P$618,171. The district health, welfare
and public works departments would finance the construction and
operation of the community center totalling P$2,049,900.
Community labor and cash contributed by the residents would
contribute an additional P$238,120. (1) After the plan was made
public in January, the Council allocated $5 million pesos to the
Caja for the first year's operation. The Caja eventually
received only $3.328 million. The addition of other Caja funds
brought the first year's budget back to $5,128,000.
Shortly after public disclosure of the plan, a joint Caja and
CCC committee was established to coordinate the plan. The
committee re-evaluated the CCC's proposed budget and found that
(1) The total cost figures for all three stages are unclear. The
CCC rehabilitation report lists more than 37 international,
national, department, district, private and local agencies that
had proposed some level of investment in the plan. (Ibid. p.
44.1 - 44.3). Cost estimates used here are from Joshua Nelson
(Ibid. p.33).
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the scope of the upgrading work was generally underestimated.
The Caja needed material for 820 houses, not 800, and to clear
250, not 160, shacks. The new estimate was set at P$19,261,216
only to be revised upward again in 1970 to P$19,657,216, almost
twice what had been originally projected.
Once physical construction began, it became obvious that the
infrastructure was going to be more expensive than had been
anticipated. The water and sewer companies refused to lower
their standards for piping even though there had been an
agreement to experiment with new minimum norms. The steep slopes
and filled latrines made sewer placement even more difficult than
planned. Electrical installations ran almost 60% higher; the
CCC's estimated P$230,488 but the final cost was closer to
P$390,000. The only apparent explanation for the increase was
that more lines were needed than originally planned.
The cost of the two main vehicular roads and the pedestrian roads
throughout the barrio was almost 3 times as expensive as
estimated. The CCC study estimated P$650,000 but poor
workmanship, undermined road beds from clogged sewers, and higher
traffic loads than planned ran the final cost up to P$1,763,000.
The water company changed its connection fees several times.
They objected to operating two systems simultaneously, the new
one being installed and the older 40 tap system installed by the
mayor in 1968. The Caja eventually negotiated a P$500 to P$680
per house connection fee and a flat service rate of approximately
P$15 per month for the water itself. Household payments would be
about P$372 a year for both during a "grace period" of three
years. The rate would be re-negotiated after that time. The
water company was particularly reluctant to make this final
arrangement with the Caja because Las Colinas was already
receiving subsidized water rates through a barrio rating policy
which differentially charged for water based on a socio-economic
index.
After receiving higher bids from the water and sewer company, a
private contractor was selected to install the sewer system for
approximately P$1,100,000. Little attention was paid to showing
residents how to use it. The system often cicyged and undermined
the concrete roads and flooded some houses. People were throwing
their garbage into the system because trash collection was not
yet initiated on a wide enough scale to alleviate that problem.
Its likely that the lack of concrete roads also prevented
widespread collection.
By July of 1969, four months after loan contracts had been signed
with most families, the Caja was being threatened by barrio
residents because no materials had yet been delivered. It was
also becoming clear that a P$17,000 loan wouldn't be sufficient
to build a minimal house. Families were already paying masons
10% to 25% of the value of the job to lay up brick walls even
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though they told the Caja and National University interviewers
that they had the skills and would build their own houses.
Families soon realized that they were going to need two story
houses to get enough habitable space on the steeper slopes.
Families actually needed loans closer to P$30,000 or P$12880
higher than the average Caja loan.
Had the Caja and the CCC paid more attention to structuring and
analyzing their original home interviews, many of these problems
could have been avoided. The P$30,000 increase for building a
house could have been anticipated. In the first place,
elgibility for the second loan required families to have stable
employment to meet the additional mortgage requirements. Regular
employment greatly increases the opportunity costs for doing
one's own construction work assuming that families have the
required skills. The Caja assumed that people would build their
own houses simply because they said that they had built their
shacks themselves. What was overlooked was the fact that the
secondary materials families used to build their shacks were
cheap, commonly available and required only low levels of skill
to assemble. Shacks were generally single floor, post and beam
structures with short roof spans and non-structural floors and
foundations. A poorly constructed shack will rarely collapse;
they will sag and lean long before they fall down.
Building in brick was entirely different. The material was
costly and required more attention to detailing to make straight
walls, reinforce floor slabs properly and to pour solid
foundations. Multi-floor construction also required load bearing
walls, stairways and structural flooring. Its understandable
that families would hire masons. They have higher opportunity
costs for doing it themselves and the low cost of labor relative
to materials cost makes hiring a mason a form of inexpensive
insurance against doing a poor job yourself. What eventually
happened was that families contracted out all the structural work
and did the lighter interior finishing themselves. This was an
entirely different construction process than the Caja or the CCC
had anticipated. The Caja survey not only didn't consider this
possibility but incorrectly interpreted the construction process
data they did gather.
Housing construction got off to a slow start. The Caja delivered
only about P$200,000 in materials each month. This was used up
in one week. By September 1970, only and eight houses and one
hundred and eight sanitary units had been completed to minimal
plans. Another three hundred were in the process of
construction. The Caja had funding for only two construction
inspectors and four laborers to supervise all building activity.
Many families built additional multi-purpose rooms to reduce
overcrowding and ignored the loan conditions that the sanitary
unit be built first. Some families sold their material at a
'substantial profit on the black market. Caja personnel were
unable to monitor such a large site nor give families adequate
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technical assistance in implementing the plans drawn up by the
Peace Corps volunteer.
By 1973, almost four years after the plan was announced, many
families were just beginning to build. The output capacity of
the Caja's brick factory in barrio Primero de Mayo had been lower
than anticipated and many families had to supplement what they
were able to get from the Caja with more expensive bricks and
cement bought from local vendors.
Another unanticipated cause of slow construction starts was the
fact that from 35% to 45% of the families had designed their
houses for income earnings. They intended to build extra space
to operate a small shop, rent rooms or rent an entire floor.
Others planned to do light manufacturing or use space for
warehousing. Building for income earnings requires more
foundations, structural flooring, reinforced retaining walls and
sometimes additional entrances and utility connections. The
commitment to income earnings must be made at the point permanent
materials are used. The additional start-up materials are
considerable and families often had to delay construction until
they accumulated the extra material and capital. Nowhere in the
CCC analysis of Las Colinas does it mention income earnings
through the dwelling. This is very surprising when it was
estimated that 30% of all provisional shacks had some form of
enterprise in them when the CCC was doing their survey. The
entire Caja program viewed the house simply as a shelter problem
and ignored the very common practice to use the home to
supplement income. Income earnings is so important that it is
covered in a separate section.
UPGRADING RESULTS
The Caja's program had a very significant effect on improving
housing in Las Colinas. In just eight years, over 790 of the
owners who had signed loan agreements were living in brick
dwellings largely financed through Caja loans. The Caja reported
in 1977, two years after their formal program ended, that 804
families had received some form of housing solution with. an
average aid value of PT21,428 each. (1)
The Caja's upgrade program terminated with the closing of their
field office in 1975. That same year, a total census of the
barrio was conducted by a local Catholic charity called Social
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(1) Caja de la Vivienda Popular, "Caja de la Vivienda Popular
1942-1977", (Bogota: Caja de la Vivienda Popular, 1977),
un-numbered page approximately 9
Work of Barrio Las Colinas (Obra Social del Barrio Las Colinas).
(2) Although the census was designed to measure the educational
needs of the children and the vocational training levels of their
parents, a significant amount of housing related information has
been inferred. The census showed that the growth rate of Las
Colinas was still high. Approximately 1200 families or 7,500
persons were now living there. Only 270 families were original
invaders and almost 30% of the population was rentinging. By
1976, there were 616 brick, 37 wood and 3 pre-fabricated houses
built to acceptable standards. Only 140 bamboo, mud and tar
paper shacks remained. Most belonged to original invaders who
didn't sign contracts with the Caja or to recent invaders who had
squatted in the vacated "danger zone" after the Caja's field
office was closed.
Other conditions had also improved. Employment stability had
greatly increased as well as the overall income level. Although
the Social Work categories differ from the CCC's original survey,
Table 3.2 shows that overall family incomes had greatly improved.
(1)
INCOME
(MTH) FAMILIES PERCENT
500-1000 298 27.40
1001-1500 321 29.50
1501-2000 185 17.00
2001-2500 131 12.00
2501- UP 154 14.10
TOTAL 1089 100.00
Table 3.2 Family Income After
Upgrading Las Colinas(1975)
(2) APPENDIX B contains an annotated example of the questionnaire
used by Social Work of Las Colinas.
(1) Centro Comercial de la Escuela Mediana. "El Estudiantil."
(Bogota: Obra Social del Barrio Las Colinas, Noviembre, 1977)
INCOME EARNINGS THROUGH THE DWELLING
Although shelter is the first reason families invest in their
homes, it isn't necessarily the only nor the most important one.
When more than 1,100 households were asked in Las Colinas if they
used their homes to supplement their incomes, 28% said that they
did. Another indication of the magnitude of income earnings is
the fact that almost 40% of all households surveyed said that
they were renters. When the difference between owners and
renter's family sizes are considered, almost 30% of the entire
barrio population is renting and providing a new landlord class
with a highly liquid source of income. (1) Not only is renting
rooms, apartments and entire dwellings common, a significant
number of owners and renters operate retail stores, light
manufacturing and warehousep.
In the first chapter, a typical home construction pattern was
described. It is at the point that home builders begin building
in permanent materials that they design the dwelling for income
earnings or not. Given that renting was relatively low in Las
Colinas before upgrading began, there is little doubt that public
investments like materials loans and utilities helped achieve a
significant housing multiplier. Materials and utilities are not
enough in themselves to cause owners to build rental units. Land
values must also be rising due to better transportation to the
barrio, increased housing demand by overall growth in the city
and greater attractiveness to the barrio because of overall
development. Capitalizing on increasing land values through
rents is one way land owners can realize liquid income from it.
Undoubtedly owners depend on rents to supplement their incomes.
It is desirable to estimate the importance of this source of
income to owners, see if renters are like the low-income groups
that projects hope to reach, and see whether policies like rent
control have any effect on rental markets and home investment.
Although a survey was not specifically designed for analyzing
renting, typical rents from the open surveys can be used and
combined with income and tenancy data to estimate what land and
dwellings are worth and at what point building more rental
property will be a poor investment. It is particularly important
to know where government investment makes a difference and how to
monitor and evaluate income earnings through the dwelling.
Who are these renters and business entrepreneurs and how are they
benefiting from public housing programs? When households are
disaggregated into those who use their homes for income earnings
and those who don't, the following breakdown results. Of the 676
owner households, 35% said that they use their homes for income
(1) A weighted average of 675 owner households has a mean value
of 6.38 persons (S.D.=2.70) while renters have a mean of 4.70
persons (S.D.=2.32)
82
earnings. Of the 427 renters interviewed, 15% used their rented
space for income earnings. Not surprising is the fact that 60%
of all owners using their homes to supplement their incomes do so
by renting out individual rooms and small apartments. Over half
of the houses in Las Colinas had multiple entrances designed into
the structure. Given that only 35% were currently renting space
out, about 15% to 20% more owners had already designed their
homes for that purpose.
Almost 71% of all renters live in a single multi-purpose room.
Only 4% rent entire houses while about 25% rent 2 and 3 room
apartments. Rents for single rooms are from P$400 to P$600 per
month depending on location, quality of construction and level of
services. Apartments are commonly 2 or 3 rooms, generally on the
same level with private entrances. Typical rents are from
P$1,200 to P$1,900 per month. (1)
In addition to renting, 20% of all owners and 15% of all renters
operate small retail shops or engage in light manufacturing and
warehousing within their homes. Small general stores, shoe
repair, bakeries, dressmakers, grocery and dry goods stores,
tailors, fruit and vegatable stands, fuel depots and bars are the
most common.
Who are landlords attracting? The survey shows that renters are
very definitely young married couples with one or two children.
Unlike renters in more developed countries where they tend to be
bimodal by age -- numerous young households, relatively few
middle aged renters and again many elderly ones -- these renters
are almost exclusively under 35 years of age. When the age of
the household head is tabulated by tenancy, there is a dramatic
cross-over from predominately renting before 35 years of age to
predominately owning after 35. (Table 3.3 shows that the number
of renter households sharply declines after 35 while the number
of owner households sharply increases.) The Chi Square and
significance level indicate that age and tenancy are very
interdependent.
Where do all the elderly go? Las Colinas is an upgraded invasion
barrio. Most invaders were young families 18 years ago putting
them in their mid 40's today. It is common in Colombia to find
grandparents moving in with their children or having their
children move in with them. Either way, the oldest son or
son-in-law will be considered the household head. Table 3.3
shows the combined effects of the young invaders and
grandparent-cum-children households. (2)
(UIR-entsstated in 1978 prices.
(2) When the ages of a household's dependents are tabulated, one
frequently encounters young children and an elderly person.
Presumably this is an aunt or uncle.
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TENANCY
ROW
AGE OF HEAD OWNER RENTER TOTAL
OF HOUSEHOLD +-------------------+
5 75 80
15-24 6.3 93.8 7.9
0.8 : 20.1
0.5 74
+-------------------
85 | 143 228
25-34 37.3 | 62.7 : 22.5
13.3 38.2
8.4 14.1
--------------------
205 81 | 286
35-44 71.7 28.3 28.3
32.1 21.7
20.3 : 8.0
+-------------------4-
221 48 269
45-54 82.2 17.8 26.6
34.6 12.8
21.8 1 4.7
--------------------------
86 | 19 105
55-64 81.9 18.1 10.413.5 , 5.1
8.5 1.9
--------------------
30 | 7 37
65-74 81.1 18.9 3.7
4.7 | 1.9
3.0 1 0.7
+-------------------
61 1: 76 |1 |7
75-84 85.7 14.3 0.7
0.9 | 0.3
0.6 0.1
+---------+-----------
COLUMN 638 374 1012
TOTAL 63.0 37.0 100.0
CHI SQUARE = 249.77 DF = 6
SIGNIFICANCE = .0000
Table 3.3 Age of the Household Head by Tenancy in Las Colinas
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The general cross-over pattern, from renter to owner, holds for
all renters with one major deviation -- those who use their space
for income earnings definitely start out renting later in life,
almost 10 years later, and continue doing so much longer. They
also have significantly higher incomes and family sizes than
renters without such dwelling use. Starting out later seems
consistent with~ the fact that opening a business usually implies
an apprenticeship somewhere else, increased formal education or a
period where start-up capital and equipment are accumulated.
In light of what was said about the age of renters, one expects
renters in general will have lower incomes than home owners as a
whole. There is a general maxim that associates increased age
with increased income. From Table 3.4 it's surprising to see
that owners are only slightly better off. They aren't
dramatically as different as one would expect for their ages or
having accumulated the wealth needed to build a home.
HOUSEHOLD INCOME
$500- $1001- $1501- $2001- $2501 & ROW
$1000 $1500 $2000 $2500 UP TOTAL
TENANCY --------------------------- +------------------------+
178 | 190 104 85 109 | 666
OWNERS 26.7 | 28.5 15.6 12.8 | 16.4 : 61.3
59.9 59.2 56.5 64.9 : 71.2
16.5 : 17.5 | 9.6 7.8 | 10.0
+----------------+------------+------------------------
119 : 131 | 80 46 44 420
RENTERS 28.3 | 31.2 19.0 11.0 | 10.5 : 38.7
40.1 |40.8 |43.5 35.1 |28.8
11.0 | 12.1 7 4.3 | 4-1
----------------- +------------+------------------------
COLUMN 297 321 184 131 153 1086
TOTAL 27.3 29.6 16.9 12.1 14.1 100.0
CHI SQUARE = 9.69 DF = 4
SIGNIFICANCE = .0459
Table 3.4 Tenancy and Household Income in Las Colinas
Table 3.4 has a high number of observations (1086). Even slight
variations will tend to show statistical significance yet the
strength of association between tenancy and income is very weak.
Based on this table alone, the claim can't be made that renters
are any richer or poorer than owners on the whole. Although
there is little statistical significance to the overall income
differences, there are some minor differences when the incomes
of owners who do not use their homes to supplement their incomes
are seen to differ from those owners who do. There are specific
85
ways owners use their homes too. Do the owners who do not use
their incomes for supplemental income differ from those that do
offer rooms, run small shops or manufacturing, or those that do
both? This co.. arison shows a reasonably strong association.
Essentially owners who only rent rooms or apartments out do not
have significantly different incomes from owners who do not use
their houses at all for income earnings. Owners that use their
homes for income supplement in other ways however have notably
higher incomes than owners who don't. It's reasonable to expect
that owners who rent out rooms as well as operate shops, etc.
would be very investment conscious and, indeed, they are because
their incomes show the greatest overall increases when compared
to owners who do not use their homes at all for income earnings.
The case of renters using their space for small shops and
manufacturing is much t e same as for owners: they show higher
income earnings than renters who use their space only for
shelter. It is interesting to note that there is no significant
difference between the income distribution of owners and renters
who engage in retail shops. One might think that store owners
might derive some increased income over renters simply because
they are permanent residents; this survey of homes in which
there is a business does not show a difference however.
SUMMARY
Reviewing the above results again: 1) there is no income
difference between owners and renters as a whole nor between
owners who rent out space and the renters who consume it, 2)
owners who simply rent out rooms or apartments have only slightly
higher incomes than owners that don't and 3) only the minority of
owners who either run shops for themselves or run a shop and rent
out space as well have significantly higher incomes than renters.
The lack of association between income and tenancy means that one
cannot reject the hypothesis of independence between income and
tenancy. One must accept that for this particular upgrade
project at least, renters are the same as owners. Thus the idea
that upgrading mightreach still lower income families through
renting seems unlikely in this case. Not only isn't this project
reaching a lower income group as the latest table shows, the age
differential between owners and renters that was noted earlier
indicates that renters are likely to have higher permanent
incomes than owners because they have the same incomes at an
earlier time in their life.
OWNERS AND RENTERS
The lack of significant differences between owners and renters
incomes would be an important research finding but it is
important to be more confident that this is true and not falsely
base conclusions on the results of just one or two tabulations.
Other ways to check income differences are to see if 1)
owner-renter employment types are significantly different, 2)
spatial location affects owner to renter ratios, 3) sex or
migration of the households differ or 4) materials used in the
dwelling relate to tenancy type.
The survey uses nine general categories of employment. When the
number of households is tabulated in each, there is still very
little difference between the distributions of owners and renters
in each occupational category. (1)
To see if,owners living in certain areas tend to have more
renters than others, the owner to renter ratio in each block can
be compared to that of the overall barrio ratio. To make a
proper compariscn, one must exclude commercial property renters
because their businesses are likely to relate to a few main
circulation routes through the barrio. Tabulating owner to
renter ratios block by block shows that there is very little
central tendency for rental property, that is, room and apartment
renters do not cluster near major roads, markets or areas where
more public services are available. With very few exceptions,
the residual difference between the proportion of owners and
renter households on each of the 40 blocks in the barrio did notvary significantly from the distribution of the barrio as a
whole. On the other hand, there is a strong spatial effect for
retail stores as one would expect. Essentially what the residual
comparisons show is that renting is fairly homogeneous spatially.Since all locations in the barrio aren't equally well developed
nor desirable to live in, locational differences reflect in.
varying levels of building permanency and the rents charged --
not particularly in the ratio of owner households to renter
households.
Renting in Colombia is generally considered an inferior kind of
tenancy. Just how strong the urge to own land is is shown by thehigh number of young renters becoming land owners themselves
after 35 years of age. One could further hypothesize that those
families who continue to rent do so largely because they have low
incomes and can't afford to own property and build.
The analysis links age, income, work and location with tenancy.
It is useful to know if the sex of the household head shows any
systematic relationship with tenancy. One might expect to see a
higher proportion of female household heads renting because
self-help construction is usually associated with males. Also
women generally have lower overall incomes than male heads of
(1) Significance level is .00496, Chi Square is 15.83 with 8
degrees of freedom and 851 observations. Work categories are:
hourly employee, business man, construction, salesman, chauffer,
musican, mechanic, maid or other.
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households. A test of this hypothesis shows no statistical
association however.
SEX OF HOUSEHOLD
HEAD
ROW
MALE FEMALE TOTAL
TENANCY ------------------------ +
527 125 | 652
OWNER 80.8 | 19.2 | 61.7
61.4 1 62.8
49.9 11.8
--------------------
331 74
RENTER 81.7 : 18.3 405
38.6 37.2 : 38.3
31.3 7.0
+-------------------
COLUMN 858 199 1057
TOTAL 81.2 18.8 100.0
CHI SQUARE = .13 DF = 1
SIGNIFICANCE = .7184
PHI = .01
Table 3.5 Tenancy by Sex of Household Head in Las Colinas
From Table 3.5 one can only conclude that the institutional
mechanisms that lead to the land titling in this upgrade program
are no more discriminatory toward sex than overall barrio renting
markets.
It's often speculated that upgrade projects increase rural to
urban migration by legalizing squatting. If migrants do not live
with friends when they arrive, it is likely they will rent. When
household heads were asked where they lived prior to moving into
the project, owners and renters showed exactly the same
distribution: 76% of both the owners and renters reported that
they had lived previously in Bogota or some other city while only
24% were from rural areas. Rural migrants tended to come from
the neighboring departments of Boyaca and Tolima while the vast
majority who reported they were previously in another city said
they were still from the department of Cundinamarca where Bogota
is located. Table 3.6 shows the exact distribution and the
extremely low Chi Square values obtained.
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PROJECT
PRIOR RESIDENCY
ROW
URBAN RURAL TOTAL
TENANCY ------------------------ +
515 160 675
OWNERS 76.3 23.7 61.3
61.3 61.1
46.7 14.5
-------------------
325 102
RENTERS 76.1 23.9 427
38.7 38.9 38.7
29.5 9.3
+-------------------
COLUMN 840 262 1102
TOTAL 76.2 23.8 100.0
CHI SOUARE =0. DF = 1
SIGNIFICANCE = .0000
PHI = 0.0
Table 3.6 Tenancy and Prior Residency in Las Colinas
The results from Table 3.6 are consistent with the open
interviews. Most of the owners who invaded said they were
previously paying rent in either Bogota's center city
inquilinatos or in one of the numerous poorer barrios on the
perimeter of what was then the city limits (Barrios 20 de Julio,
Marco Fidel Suarez, San Carlos, Las Granjas, San Vicente, Las
Cruces or Restrepo). Only a few invaders were recent arrivals
from the campo. Given the same rural/urban split for owners and
renters alike, Las Colinas seems to be acting in much the same
way for newly formed families looking for land as the earlier
mentioned barrios acted for the owners 18 years ago. Given that
owners reported that the renters generally stay less than a year,
it seems that the barrio is acting as a queuing area for families
looking for land in the vary active pirate barrios or waiting for
an opportunity to invade themselves. (1)
It is very unusual to get such low measures of association as
Table 3.6 indicates. The observed counts in each category are
almost exactly what their expected theoretical values would be if
the table had been determined from the marginal row and column
(1) On several occasions, the author had interviewed families in
invasion barrios and found that they were residents of Las
Colinas. Basically they said that they were getting land for
themselves or one of their children and paying rent elsewhere in
the event the invasion fails.
values only. When the total number of observations is as large
as 1102, even slight variations yield significant Chi Square
values because that measure is directly proportional to the
number of observations. Although the table results appear quite
consistent with our open interviews, one can't help but think
that there might be a third variable that is masking the complete
interaction reported in this table.
Given that there is a fairly typical pattern for developing a
house for rental use, it would be expected that there would be
more owners living in permanent material dwellings than renters
when taken as a proportion of the total. Table 3.7 shows that
there is only a slight association between tenancy and the
predominant construction material used in the dwelling.
DWELLING MATERIALS
ROW
PERM NON-PERM TOTAL
TENANCY ------------------------ +
524 143 667
OWNERS 78.6 21.4 61.2
59.5 68.4
48.1 , 13.1
+-------------------
356 66 422
RENTERS 84.4 15.6 38.8
40.5 31.6
32.7 | 6.1
+-------------------
COLUMN 880 209 1089
TOTAL 80.0 19.2 100.0
CHI SQUARE = 5.39 DF = 1
SIGNIFICANCE = .0202
PHI = .07
Table 3.7 Tenancy by Dwelling Material
Permanency in Las Colinas
It is no surprise that 78.6% of the owners live in permanent
dwellings while the other 21.4% live in moderately improved
shacks. At first inspection, the high percentage of renters in
permanent dwellings may seem contrary evidence to the dwelling
construction pattern described in chapter one but it is
consistent. Home owners are very aware that their land values
are rising. There's little doubt that they will build permanent
rental space as soon as they can, simply because this allows them
to capture more of the location rents than provisional shacks do.
This is particularly important when store fronts and apartments
are in the offing because they imply full services, private
entrances, individual kitchens and bathrooms -- major investments
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rarely associated with shacks.
The demand for commercial space is yet another important way that
dwelling construction relates to tenancy. The number of rooms
inhabited is moderately associated with renter's shelter
income-earnings preference. Table 3.8 shows that when renters
are categorized by what they rent, renting entire houses is not
very common; only about 5% do so.
FACILITY RENTED
ENTIRE ROW
ROOMS APARTS. DWELLING TOTAL
DWELLING USE-+----------------------------+
265 | 82 | 14 | 361
SHELTER 73.4 22.7 : 3.9 | 84.5
ONLY 87.5 75.9 87.5
62.1 | 19.2 | 3.3 |
+-------+----------------------
38 26 | 2 | 66
INCOME 57.6 39.4 3.0 1 15.5
EARNINGS 12.5 | 24.1 12.5
8.9 6.1 0.5
+-------+----------------------
COLUMN 303 108 16 427
TOTAL 11.0 25.3 3.7 100.0
CHI SQUARE = 8.22 DF = 2
SIGNIFICANCE = .0164
Table 3.8 Dwelling Use by Facility Rented in Las Colinas
Whether or not a family will rent a single room or an apartment
depends upon its use for income earnings. Although 62% of all
types of renters rent single rooms, there is a higher proportion
of apartment renters among renters using their home for income
earnings than those that don't. This suggests that owners who
rent out store fronts with habitable back rooms are offering
renters a "package deal" where the housing aspects are as
important as the commercial aspects of what's rented.
Although there appear to be surprisingly few differences between
owners and renters, renters definitely influence the owner's
investment patterns. To build rental space, you first have to
solve your own growing shelter needs. Construction patterns show
that if part of the dwelling is to be rented, this use is
anticipated from the very start. One expects to find some
younger, smaller families renting space to the extent that their
unstable earnings will permit. Middle-aged owners are likely to
be the least able to rent. Their expenditures for food, clothing
and education may prevent expenditures for building because their
family sizes are the largest. As families get older, and
children begin moving out, parents can spread out and consume
more of the house for themselves, rent some of the surplus out,
add still more space and rent it, or rent or sell the entire
house.
This scenerio argues for a strong relationship between the
owner's lifecycle and his investment in building rental space.
The strength of this relationship can be tested by tabulating the
owner's age and the way the dwelling is used for income earnings.
Table 3.9 summarizes how 629 owners of different ages used their
dwelling. The table shows that 54.7% do not use their homes at
all for income earnings while 45.3% do. The low number of young
and old owners is consistent with the age of the households at
the point upgrading began in Las Colinas. What's surprising is
the fact that statistically there is no association between the
age of the owner and the way the house is used. This result
appears to contradict what was just said about lifecycle and the
dwelling use. If one ignores the few cases at the extreme age
groupings, Table 3.9 shows that the dwelling use is relatively
constant and does not vary with age as expected.
Measuring the use of the dwelling for income earnings requires
some measure of the intensity of use. Table 3.9 merely-states
whether or not a certain use exists, it doesn't indicate how
much. When the owner's age is tabulated by the total number of
families living in the dwelling an entirely different
relationship is found.
DWELLING USE
,NO DWELLING DWELLING
DWELLING EARNINGS EARNINGS ROW
EARNINGS RENTER SHOPS TOTAL
OWNER' S AGE +-----------------------------+
2: 2 | 4
15-24 50.0 50.0 0.0 ' 0.6
0.6 | 1.2 | 0.0
0.3 | 0.3 | 0.0
+-------+----------------------
44 36 | 17 | 85
25-35 51.8 | 28.2 1 20.0 13.5
12.8 -14.7 13.9
7.0 3.8 | 2.7
+-------+----------------------
118 : 80 | 40 | 208
35-44 56.7 | 24.0 | 19.2 33.1
34.3 30.7 1 32.8
18.8 7.9 6.4
+------------------------------
122 | 84 : 44 212
45-54 57.5 21.7 20.8 | 33.7
35.5 3222 , 36.1
19.4 7  3 7.0
+-------+----------------------
40 1 38 1 17 1 85
55-64 47.1 : 32.9 20.0 13.5
11.6 : 17.2 | 13.9
6.4 : 4.5 : 2.7
-------- +----------------------
16 | 11 : 3 29
65-74 55.2 | 34.5 1 10.3 4.6
4.7 6.1 1 2.5
2.5 | 1.6 0.5
-------- +----------------------
2 91 4: 12 | 4 | 16
75-84 33.3 1 50.0 | 16.7 1.0
0.6 1.8 0.8
0.3 | 0.5 1 0.2
-------- +----------------------
COLUMN 344 163 122 629
TOTAL 54.7 25.9 19.4 100.0
CHI SQUARE = 10.88 DF = 12
SIGNIFICANCE = .5392
Table 3.9 Owner's Age by Dwelling Use in Las Colinas
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What is happening is that the lifecycle of the owner is
associated with the presence of the second and third renter but
not with the first. This means that the first housing multiplier
results as soon as families build what they need for themselves
and for an additional family. Essentially this multiplier comes
at the beginning of upgrading when the house design (foundations,
entrances, etc.) is set up for income earnings. This is why the
dwelling use is so constant in Table 3.9. The existence of the
second or third renters are related to the lifecycle of the
family which means that this multiplier occurs later on and is
likely to result from space freed by departing children or
incremental secondary construction financed by the owner himself
long after the upgrading intervention ceases.
SUMMARY
The discovery that there are no differences between owners and
renters is a major finding. Home owners do not tend to rent to
families with lower incomes than themselves. Although there may
be tendencies to do this in some cases, the overall distribution
of owners and renters indicates that there is no general case for
the practice. The notion that owners will tend to maximize their
incomes by renting out their improved dwelling while they remain
in the unimproved shack also must be rejected. At this point,
one can state that renting is serving a highly transient young
family group that is waiting to become land owners themselves.
The upgrade case is acting much like the older center city
inquilinatos did years ago. Although the benefits of the
projects are not reaching a lower income group through renting,
they are at least reaching young families with the same income
while pressuring owners to accelerate their own home
construction. Thus there is an economic symbiosis, owners derive
real income increases and renters find acceptable short term
housing solutions.
The study of lifecycle indicates that owners who have not planned
to rent out rooms by the time they initiate permanent
construction are unlikely to do so later. For those that do,
they will have at least one renter all the time. As families age
and their children start leaving home, part of their freed space
and some secondary construction will be used for second and third
renters.
RENTS, HOUSING PRICES AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT
The rents charged and the prices owners are willing to sell their
homes for imply a subjective interest rate or rate of return on
capital investment that homebuilders expect. For owners who don't
use their homes for income earnings, prevailing rents are a good
measure of the value of their house. Rents are future benefits
and are performance measures of capital investments in the home.
When a family builds rental property, they are postponing current
consumption. Their willingness to postpone can be reduced to atime preference for some future consumption. An owner'sparticular time preference will influence his willingness to
save. If his time preference is low, he will likely save more,
occupy less of his home himself and will build up rental property
at a higher rate than builders with higher time preference -- all
other things being equal of course. Families with high time
preferences are just the opposite. They will tend to invest forincome earnings through their homes only if the return is high.
Research on time preference is relatively new but very promising
as a model for evaluating private investment. It can be used
with other indicators to measure building rates, housing
multipliers, dwelling maintenance and owner reaction to rent
control and zoning changes affecting multi-family and commercial
uses of houses. Although an exact relationship between time
preference and income is itself a research problem, it is
generally believed that low-income groups have the highest time
preferences which tends to decrease as their incomes rise. A
general pattern is the higher the current to future income, the
lower will be the rate of time preference while the lower the
current to future income, the higher will be the rate of time
preference. Very low income families have very high time
preferences. They can't further reduce their current consumption
of certain things like food and shelter in order to "invest" in
the future no matter how much better off they might be tomorrow
for having done so.
Rents in Las Colinas ranged from P$300 to P$600 a month in 1978
for single rooms measuring approximately twelve square meters.
Rooms were generally made of rough-finish brick walls without
interior stucco (obra negra) and had cement floors and ceilings.
Rented rooms rarely have separate street entrances, individual
utility connections or private baths and kitchens. A family of
four will typically cook and sleep in these single multi-purpose
rooms.
Apartments are two or three general rooms and have private
entrances, cooking and bath facilities. Although rents range
from P$1,400 to P$3,000 a month, most were under P$2,000.
Utilities are usually included in the rent because the water and
power companies will not make multiple connections to houses in
barrios where residents receive subsidized flat rates.
The turnover rate for rental rooms is very high. The average
stay is less than one year while apartments turn over every two
to three years. The introduction of rent control in 1975
encouraged owners to quickly turn-over renters to keep rents
high. Even though rent control was rarely enforced in Las
Colinas, the fact that Colombian law protects the renter from
eviction regardless of his payment history keeps owners on guard.
If a tenant has occupied a unit for at least seven months, the
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owner must allow him to remain up to one year rent-free while he
looks for other housing if he is evicted. Owners will rarely
sign a lease and will accept a renter only if he is highly
recommended by friends. Las Colinas' central location and good
public services creates high demand for units. Owners rarely
have to look for very long to fill their units.
From interviews of residents in 1978, it was found that almost
every home owner knew what prevailing rents were and that most
knew the current market value of their homes. No one interviewed
suspected that there was a systematic relationship between what
they were charging for rents and what they would sell their house
for. One family, whose income was P$3,900 per month, reported
that their second floor apartment rented for P$1,450 per month
and estimated that their home would bring about P$200,000. A
second family with an income of P$1,350 built the Caja's minimum
house and rents out two rooms for P$325 a month. They themselves
lived in two other rooms that they had considered renting out at
P$400 each. They were recently offered P$54,900 for their house
but think that it was a low offer. A third family built a three
story brick walk-up with a first floor store front. They used to
operate the store themselves and live in two smaller back rooms
that were connected to a standard Caja sanitary unit. The upper
floors were rented for P$1,400 and P$1,300 per month. Their
income from rent and two part-time jobs was $5,300 pesos a month.
Today they have rented out the shop and back rooms for P$900 a
month and have moved into the second floor apartment. Although
their lot is not as well located as it once was for a local shop,
they think that they can sell the house for at least P$275,000
and maybe as high as P$300,000 if they convert the ground floor
into another apartment. For each of these cases, one can
calculate the time preference that families have for their
capital investments in their homes.
The present value of a stream of future rents is a good
approximation of the value of a house. It measures the present
value of total revenues from rents that the dwelling can produce
at a given time preference or interest rate. To estimate the
value of homes, one must impute a monthly rent for any rentable
space not currently occupied and any rentable space that the
owner himself is occupying. The rents for unoccupied space or
that the owner "pays himself" can be estimated by comparing the
size and quality of the space with that of similar space already
rented out. Algebraically, the present value of a future rent
stream is as follows:
End of Discounting Period
- Year
(a) Present Value of Capital = Rent (1 + Time Preference)
Year
Year = 1
Although the theoretic present value of future rents is derived
from an infinite number of years of rent from the capital, it
turns out that home owners in Las Colinas have high time
preferences and that a simpler and more convenient equation will
approximate the same present value of rents just as well: (1)
Future Rents from Capital
(b) Value of Capital = ----------------------------
Time Preference
If the first family can rent their second floor apartment for
P$1,400 per month, it is likely that the first floor occupied by
the owner himself would rent for P$1,400 to P$1,500 per month.
If the owner would sell the house for P$200,000 then his time
preference -- his expected interest rate on his investment -- is
about 18%. (2) The second family who built the Caja's minimum
house currently has two rent streams of P$325 a month and they
estimate that the rooms they occupy would rent for P$400 a month.
If one assumes that their offer of P$54,900 was about 10% lower
than what they could get by advertising a little, then their time
preference is about 21%. (3) The third family already has units
rented for P$1,400 and P$1,300 per month and could likely get
P$1,300 to P$1,400 for the converted ground floor. If they sell
their home at the lower offer of P$275,000 their time preference
will be 17%; at the higher offer of P$300,000 it will be 16%. (4)
(1) When the end of the discounting period is infinity, formula
(a) becomes (b).
(2)
TP = 12(P$1450 + P$1500) / P$200,000
TP = .18
(3)
TP = 12(P$325 + P$325 + P$400) / P$60,500
TP = .21
(4)
All of these time preferences are relatively high and tend to
reflect the low incomes of the residents. Although the
representativeness of these values might be in question, the
inverse relationship between time preference and income appears
to be confirmed. The second family has the highest time
preference and the lowest income while the first and third owners
had progressively higher incomes and decreasing time preferences.
Time preference is also useful in estimating future construction.
One owner interviewed had designed his house for multi-floor
construction. The first floor cost about P$70,000 to build. The
second floor cost P$50,000 to add because most of the expense of
the first floor went into additional foundations and structural
flooring. The owner's second floor tenants pay P$1,400 for an
apartment very similar to the first floor where the owner lives.
The same contractor that built the first two floors estimated
that a third, fourth and fifth floor would cost approximately
P$60,000, P$72,000 and P$90,000 to build. Costs increase 20% to
25% per floor beyond the second because masons charge much more
for the additional scaffolding, logistics and labor involved in
moving materials up several floors. The owner said that rents
decrease the further up renters have to walk. He would have
preferred to build additional space at the rear of the lot but
the excavations required would cost more than multi-floor
construction.
Using the rent from the second floor apartment and imputing a
rent for the first floor apartment where the owner lives, one can
generally estimate that the owner's time preference is about 18%.
If rents from a third, fourth and fifth apartment would be about
P$1,350, P$1,350 and P$1,300 one can see that it will not be
profitable for the owner to build beyond four floors. Figure 3.1
graphically shows the marginal cost and revenues for the existing
and proposed construction. Note that the point at which marginal
costs of construction equals marginal revenue from rents is
mid-way between four and five floors. Building five floors will
definitely not be profitable while four still is.
TP(ist Offer) = 12(P$1,400 + PT1,300 + P1,300)7Pq*275,000
TP(1st Offer) = .17
TP(2nd Offer) = 12(P$1,400 + P$1v300 + P$1,300) / P$300,000
TP(2nd Offer) = .16
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COST/REVENUE
Marginal Annualized
Cost of Constructing
One Unit$20,000 +
$11
$15,000 +
$10,000 +
$5,000 +
,200
, 600
Marginal
Revenue
from Rent
$12,600
$9,000
+------------ ---------------------------- + CONSTRUCTED
1 2 3 4 5 FLOORS
MARGINAL MARGINAL
REVENUE MARGINAL ANNUALIZED
FLOOR RENT/MTH RENT/YEAR COST/APT COST
1400
1400
1350
1350
1300
16800
16800
16200
16200
15600
70000
50000
60000
72000
90000
12600
9000
10800
12960
16200
(1) Time Preference = 18%
Figure 3.1 Marginal Cost and Revenue for
Multi-Apartment Construction in Las Colinas
Although the open interviews do not deal with enough cases to
establish precise estimates of time preference as a function of
income, one can see that any policy that regulates income
earnings through the dwelling will have a serious impact in this
upgrade project. Regulation can take several forms -- rent
freezes or roll backs, eliminating multi-family and commercial
zoning or banning "tenant at will" leasing.
Rents have already been frozen at 1975 levels although it has had
little direct effect in Las Colinas. It is possible to estimate
its impact if enforced. Table 3.10 shows that the income
distribution of home owners is highly related to the way they use
their house. Not every owner derives rent income even though the
current market is very good. 57.6% of the home owners do not use
their homes at all for income earnings. Presumably rent control
will not affect their incomes but might have secondary effects on
depressing the values of homes.
From Table 3.10, one can see that 22.7% of the owners derive
income from rents and another 4.8% from combined rents and other
forms like running small shops or light manufacturing. A total
of 27% or 171 households would therefore be directly affected by
rent control enforcement. If one supposed that the lowest income
families (monthly incomes between P$500 and P$1,000 per month)
were renting out just one room at the minimum P$300 rent about
30% to 60% of their total income will be from this source.
Higher income families with P$2,501 per month incomes would
derive 56% of their incomes from rents if they are renting out a
single apartment at the prevailing rent. Even though these
figures are approximations, it is certain that rents will be a
significant part of these families incomes.
Freezing rents will tend to decrease these families incomes and
their time preferences are likely to increase as a result. There
are two general income cases. If families can offset their rent
losses through increases in wage income, then their time
preferences will remain -unaffected. If they can't, then their
real income begins to fall as inflation rises and their time
preference will increase.
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HOUSEHOLD INCOME
$500- $1001- $1501- $2001- $2501- ROW
$1000 $1500 $2000 $2500 UP TO TAL
DWELLING USE +----------------------------------------------+
98 116 56 39 49 358
NO DWELLING: 27.4 | 32.4 : 15.6 | 10.9 : 13.7 57.6
INCOME 60.5 : 64.4 | 55.4 | 51.3 : 48.0
15.8 : 18.7 : 9.0 | 6.7 : 7.9
+-----+----------+------------+------------+-------------
40 : 40 18 | 19 | 24 : 141
RENT ROOMS ' 28.4 : 28.4 : 12.8 : 13.5 17.0 22.7
& APARTMENT: 24.7 : 22.2 17.8 | 25.0 : 23.5
6.4 6.4 | 2.9 : 3.1 3 .9
+-----------------+------------+------------------------
III 20 : 14 | 21 : 16 : 21 | 92
COMMERCIAL 21.7 | 15.2 | 22.8 | 17.4 22.8 | 14.8
ENTERPRISE 12.3 | 7.8 | 20.8 I 21.1 | 20.6
3.2 2.3 3.4 2.6 1 3.4
+----------------+------------+------------------------
4 10 | 6 | 2 1 8 1
BOTH RENT & 13.3 1 33.3 | 20.0 1 6.7 : 26.7 4.8
COMMERCIAL 2.5 : 5.6 | 5.9 1 2.6 | 7.8
0.6 1.6 | 1.0 1 0.3 | 1.3
+----+-----------+------------+------------------------
COLUMN 162 180 101 76 102 621
TOTAL 26.1 29.0 16.3 12.2 16.4 100.0
CHI SQUARE = 23.89 DF = 12
SIGNIFICANCE = .0210
Table 3.10 Household Income by Dwelling Use in Las Colinas
Returning to the case of the second family that built the Caja's
minimum house, their total monthly income was PS1,950 per month.
If their time preference shifted upwards just 4 percentage points
to 25%, than the present value of their future rents will now be
worth P$50,400 instead of the former P$60,800. This is a 15,
loss. Owners can do two things. They can crowd more renters into
the existing structure. Obviously, no one will be building new
rental units at this time. More renters might require the owner
to occupy less of the house himself to make more space rentable.
Owners can also stop maintaining the building and let it
depreciate to a point which approximates the new present value of
his rents. Even if he eliminates all maintenance, it is unlikely
that he can depreciate the building fast enough to break even.
For the lower income groups, the overall effect of rent control
will be to depress the capital value of homes, force owners to
overcrowd, and cause a lower than normal level of maintenance to
occur.
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SUMMARY
Examination of rents, housing prices and construction points out
that owners by and large make rational choices in their home
investments. Although few owners knew how they determined rents
or sales prices for their homes, there was a high degree of
consensus. None of the families interviewed were aware that
rents, home values and land values were related but their
investment patterns showed that they were maximizing the ground
rent by building as much additional construction as they could
afford up to the point where marginal costs and revenues
converged. Time preference appears to be a very promising aid.
Its principal advantage is convenience. Though the analysis
clearly shows that significant variances exist, it seems to offer
further investment discrimination among families with similar
incomes.
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LEGALIZING GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN SLUNS
Public investment programs in slums are limited not only by
capital resources but also by the nature of the laws which
regulate public programs targeted to slum areas. Upgrading
invasions and pirate barrios in Bogota required a series of
enabling legislation to authorize municiple authorities to
disburse capital improvements to settlements in which: 1) the
land was fradudlently or otherwise illegally obtained, or 2)
construction had occurred which had not been approved.
In response to the growing number of invasions and the dramatic
effect that barrio piratas were having on Bogota's development,
the mayor's office submitted legislation that would allow the
city to initiate capital and technical assistance programs in
barrios where there was de facto possession of the land or where
clear title is held but normal urbanization and house
construction had not taken place. Agreement 22 was the first
major piece of. legislation designed to normalize government
intervention in slums. (1 ) The intent of the agreement was to
restore planning control over low-income housing starts that had
been pre-empted by speculators, to allow residents a legal means
of obtaining services, to formalize a system for redressing
speculator abuses that citizens suffered in clandestine
settlements, and to bring newly urbanized land into the tax base
of the city. Agreement 22 states that any barrio in a "special
residential" zone that had elected and registered a Community
Action Group (Junta de Accion Comunal) with District Planning was
elgible for technical assistance, low interest development loans
and public service delivery irregardless of their tenure or past
construction history.
To define what zones were "special residential", the mayor's
office sought and won the City Council's approval of Agreement 51
to draft a new land zoning scheme for Bogota. (2) The
legislation called for the classification of all residential
areas and each was to be assigned an elgibility code for city
rograms. Invasion and pirate barrios were designated "R-E"
Residencial-Especial) or Special Residential zones.
Agreements 22 and 51 formalized government intervention in
illegal settlements by designating elgibility criteria for public
programs but the legislation had not yet defined what the scope
of the city's services would be. It wasn't until Agreement 65 in
(1) Consejo del Distrito Especial de Bogota, "Acuerdo 22 de
1963". (Bogota: Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion
Distrital, 1963)
(2) Consejo del Distrito Especial de Bogota. "Acuerdo 51 de 1963"
(Bogota: Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Distrital,
1963)
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1967 that minimum design standards for vehicle and pedestrian
roads, potable water, electrification, and land use were defined.
(1) The basic approach of the legislation was to usher total
redevelopment plans into settlements that were politically ready
to deal with the city.
Once a settlement was selected for legalization, District
Planning (Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Distrital)
would commission a redevelopment plan and then orchestrate a
single development effort negotiated among the public sector
agencies such as the light and water companies, the ministry of
land and taxation and the national housing development banks.
Las Colinas was the first major experiment in this new approach.
Within the first year of the Las Colinas project, it became clear
that widespread upgrading in Bogota's slums could not be achieved
if every new settlement required a simultaneous consensus and
coordinated investment program to be successful. Las Colinas'
project overruns already showed that the advantages of lowering
project costs through self-help programs were more than offset by
the increased administrative costs of coordinating numerous
development programs at the same time. What was needed was a way
to make upgrading and legalization efforts logical extensions of
regular public service agencies' capital programs without the
requirement that they all be undertaken at the same time.
Administrative costs could then be reduced by transferring
project implementation from single purpose slum development
agencies like the Caja to the service delivery agencies
themselves. Projects requiring community participation could
also mobilize residents for fewer projects at a time, another
lesson learned in Las Colinas.
In view of the Caja difficulties in Las Colinas and the
increasing pressures to expand low-income housing programs in the
Special District, the mayor's office made three ammendments to
Agreement 65. The law now allowed for: 1) long-term development
programs, 2) reduced design standards and 3) project
implementation by either public or private entities. In less
than two pages of changes to-article 13, Agreement 20 of 1972
made a significant leap foreward by allowing a new minimum
housing standard -- sites-and-services. (2)
The changes mandated by Agreement 65 stated four new policies.
First, physical development need only supply the following:
(1) Consejo del Distrito Especial de Bogota, "Acuerdo 65 de 1967"
(Bogota: Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Distrital,
1967
(2) Consejo del Distrito Especial de Bogota. "Acuerdo 20 de
1972", (Bogota: Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion
Distrital, 1972)
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- general automobile and pedestrian circulation routes
through the development built on stabilized base
densities
- potable water stations administered by the water and
sewer companies of Bogota and checked by the Secretary
of Public Health
- public street lighting built to post and wiring
specifications stated by the energy company
- public telephones within 1 kilometer of the settlement
- latrine on each lot
- public clothes washing facility with drainage (1)
Second, the above conditions could be met by either government,
non-government non-profit agencies like the Caja or by
incorporated private investors. Third, all projects must have an
officially registered Community Action Group. Fourth, District
Planning must sanction the design, financing, material selection
and home building process. The same department must keep an
information data registry through the Superintendent of Banks of
any report of noncompliancy by developers. The last policy is
the first attempt in Colombia to formalize an ongoing information
system to measure the effects of low-income housing policy.
The implications of Agreement 20 were immense. Prior to this
law, all physical infrastructure had to be in place before plots
could be occupied. Initiating a project always involved large
amounts of start-up capital. Previously, any delay in the
approval or inspection of utilities, paving or drainage
decapitalized the project and delayed occupation. Lowering
minimum design standards and allowing the lots to be occupied as
soon as the water and power systems were approved would lower
initial capital requirements, produce immediate returns on
investment and occupy lots more rapidly. The legislators were
clearly impressed with the power of private enterprise in
Bogota's pirate barrios and were hoping that a similar investment
effect would result from the law.
Reducing start-up costs in new projects would be paramount if
Agreement 20 projects were to compete with pirate barrio
speculators. Figure 3.2 shows the anticipated impact that the
law would make on a typical project. (2) The utility cost per
lot using the former standards was approximately P$6,A12 while
1) Consejo del Distrito special de Bogota. "Acuerdo 20 de 1972"
(Bogota: Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Distrital,
1972), p. 1
(2) Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Distrital.
"Aplicacion de las Normas Minimas de Urbanizacion y de
Servicios". (Bogota: Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion
Distrital, Unidad de Mejoramiento y Coordinacion de Barrios,
Febrero, 1978), un-numbered graph.
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the Agreement 20 standards allowed a 65. reduction to about
P$2,206 per lot. (1)
COST/LOT
(1970 PESOS)
$2,500 +
$2,000 +
$1 ,500 +
$1 ,000 +
$500
$2,422
$1 ,012
AGREEMENT 20
STANDARDS
PREVIOUS STANDARDS
$1,060 $1,052 $1,036
!t842
$461
-$-10 8
----------- +---------+---------+------------------
PAVING WATER SEWER TELE- LIGHTING
PHONE
PUPLlC
UTILITY
Figure 3.2 Agreement 20 Impact on Public Utility Costs
Agreement 20 refers to itself as "preventative action" because it
focuses on new housing starts. The same year, Agreement 21 was
assed authorizing "corrective action" in existing R-E barrios.
2) Three kinds of settlements were identified in the
legislation: 1) legal settlements that were deteriorating because
they had grown beyond the capacity of their infrastructure, 2)
(1) Cost items include: 1)paving - base, topping and sidewalks;
2) water - meter, lot connection and part of the network; 3)
sewer - lot connection and part of the network; 4) telephone -
phonesets, cables and underground channels; and 5) lighting -
meters, lot connection, line transformer and part of the network.
(2) Conse jo del Distrito Especial de Bogota. "Acuerdo 21 de
1972". (Bogota: Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion
Distrital, 1972)
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invasion and pirate barrios, and 3) projects started under
Agreement 20 but abandoned by the developer because of bankruptcy
or corporate dissolution. The intent of Agreement 21 was to
guarantee that every home builder would have access to water and
street lighting on principal roads. Lighting implies
electrification throughout and power drops to each lot. To
encourage the utility companies to step up infrastructure
programs in R-E zones, Agreement 21 authorized them to charge
standard tariff rates for individual lot connections. The law
stated that profits resulting from connections were to revert to
a rotary fund to finance further extensions of basic trunk lines.
In invasion or pirate settlements, owners were required to build
and maintain a latrine until a sewer network was installed. Any
readjustment of the lotting plan due to roads or reclaiming open
space was to be elaborated by District Planning and implemented
by the Community Action Group in that barrio. Under the law, the
group was elgible to draw capital funds from the rotary fund to
the limit of their per capita elgibility to finance mutual-help
public works programs. Agreement 21 requires District Planning
to form an inter-agency commission for urban renewal projects.
Commission members from each of the public service agencies
determine the technical and financial feasibility of upgrade
programs. The minimum service level was left to the discression
of the corresponding representative. Bogota's public service
agencies were enthusiastic about this provision because it
restored their autonomy. They now had control over the design
standards that judged the level and quality of their service
output. District Planning was further obligated by Agreement 21
to register approved renewal plans with the Land Registry
division of District Planning where land values would be assessed
and taxation levels determined.
While Agreements 20 and 21 were being prepared for the City
Council, the ICT, District Planning and National Planning
together commissioned a Bogota based planning firm,
Consultecnicos Ltda., to prepare a technical review of the
minimum standards approach to urbanizing land. (1) The findings
of this study became the basis for District Planning's project
licensin, procedures and two supplemental legislative mandates
issued in 1973 covering the responsibilities of private
developers in Agreement 20 projects.
Decrees 1259 and 1260 in 1973 were direct results of the
Consultecnicos Ltda. study and essentially provided the technical
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(1) Consultecnicos Ltda., Estudio de Normas Minimas d
Urbanizacion, Servicios Publicos Y~Servicios Comunitarios:
Primera Parte Normas Pisicas Y Aspectos Generales, (Bogota:
Instituto de Credito Territorial, Agosto, 1971)
base for Agreement 20 projects. (1) Decree 1259 specified the
requirements for vehicular and pedestrian roads, access to and
minimum areas for lots, open space and utility service levels.
Developers were to provide permanent water taps, storm drains,
latrines, street lighting and power connections to each lot.
Projects could not exceed a maximum density of 100 lots per
hectare and single family residences could not exceed three
floors. Developers must submit to District Planning a basic
topographical plan, an urbanistic scheme, land title and proof
that there were no property liens against the site. (2) The
Technical Coordinating Committee for Public Services and New
Works would review the plans and assign street names and number
each plot for tax registration purposes. The city plat maps were
also updated to reflect the new plan. Approval of projects was
estimated to take six months. Failing one or more licensing
steps, the developer was required to repeat the full sequence of
steps.
As soon as District Planning approved a sites-and-services
project, binding letters of intent were exchanged with the
developer stating what each party would do and in what sequence.
Developers were then required to turn over all urbanistic work
and sanitary facilities to public works officials no later than
six months from contract signing. The city would monitor the
project in four to six field inspections to insure that standards
were being met and that the project would not fall behind.
Decree 1260 was an engineering reference document for each of the
service networks associated with a sites-and-services project.
Detailed specifications were outlined in the following areas:
Water Consumption Combined Storm and Sewers
Flow Estimation Flow Estimation
Types of Tubing Location of Inlets
Hydrant Locations Inspection Chambers
Staged Construction Staged 'Construction
Lot Connections
Electrical
Sanitary Sewers Demand Rates
Flow Estimation Transformer Capacity
(1) Alcalde Mayor del- Distrito Especial de Bogota. "Decreto
Numero 1259 de 1973" and "Decreto Numero 1260 de 1973". (Bogota:
Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Distrital, Noviembre,
1973).
(2) Agreement 20 project licensing procedures are described in
forms: "Consulta Previa Normas Minimas (F-1A)", "Plano
Topografico Normas Minimas (F-1-1A)", "Esquema Basico Normas
Minimas (F-3A)" and "Proyecto Y Respuesto Normas Minimas (F-3A)"
available for Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion
Distrital, Bogota.
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Tubing Voltage Fluxuations
Inspection Chambers Pole Design
Clean-Out Boxes Wiring Specification
Staged Construction
Lot Connections Public Street Lighting
Materials Specification Frequency of Lights
Light Intensity
Storm Drains Pole Design
Flow Estimation Wiring Specification
Location of Collectors
Inspection Chambers Telephone Service
Staged Construction Underground Cables
Materials Specification Pole Height and Spacing
SUMMARY
Agreement 20 and Supplemental Decrees 1259 and 1260 are
significant legislative advances. In much the same way that the
self-help model contributed to redirecting policy away from total
design and build approaches, the pirate barrio model contributed
to increasing the marketability of low-income housing through
private sector participation.
Agreement 20 is too general to evaluate the investment
consequences of sites-and-services but not the supplemental
Decrees 1259 and 1260. Though 1260 goes into considerable
technical detail about capital programs, there is a major
omission that could institutionalize poor policy performance from
the start -- there are no specifications for layout design. Four
uncoordinated provisions spanning both decrees indirectly set
design: 1) 19.3% of the total site area is to be designated open
space, 2) densities are limited to 100 houses/Ha., 3) single
family dwellings may not exceed three floors, and 4) bi-family
dwellings cannot be built on lots smaller than 75 square meters.
(1) The analysis of alternative block designs in chapter two
shows that approximately 20% of the site area used for open space
is feasible from a revenue producing (land taxation) viewpoint
only if cluster designs are employed. When circulation area is
considered, approximately 45% of the entire project area will be
non-taxable land if gridiron designs are used. Since Decree 1260
does not mention layout, one can assume that the traditional
gridiron block design will dominate. At the legal limit of 100
houses/Ha, lots will be approximately 60 to 80 square meters.
Decree 1259 requires every lot to have a minimum 6 meter front,
thus the lot proportions will range from 1:1.7 to about 1:2.2.
The combined effect of the gridiron design and small lots is
disastrous. The amount of private land that is taxable is
minimized while the amount of infrastructure per dwelling unit is
(1) Ibid., Decreto 1259, pp. 4-5
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maximized. (1) In terms of the families who buy these lots,
their income earnings potential through the house is seriously
limited. Given the space requirements that Las Colinas residents
displayed, families will have to build three floors just to
satisfy their own housing needs. Even when buyers are successful
in obtaining the larger lots required for bi-family dwellings, it
is unlikely that 80 square meters will allow enough space for an
entire apartment even with multi-floor construction; single
rental rooms seem more likely.
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(1) See Chapter 2 - UTILITIES AND COSTS for gridiron and cluster
comparisons.
CASE 2: SITES-AND-SERVICES
LA MANUELITA EXPERIMENT
To test the feasibility of Agreement 20 legislation, the Caja
undertook in 1971 an experimental sites-and-services project
called La Manuelita. Approximately 300 lots were proposed to
test Consultecnicos' findings, to measure project implementation
times and costs using the new minimum standards, and to evaluate
the applicability of draft legislation (Decrees 1259 and 1260) to
future Caja projects. About 60% of the beneficiaries were to be
selected from families displaced form ICT and Caja slum upgrade
projects in barrios Las Colinas, Altamira, Egipto and others. (1)
The remaining 40% would be randomly selected from low income
project applicants.
A small site measuring 3.52 Ha was purchased in the township of
Suba, a northern suburb of Bogota. Initial studies of the site
indicated that a density of approximately 75 houses/Ha would
result from traditional gridiron plans. Further lotting studies
showed that the densities could be increased 10% or from 265
houses to 291 without any changes in the lot dimensions if a
cluster approach was used instead. Although the Caja had never
used clusters before, they were impressed with the fact that
higher densities were obtained with less infrastructure. The
final design grouped 30 small lots measuring 6 by 9 meters around
a 20 by 30 meter open ai-q or court. In one corner of the area,
a water tap, sanitary facility, six laundary stations and seven
showers were located.
On each lot, the Caja constructed a single brick multi-purpose
room measuring 3.5 by 3.15 meters and a detached latrine stall at
the rear of the lot. Due to the simplicity of the
sites-and-services approach, the Caja finished the basic project
design, contracted the basic urbanistic work and began installing
utilities in less than six months. District Planning monitored
the progress of La Manuelita and thought that six months was a
desirable implementation time for all Agreement 20 projects.
Decree 1259 was still in draft form and it was changed
accordingly.
By January of 1973, the public works agencies had completed the
first phase of installing utilities and the Caja permitted the
families to move in. All 291 lots had sewer connections while
149 had water supplied to the lot. The other households filled
water tanks by running hoses from the taps in the court to their
(1) Caja de la Vivienda Popular. "La Manuelita: Como Plan de
Desarrollo Progresivo con Normas Minimas". (Bogota: Caja de la
Vivienda Popular, Distrito Especial de Bogota, Abril, 1976), p. 5
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lot. (1) Project costs mounted to P$1,511,OO for the land and
start-up utilities and P$1,684,600 for the single room and
latrines built on each lot. The ICT charged the Caja an
additional P$46,700 for technical, legal and financial services
during the project. The value of lots were set at P$11,140 and
mortgages designed accordingly.
Due to the fact that most beneficiaries were receiving lots in
Manuelita as compensation for displacement from upgrade projects
elsewhere, the ICT and the Caja decided to subsidize the mortgage
terms. Families were to pay only P$91.34 per month for 12 years
without any down payments. The interest rates were approximately
6% per year of which 2% was for life and fire insurance.
Standard bank mortgage interest in 1975 in Bogota was about 18%.
In 1976, the Caja conducted a census in La Manuelita to determine
how rapidly families were building and what their income levels
had become. Interviewing 283 owners and 30 families who were
renting, the total project population was estimated to be 1820
persons. (2) In general, family sizes were only slightly under
the mean value of Las Colinas while the overall income
distribution was almost identical. Table 3.11 shows the census
tabulation.
The Caja was particularly interested in measuring how rapidly
families had expanded their single room units. An inventory of
each lot after three years occupation showed that 200 out of 291
lots had at least doubled the constructed area while 58% had
quadrupled it. (3) These advances were impressive enough but a
surprisingly high number of families, about 68 or one fourth of
the beneficiaries, had not made any investment at all. After
three years, they were still living in the 10 square meter room
the Caja had built. The Caja did not attempt to cross tabulate
construction with other variables to find out why these families
did not invest but interviews with Caja field personnel involved
in the census stated that lack of income was the principal
reason. The response to the construction question from the other
215 families showed just the opposite. These families had
invested an impressive P$5,511,600 in their homes within three
years. This means that families on the average invested P$25,635
in their home or about 4.4 times as much as the Caja invested in
constructing the original room and latrines on each lot.
(1) Caja de la Vivienda Popular. "Un Caso Especifico de Solucion
en Bogota - Colombia". (Jalapa, Mexico: Sociedad Interamericana
de Planificacion, Seminario Africo-Latino Americano Sobre
Asentamientos Humanos Marginados, 1977)
(2) Ibid., p. 8
(3) Ibid., "Grafico Numero 10"l, approximate page 19
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INCOME
(MTH) FAMILIES PERCENT
- 700 23 7.34
701-1200 74 23.64
1201-1700 74 23.64
1701-2200 66 21.07
2202-2700 34 10.89
2701-3200 21 6.71
3201- UP 11 3.51
NO ANSWER 10 3.20
TOTAL 313 100.00
Table 3.11 Income Distribution
in La Manuelita
The Caja estimated that a single brick room and accompaning
latrine stall cost P$5,800 to build. This figure does not
include the land nor urbanistic work like the communal facilities
located in the court area. The families that did invest,
invested about P$8,545 per year plus met their monthly P$91
mortgage payment. This results in housing expenditures of about
P$9,600 each year.
Given that the lot sizes in La Manuielita are very small, there
are a surprisingly high numbers of families, 24% in fact, that
use their homes for income earnings. Of the 215 families that
expanded their homes, 171 had built at least 45 square meters or
more (enough space to house another family or operate a store)
yet 30 families were renting and 11 stores operating in owner
occupied dwellings. (1)
Based on the success of Manuelita, the Caja decided to use the
core unit and cluster design again in a substantially larger
sites-and-services project called Las Guacamayas. Here,
applicants would not be subsidized to the extent they had been in
La Manuelita and it was important to determine from this project
what families could pay for housing. Income seemed the best
indicator the Caja had for determining affordability and
investment potential.
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(1) Decrees 1259 and 1260 that required lots with bi-family
dwellings to be at least 75 square meters were still in draft
form when the Caja undertook La Manuelita.
Assuming that income leads to investment, what proportion of
income was being spent on housing? If the 68 families that did
not invest had insufficient incomes to do so, a new average
family income for the investors can be estimated by removing 68
families from the lowest income groups in Table 3.11. If the
upper income limit in La Manuelita is assumed to be P$5,000 per
month and the mean income within each group is weighted by the
corresponding number of families, a new mean income of P$1,920
per month is obtained or P$23,031 per year. By this analogy, a
yearly housing investment of P$9,600 and an average yearly income
of P$23,031 indicates that housing alone accounts for 42% of
family expenditures in the first three years of the project.
Using income only, this surprisingly high household expenditure
might even be underestimated in the above calculations because
the four basic assumptions - low income families are the
non-investors, the maximum income is less than P$5,000 per month
and self-help inputs are undervalued - will tend to raise the
income average while lowering the investment.
An analysis similar to this one was likely to have led the Caja
to set the maximum limit on mortgage payments in Las Guacamayas
at 30% of monthly income. Thus, applicants would be eligible for
different housing types within the project based on meeting a
mortgage payment that couldn't exceed 30% of their monthly
income.
Although most families in La Manuelita invested impressive
amounts in home improvements, the relationship between investment
and income is still unclear. The survey and subsequent analysis
was not structured well enough to act as an evaluation
information system. Mortgage payments amounted to only 11% of
household expenditures thus 89% was free for direct capital
improvements. Rapid consolidation cannot possibly occur if these
percentages are reversed. High housing investments raise another
question. Where does the capital come from in the first place?
Wage and salaries simply could not account for everything.
Families are likely to be using funds from other sources that
were not measured with survey questions about income. Some of
the more important institutional sources in Colombia are the
mandatory employer savings funds for workers (Prestaciones
Sociales), credit unions and employees' cooperatives. Their
effect is to increase a family's access to capital and to
decrease their expenditures for other things especially food and
clothing or at least to allow them to consume more without
spending more. Informal credit systems, loans from friends and
contributions from extended family members living in the house
also figure. The high number of families that use their homes
for apartments and stores argue that investment leading to incomeis just as likely as vice versa.
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PRIVATE SECTOR SITES-AND-SERVICES
By 1973, District Planning had all the legal and administrative
procedures in place and was accepting applications from
developers for minimum standard projects under Agreement 20. In
the first six months, 12 applications totalling 52 Ha had been
received. Within the next year, the number would dramatically
increase to 62 projects and 720 Ha. In 1975 and 1976, the
numbers of applications had remained constant at about 63 per
year but the total area of projects was declining somewhat. (1)
By 1977, both the number of applications and project area had
significantly dropped to only 49 applications with 410 Ha, the
lowest yearly level since the Agreement 20 procedures had begun.
Although the number of applications declined every year after
1974, the number of approved projects and the total project area
processed steadily increased until 1977 when the decrease in
applications resulted in only 19 approved projects and 183 Ha of
urbanization. (2)
Privately developed sites-and-services were definitely on the
decline. A brief review of proposal rejections and land
availability within the sewered area of Bogota suggests several
reasons. The single most common reason for rejecting
applications was that the proposed site was beyond the municipal
limits or outside the sewered land area of Bogota. All the
rejected applications in 1973 were for this reason, 60% in 1974,
48% in 1975, 30% in 1976 and 14% in 1977. The second most common
cause for rejection was location of a project in a zone not
designated for residential use. Rejections for this reason
steadily increased each year from 13% in 1975 to 49% in 1977 as
the amount of low-cost land within the District was progressively
built up. Although Bogota's 1968 city limits were extended in
1975 in anticipation of Agreement 20, the eligible area (within
the sewered perimeter) was only about 10% of the annexed areas.
(3)
(1) Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Distrital.
"Aplicacion de las Normas Minimas de Urbanizacion y de
Servicios". (Bogota: Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion
Distrital, Unidad de Mejoramiento y Coordinacion de Barrios,
Febrero, 1978), unnumbered pages approximately p. 14
(2) Estimations for 1977 were supplied in an interview with Arq.
Luis Carlos Jimenez of the Oficina de Regularizacion y
Mejoramiento de Barrios at Planeacion Distrital, August 1978.
(3) Consejo del Distrito Especial de Bogota. "Acuerdo Numero 25
de 1975". (Bogota: Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion
Distrital, 1975)
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Several research groups outside District Planning had noted that
both invasions and pirate barrio activity was definitely
increasing again. Staff members from the slum improvement office
at District Planning conducted a brief survey of lot prices and
they found that licensed developers were charging from P$25,000
to P$45,000 for lots while speculators were selling lots for
almost half this or from P$14,370 to P$35,570. In terms of
financing, developers charged P$500 to P$800 per month while
speculators charged only P$377 to P,538. Two obvious sources of
price difference are the higher level of initial services in
Agreement 20 projects and the higher land cost within the sewered
perimeter of Bogota. Just beyond the city limits, speculators
were offering almost twice the lot size for half the price.
Apparently, the lowest income families couldn't afford the legal
settlements and prefered to buy into pirate barrios where they
could get more for their money. Since families in both kinds of
settlements have assurances of title, it is clear that the
increasing pirate barrio growth was due to families who wanted
cheaper land at the sacrifice of higher initial amenities.
SUMMARY
La Manuelita and early Agreement 20 projects proved that under
certain conditions, sites-and-services was an effective housing
policy. In less than five years, 132 projects had urbanized
almost 1,000 hectares of land. But the long term use of the
policy was in doubt. (1) The failure of more recent projects
shows that the main bottleneck in housing continues to be the
supply of low-cost serviceable land. While the pirate barriosjust beyond the city limits are increasing their share of the new
housing starts, it becomes clearer that District Planning had not
correctly estimated the land mass affected by Agreement 20 nor
had the utility companies compared the proximity of their service
networks to the new R-E zones.
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(1) Ibid., totals from graphs on unnumbered pages approximately
p. 21
CASE 3: SITES-AND-SERVICES
A BRIEF HISTORY OF BARRIO LAS GUACAMAYAS
In 1971 the mayor's office, through District Planning, undertook
an integrated development program for Bogota's eastei: mountain
area called the Integraded Program for the Urban Development of
the Eastern Zone of Bogota or PIDUZOB. The city proposed to
rehabilitate the forest regions which protect the soil on the
slopes adjacent to Bogota, develop urban recreational facilities
in this area, increase public facilities such as schools and
hospitals, and expand the existing sewer and water systems to
include older slum areas in the south and new luxury housing in
the north. The centerpiece of the plan was a new perimeter
north-south highway called "Paseo Bolivar" which would link all
the eastern most barrios. In anticipation of relocating
approximately 1,500 low-income families displaced by the southern
portion of the highway, the ICT and Interamerican Development
Bank authorized the Caja to design and implement the required
low-income housing. (1)
The PIDUZOB plan called for 1,480 new houses, 820 renovations and
2,000 sites-and-services lots. The new units were to be built in
Barrios Lomas I and II while Barrio Las Guacamayas was to contain
upwards of 3,000 serviced lots. About 500 would be reserved for
families displaced from the right-of-way of the highway. The
Caja was a logical choice to implement the housing portion of
PIDUZOB because they already had implemented three major projects
in the south and were currently experimenting with minimum
standards in Barrio La Manuelita. (2)
Unanticipated public opposition to PIDUZOB forced District
Planning to abandon the highway portion of the plan but the Caja
was authorized to continue with Las Guacamayas. (3) Shortly
after the defeat of the PIDUZOB highway, the mayor's office
issued a directive to the Caja making Special District employees
(1) Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota. Programa Integrado de Desarrollo
Urbano Zona Oriental de Bogota D.. ,(Bogota: AlcaTdia Mayor de
Bogota, Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Distrital,
Diciembre, 1973). pp. 272-274 section "Subprograma No. 4
Habitacional".
(2) Caja projects in southern Bogota include: Barrio Los Laches
(629 units), Las Colinas (804 upgraded lots) and Las Lomas I (834
units).
(3) See Gabriel Murillo and Elisabeth Unger, "Case II Programa
Integrado de Desarrollo Urbano de la Zona Oriente de Bogota
(PIDUZOB)" in Poder e Informacion. (Bogota: Canal Ramirez,
Antares, 1977)
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eligible for 75% of Las Guacamayas units. (1)
In 1973, the Caja purchased approximately 500,000 square meters
of land from The Agriculture and Forest Society (La Sociedad
Agricola y Forestal), a subsidary of the cement piping company
Tubos Mioore who supplied the sewer and water pipes for the Las
Colinas upgrading. From the outset, the Caja was committed to
the cluster design that had been so successful in La Manuelita.
This time they would also introduce several different housing
types ranging from serviced vacant lots to nearly completed
houses. Eventually, designs were limited to four types of units
designated A, B, B1 and C:
Type A - Cleared 60 square meter lots with sewer connection,
communal water tap, concrete sidewalks and paved
vehicular and pedestrian ways. Lots would sell for
P$18,400. Minimum qualifying income was P$780/Mth.
Type B - Same as type A but with an electrical connection and
a single 10 square meter multi-purpose room.
Estimated value was P$27,580 (1974 pesos). Minimum
income was P$1,025/Mth.
Type B1- Same as type A with a 15 square meter room, kitchen
and electrical service to the unit. Estimated value
in 1974 was P$31,500. Minimum income P$1,200/Mth.
Type C - Same as type A with an 18 square meter multi-purpose
room, kitchen and bath facility. Full electrical
service to the unit. Estimated value was P$46,000 in
1974. Minimum income P$1,500/Mth.
By 1976, the Caja had 624 type A, 156 type B, 161 type B1 and 279
type C solutions underway totalling 1,219 units in the first
sector of implemention. In advance of starting the second
sector, the Caja distributed 10,000 application forms to workers'
unions, Special District employees, PIDUZOB affected families and
to the Caja's field office in southern Bogota to test the market
response. In less than one month 7,366 completed applications
had been received - the response was overwhelming. Table 3.12
shows the eneral pattern, especially the popularity that type C
units had. 2)
(1) Caja de la Vivienda Popular. "Resolucion No. 2 de 1975(Articulo 2)". (Bogota: Caja de la Vivienda Popular, Junta
Directiva, 1975)
(2) Caja de la Vivienda Popular. "Plan de Vivienda Las Guacamayas
- Caracteristicas del Plan y de los Solicitantes". (Bogota: Caja
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UNIT SPECIAL PUBLIC GENERAL
TYPE DISTRICT PIDUZOB WORKS PUBLIC TOTAL PERCENT
-----------------------------------------------------
A 72 7 103 464 646 8.77
B 95 17 43 641 796 10.81
B1 124 30 32 1,096 1,282 17.40
C 1,012 96 48 3,486 4,642 63.02
-----------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 1,303 150 226 5,687 7,366 100.00
Table 3.12 Applicant Source for Housing in Las Guacamayas
Even though the ICT had forecasted a housing deficit in excess of
135,000 units for Bogota in 1970 (only to be revised upward to
218,000 in 1975), the applicant response took the Caja by
complete surprise. (1) Not only was the demand much higher than
anticipated, it was opposite to what the Caja had already built.
For 624 vacant type A lots, there were only 646 applicants. By
the time applicants were screened, there would be more lots than
eligible families. The demand for B and B1 units was just the
opposite; 796 families applied for 156 B units while 1,276
families applied for 161 B1 units. The demand for type C units
was higher yet -- 4,642 applications were received for just 279
units. Not only was the market for minimum sites-and-services
plots totally overestimated, applicants obviously wanted as much
on-lot construction as they could possibly qualify for.
In response to the demand, the Caja redistributed the capital
investment program for the second sector which was still in the
design phase. Type A lots would be vastly reduced from 51% to
15% of the sector and type B1 units would be eliminated
altogether to simplify construction and administration. B units
would be 35% of second sector construction; up from 13% in the
first sector. The most dramatic construction shift would be in
the number of nearly completed housing types. Type C units would
now be 40% of the second sector instead of 23% and a completely
finished unit, type D, would be introduced on 10% of the lots.
What started off as a minimum standard sites-and-services project
that would benefit PIDUZOB and Special District employees was
evolving into a traditional low-cost housing project for the
de la Vivienda Popular Oficina de Integracion Social, Grupo de
Divulgacion, Marzo, 19765. recompilation of table on p. 11.
(1) Centro Nacional de Estudios de la Construccion. "Oferta de
Edificaciones Urbanos en Bogota 1977". (Bogota: Centro Nacional
de Estudios de la Construccion, 1977)
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general public.
The public investment shift back towards total design-and-build
housing greatly disturbed Agreement 20 advocates. They argued
that access to low-cost serviceable land was still the main
problem facing low-income families and they pointed to the
increased invasion and pirate barrio activity that was now being
reported by researchers at the Fundacion para la Educacion
Superior de Desarrollo (FEDESARROLLO). (1) Yet
sites-and-services in this project and in the private sector
Agreement 20 projects seemed to be failing.
The apparent failure of the sites-and-services portion of Las
Guacamayas and the decline in Agreement 20 licenses showed that
more than just lowering the cost of serviced land was involved.
The fact that Las Colinas, La Manuelita and early Agreement 20
projects were successful questions the differences in
circumstances under which these projects were implemented.
Obviously part of the investment uncertainty surrounding projects
is linked to the beneficiary himself and his market options.
SELECTING BENEFICIARIES
The only restrictions imposed on applicants by the Caja were that
families have low-incomes but stable employment, preferably have
dependents, not be more than 50 years old, have lived in Bogota a
minimum of two years and not own land within the Special
District. There was no requirement that families agree to build
within a specific period if accepted. (2) One possible
explanation for the skewed demand for partially completed
dwellings was that the admission criteria simply eliminated the
families that were similar to those who benefited from pirate
barrios and earlier Caja projects. Of all the criteria, income
and accumulated capital appear to have been the most important.
A sample of 1,840 applicants taken from the Caja project records
shows that families were well above the minimum incomes required
for each type of unit. Type A applicants had almost twice the
required income. Type B, B1 and C applicants also exceeded the
minimum income but to a lesser degree with 111%, 70% and 81% more
than the minimum required. (3) The mean income for families
(1) Rodrigo Losada Lora and Hernando Gomez Buendia, La Tierra en
el Mercado Pirata de Bogota. (Bogota: Fundacion para la Educacion
Tuperior de arrollo, Junio, 1976).
(2) Arqa. Elssye de Alcala and Soc. Laureano Gomez, interview at
the Caja de la Vivienda Popular, Oficina de Integracion Social,
Bogota, July 1978.
(3) Caja de la Vivienda Popular. "Plan de Vivienda Las Guacamayas
- Caracteristics del Plan y de los Solicitantes". (Bogota: Caja
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applying for types A, B and B1 the solutions most comparable to
La Manuelita and Las Colinas was approximately P$2,719/Mth in
1976. The mean income for owners in Las Colinas was about
P$1,731/Mth when the Social Work survey was taken a year later.
Allowing for small differences when comparing income figures one
year apart, applicants to the project still earned 50% to 60%
more than families in Las Colinas. A second survey of Las
Guacamayas in 1978 shows that families who were eventually
accepted into the project were earning P$3,616/Mth, almost twice
what Las Colinas families were earning. (1) The selection
process definitely creamed off the highest income families
because the mean incomes for applicants as a whole is
significantly below the mean for accepted families.
There is little doubt that the selection process systematically
admitted families that were better off than either of the earlier
Caja projects. Given the need to reduce subsidies in Las
Guacamayas, ability to pay appeared to be sound admission
criteria. The higher income groups will likely make rapid
initial investments while their accumulated savings last but
cease to invest when their mortgage payments take up the majority
of their capital. On the other hand, the lowest income families
who can least afford it are actually making double housing
expenditures. Since the lot is not initially habitable, families
must first continue paying rent elsewhere until a provisional
shack or enough permanent construction has taken place.
Secondly, families have to finance the start-up dwelling. The
longer they delay building, the longer they maintain paying
double rent because they must still make their mortgage payments.
The above scenerio suggests that income criteria alone may not be
sufficient to determine a family's real ability to pay and it may
incorrectly match solutions to families. The lowest income
families that can still meet the payments for B and B1 solutions
might best be allocated these units instead of type A while high
income families be assigned A or B solutions.
Although the Caja application records do not have enough
identification information to directly relate a family's initial
solution preference and capital sources to their eventual housing
investments, some general patterns support the above argument.
Applicant records show that families had already accumulated
capital in addition to wage and salary income. Table 3.12 shows
the accumulated capital from savings and workers' benefits
de la Vivienda Popular, Oficina de Integracion Social, Grupo de
Divulgacion, Marzo, 1976) recompiled from tables on pages 16 to
19.
(1) APPENDIX C contains an annotated example of the evaluation
survey used to evaluate Las Guacamayas in March of 1978.
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(cesantias) from a sample of 1,840 project applicants. (1)
----------------------------------------------------
ACCUMULATED
CAPITAL A B B1 C TOTAL PERCENT
UNDER 500 24 29 34 21 108 5.87
500- 1000 9 10 8 9 36 1.96
1001- 5000 73 90 121 164 448 24.35
5001- 10000 31 43 85 316 475 25.81
10001- 20000 21 16 53 380 470 25.54
20001- 30000 2 9 14 152 177 9.62
30001- 50000 2 1 5 96 104 5.65
50001- 80000 1 19 20 1.09
80001-100000 2 2 .11
TOTAL 162 199 320 1159 1840 100.00
Table 3.13 Accumulated Capital of Applicants to Las Guacamayas
The counts for each accumulated capital range indicate that le.-
then 8% of the applicants had under P$1,000 start-up capital. If
type C applicants are ignored, most A, B and B1 applicants had
already saved about P$6,500. Applicants for type C are not as
representative of the investment system of self-help and minimum
standards because the initial solution approaches a minimum home.
The Manuelita experiment showed that there was significantly more
home investment than could be explained by income expenditure
alone. Although specific information was not gathered,
accumulated capital was obviously important since their
investments were significant. Most families were being
compensated for losses in property due to public works and would
not otherwise qualify for housing. It would be useful to
summarize the relationship of income to accumulated capital
because the amount of downpayment that families can make or
initial construction that can be undertaken will have more effect
on future investment potential than their ability to make monthly
payments. The mean housing expenditure that families will
eventually make can be more closely approximated if data from
both Las Guacamayas and La Manuelita are combined. When the mean
capital accumulated for applicants entering Las Guacamayas is
tabulated with their monthly incomes, a surprisingly low but
constant capital/income ratio appears. Table 3.14 summarizes the
ratios.
(1) Ibid., p. 22
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UNIT TYPE: A B B1 C
MEAN CAPITAL(K) 6545 6882 8222 15486
ACCUMULATED
MEAN INCOME (Y) 2528 2678 2841 3518
PER MONTH
RATIO K/Y 2.59 2.57 2.89 4.40
Table 3.14 Accumulated Capital and Income
Ratios in Las Guacamayas
Accumulated capital/income ratios appear to be almost constant
for families applying for types A, B and B1 housing. Since the
income distribution of families in La Manuelita and Las
Guacamayas are almost identical, the mean household expenditure
can be estimated by readjusting the reported home improvements in
La Manuelita with capital accumulation data from Las Guacamayas.
If one assumes that the applicants to La Manuelita had similar
accumulated capital ratios as applicants reported in Las
Guacamayas, then the 42% of income spent on housing that was
forecasted earlier would now have to be readjusted downward to
approximately 28%. (1) It must be kept in mind that the Caja
assumed from the investments made in La Manuelita that families
in Las Colinas could spend 30% of their income on mortgage
payments and still invest in construction. Because accumulated
capital was not part of a family's investment records, the Caja
overestimated what a family could invest after meeting mortgage
obligations.
DOUBLE RENT
One hypothesis for the lack of demand for the type A solutions is
that the prevailing rents that applicants were already paying
were enough to finance B, B1 and C units. Presumably no family
can afford to pay a mortgage for a vacant lot, invest sufficient
capital to build a provisional shack (whose value would be
(1) The mean income for Las Guacamayas is approximately
P$1,665/Mth. Accumulated capital according to Table 3.14 is
about P$6,500. The reported mean household expenditures of
P$8,545/Yr in La Manuelita would have to be decreased by a third
part of the savings each year thus a more realistic estimate of
the portion of income spent for housing in Manuelita is
P$6,378/Yr or about 28% of the mean yearly income P$23,000.
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minimum when permanent construction started), and continue paying
rent until the shack is built. Type A recipients who cannot
build immediately are paying double rent. The fact that families
already occupied rent-free dwellings in the two previous Caja
projects is a curious oversight. In Las Colinas, families
occupied their shacks for eight years prior to the Caja's upgrade
project; in La Manuelita, families had a single room to start off
with. Admittedly the 10 to 18 square meter rooms offered in La
Manuelita and Las Guacamayas B, B1 and C units caused
considerable overcrowding, but only one rent (or mortgage
payment) was required at rates comparable to rents elsewhere for
similar amounts of space.
Almost all (95%) of the applicants said they were previously
renting single rooms (62%), entire houses (29%) or space in a
slum (15%). Presumably the families who rented in slums were
like those who rented rooms in Las Colinas in that 75% of the
applicants were already living in spaces equivalent to the
initial areas of B, B1 and C units. The application sample also
shows that only 2.8% were paying less than P$230/Mth rent, the
minimum payment for type A solutions. (1) Almost half (48%) of
the household were paying rents between P$230 and P$500/Mth.
while 41% were paying more than P$500/Mth. This means that
almost all of the applicants could move to at least B or B1
solutions and still have the same rent expenditures as before.
The other 41% could even afford the additional amenities that
type C units offered. Any difference between monthly payments
and their current rent expenditures is capital available for
construction. From a purely income and rent point of view, the
skewed demand for partially built units now appears quite
logical. If the double rent hypothesis is correct, one will
expect to find a lot of type A owners who simply couldn't get
enough capital ahead to start at all or a small number whose
income was in the highest group and made more investment than
normally expected.
SUMMARY
Although the skewed demand for solutions in Las Guacamayas took
project administrators by surprise, there was more than enough
information to have predicted the direction it would take. (2)
(1) Ibid., p. 23
(2) The major sources for this information in 1974 were:
a) Fundacion para la Educacion Superior y el Desarrollo
(FEDESARROLLO). Derecho I Desarrollo Urbano: Configuraciones
Juridicas Sobre Relaciones de ropiedad de Terrenos en las
Urbanizaciones Piratas de~Bogota. (Bogota: FEDSARTIOLITI~
Agosto, 1974)
b) Jaime Valenzuela y Vernez, Georges. "Construccion Popular y
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The defeat of "Paseo Bolivar" might have been unforeseen in 1974
but it was also unlikely that affected families would be
compensated with vacant lots (type A solutions) like the project
design intended. Instead, families would more likely have
insisted on equitable compensation for having lost their homes
thus increasing the pool of applicants for the already
oversubscribed B, B1 and C units. The lessons of Agreement 20
projects and Las Guacamayas also make it clear that the market
for sites-and-services and pirate barrios is the same. For the
former to succeed, it must offer competitive advantages like
large lots that permit income earnings through the dwelling and
financing that avoids double rent.
PROJECT DESIGN
The physical design of Las Guacamayas greatly influenced public
and private investment in the project. The Caja decided early on
to continue with the cluster approach that had proved so
successful in La Manuelita. The fact that automobile ownership
was almost zero meant that the Caja could again separate
circulation through the site from access to individual lots thus
allowing for greater private and semi-private land. (1) With the
proper design, this could greatly increase the total number of
lots possible and the amount of future tax revenues.
Instead of using a rectilinear layout with parallel and
perpendicular block faces like the Manuelita plan, the designers
decided to use hexagonal shaped clusters within which they would
place 6 to 8 conventional gridiron blocks containing small square
lots. The centers of some clusters would be left open to create
semi-private and semi-public spaces. Two groups of artists
sketches, one from the Consultecnicos report on minimum standards
and another from the Peruvian PREVI competition for low-income
housing, seemed sufficient empirical grounds to justify
abandoning the proven Manuelita design. (2)
Estructura del Mercado de Vivienda: El Uaso de Bogota"-
(Bogota: Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Nacional,
1972)
c) Georges Vernez. "Pirate Settlements, Housing Construction by
Incremental Development and Low-Income housing Policies in
Bogota, Colombia". (New York: New York City-Rand Institute,
1974)
(1) See CHAPTER 2 - CLUSTERS for definitions of terminology.
(2) Consultecnicos Ltda., Estudios de Normas Minimas de
Urbanizacion, Servicios Publicos y Servicios Comunitarios:
Primera Parte Normas Fisicas Y Aspectos Generales. (Bogota:
Instituto de Credito TerritorTal, Agosto, 1971) illustration
entitled "Urbanizacion Carimagua - Bogota" plate 1-15.
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The choice of hexagonal clusters, gridiron sub-blocks and small
square lots was disastrous from the start. The maximum possible
density was only 54 lots/Ha, well below the 82 lots/Ha achieved
in La Manuelita. (1) In order to service each lot and to make
each gridiron block accessible to vehicular streets. the
designers fully serviced the perimeter of the hexagonal cluster
as well. The resulting utility network had almost twice as much
infrastructure per lot as La Manuelita.
Accomodating the gridiron blocks inside the hexagonal perimeters
introduced still more problems. The conflictive geometries
resulted in many small trapezoidal shaped lots and unusable
triangular plots; the designers simply designated them "green
areas" and ignored the waste. The long axis of gridiron blocks
differed from cluster to cluster with no systematic relation to
the 10% slope. Owners would have to contend with building their
houses at arbitrary angles to the contours and natural lines of
drainage. About one third of the lots would require higher
excavation than normal simply because of conflicts between lot
and contour orientations. (2)
Three solutions (B, B1 and C) offered at least a simple
multipurpose room. The room was set back mid-way and to one side
of the lot. Since the axis of many gridiron blocks were neither
parallel or perpendicular to the natural slope, there was no way
to partially level each lot to simplify building the core units.
Instead of a single party wall on a common foundation shared by
two abutting units from adjacent lots, each unit had to be built
as a separate free-standing element. Not only did it require
more labor and materials this way, but it took longer to complete
a grouping of similar units.
The Caja had designed a four bedroom plan that could be built by
progressively adding onto the core unit. Although it was
distributed to all owners as a model, only 23% of the owners said
they used it at all. The restrictions imposed by the small lots
were numerous. All of the lot had to be covered with
construction and a minimum of two floors was needed to obtain
enough habitable space for a five member family. The internal
stairway needed to connect each floor eliminated almost 201 of
David Serna Cardenas. "Agrupaciones de Vivienda - Vivienda Baja
de Alta Densidad Proyecto Experimental de Vivienda - PREVI -
PERU." Escala (52-53).
(1) Caja de la Vivienda Popular. "Urbanizacion Las Guacamayas -
Cuadro General de Areas". (Bogota: Caja de la Vivienda Popular,
Febrero, 1977) areas derived from construction plans for the
first sector.
(2) See ChAPTER 2 for the technical trade-offs of gridiron and
cluster designs on sloped sites.
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the area of each floor. So cramped were the original solution
designs that many of the families who bought the expensive BI and
C units tore down and rebuilt their bathroom and kitchen units at
the rear of the lot.
BUILDING PROCESSES
Interviews in both Las Colinas and Las Guacamayas show that
owners almost always build their own provisional shacks
themselves but that they do not do the major work on their
permanent dwellings. This is a surprising finding because it is
generally assumed that low-income families have a low opportunity
cost for doing their own building and that families will build
permanent dwellings if they have basic training.
When families in both Las Colinas and Las Guacamayas described
their building process, a general pattern emerges. The main
reason that families tend to build their provisional dwelling but
not the permanent one relates to the relative cost of labor to
materials more than anything else. Owners said that they always
build their provisional shack themselves because here, the
materials are relatively cheap and little or no equipment is
needed. Light weight materials (tar paper, bamboo slats, mud or
wood siding) are easy to handle with common hand tools and the
structure tends to be simple post and beam systems with
non-structural enclosures. Foundations are seldom needed and
poor construction rarely results in a total collapse of the
building. Once permanent materials are employed, the situation
is reversed. Materials are now a much larger share than labor
costs. Owners first censider income earnings through the
dwelling and begin to stockpile materials. They usually prepare
the site and foundations at the same time. When enough material
is at hand, owners then contract the structural pieces like
masonry walls, columns and tie beams but complete the interior
plastering, painting, partitioning and carpentry themselves.
Plastering and pouring floor slabs were the only components that
had any significant variance in the accounts. Owners said that
plastering does not require special tools, but considerable
experience is required to do an acceptable job. Floor slabs are
one of the few structural components that owners may attempt
themselves. Generally it is simple to do but requires several
individuals to help out for a short period of time. A thirty
square meter slab may need as many as ten workers for half a day.
Once the slab is begun, cement mixing and pouring must continue
until the full extent of the slab is completed otherwise "cold"
or bondless joints result when the slab is extended later.
Owners often describe the pouring as a neighborhood event where
everyone helps for three or four hours in return for lunch.
Home interview data from Las Guacamayas reinforces what families
have been describing. Table 3.15 shows the principal labor used
to build each of the four solution types. Types B and B1 have
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been combined because their distributions were identical. By
inspection, type A owners did most of the construction themselves
while B/B1 owners did the least.
PRINCIPAL
LABOR SOURCE
OWNER
BUILT
EXTENDED
FAMILY &
NEIGHBORS
CONTRACTED
LABOR
COLUMN
TOTAL
SOLUTION TYPE
A B/B1 C
+----------------------------+
82 ' 42 52
46.59 23.86 , 29.55
65.60 | 48.84 | 47.27
25.55 13.08 16.20
+-------+----------------------
15 4 ' 9
53.57 14.29 j 32.14
12.00 , 4.65 8.18
4.67 | 1.25 : 2.80
+-------+----------------------
28 40 49
23.00 | 34.19 : 41.88
22.40 46.51 44-55
8.72 12.46 15.26
------ +-------+-------- -+
125 86 110
38.94 26.79 34.27
CHI SQUARE = 18.70
SIGNIFICANCE = .0009
ROW
TOTAL
176
54.83
28
8.72
117
36.45
321
100.00
DF = 4
Table 3.15 Construction Labor Sources
in Las Colinas
Since many of the owners of type A solutions erected provisional
shacks in the first year, it's not surprising to see that 479
built their own dwelling. Table 3.15 also shows that labor from
neighbors and extended family is surprisingly small. It is
generally believed that mutual help -- families helping one
another build -- is an important way to pool labor and skills but
this does not seem to have happened in this project. Only 26% of
the families said they had ever received help from neighbors
while slightly more, 31%, said they had helped their neighbors at
least once. Most of the families engaging in mutual help owned
the minimum A solution.
One expects contracting to be higher for B/B1 and C then for A
because permanent materials are used from the start and families
are apparently willing to pay a contractor as a form of insurance
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against doing a poor job themselves. The even distribution of
owner and contractor construction for the B/B1 and C solutions is
consistent with the notion that contractors build the structural
parts (walls, columns, tie beams, and maybe floor slabs) while
the families do the acabados (interior partitioning, cabinet
work, plumbing, electrical and sometimes plastering).
The fact that the higher income families contract more of their
construction can lead to the wrong conclusions about the
opportunity cost of the owner's labor. It's often argued that
owners contract because they earn more at their jobs than they
must pay for construction labor. This is true sometimes but
owners consistently report that they have to be present at the
site most of the time that contractors and laborers are' working
anyway. Owners spend their time checking that contractors
actually put the materials they have stockpiled into the
building. Over-watering cement, substituting inferior quality
bricks inside walls and leaving out reinforcing in slabs are ways
contractors siphon off materials for use on other jobs when they
are not supervised. The owner rarely has a plan or drawing
prepared and thus must constantly supervise to insure that
construction fits his needs.
The fact that owners must spend so much time supervising suggests
that they forego wages. This may not be the general case,
however. Interviews indicate that owners with permanent
employment generally have fixed salaries. Many owners describe
work situations where they can reduce their work input or make
other work arrangements without decreasing their income. Under
these conditions, an owner's opportunity cost could be zero while
supervising much of the construction since he foregoes nothing
for doing so. Owners also describe additional benefits they get
from their employment like using their employer's facilities to
make arrangements for building, buying materials or supplies on
the margin of larger orders for their employer, transporting
materials with company vehicles or borrowing tools and equipment
for short terms.
On the other hand, the lowest income families have just the
opposite kind of employment characteristics and opportunity cost
for building themselves. While almost 60% of the owners with
salaried incomes bought type C solutions, less than 10% of the
type A owners had such employment. Most type A owners earned
their income on an hourly basis as travelling salesman, artesans,
day laborers or in some other self-employed way. (1) For them, a
reduction in work effort means a direct reduction in income.
Owners in this case have three building options: 1) contract
work only to the extent that they can earn more at their job than
what they will have to pay for equivalent construction labor, 2)
(1) See survey form question 7 in APPENDIX C for employment
categories.
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build when their opportunity cost is zero like on weekends,
holidays or during slack work periods if they are seasonally
employed, or 3) stop working altogether and build while their
savings last. The opportunity cost for owners without salariedjobs is further complicated by the fact that the self-employed
spend a disproportionately high amount of time in job search that
does not derive income in and of itself but is necessary to
finding further employment.
The Caja believed that the owner's own construction skills would
be important if the project was to succeed. They were
particularly concerned that only half of the applicants claimed
to have any construction experience at all and that only 10%
actually worked in the industry. After making substantial
investments in a construction training program through the
National Apprenticeship Service (Servicio Nacional de
Aprendizaje-SENA), the Caja was eventually forced to all but
eliminate the program because there was poor owner attendance.
The interviews show why: owners were. not doing the building --
they were managing it. When owners were surveyed after two
years they reported that the main obstacles in building were the
lack of transportation for materials to the site (58%), general
material shortages (16%) and problems with adapting the
construction to the small site (17%). Only 5% said that they had
encountered any technical difficulties. Because the Caja assumed
that owners built their own dwellings, they made no attempt to
include contracting in their project monitoring efforts. The
obstacles they did find, however, suggest completely different
technical assistance. Obviously transportation is a problem but
if owners tend to contract structural pieces while doing
finishing themselves, then technical assistance should
concentrate on finding fair contractors, giving legal assistance
in contract making and in training owners to judge the quality
and completion of work.
PRIVATE INVESTMENT
A 50% survey of all occupied sites in March of 1978 reported that
352 families had already invested an average of P.21,171 per
household. When the investment data is further disaggregated by
solution type, 135 type A owners invested about P$17,500 each
while B, B1 and C owners invested approximately P$23,000,
P$13,900 and P$27,700 respectively. Table 3.16 shows the general
trend that results from weighing the mean value of each income
and investment class by the number of families in each cross
category.
Table 3.16 reports only the weighted mean values for owner
incomes and the investments reported. Within each income class,
significant variance was found. With the exception of the lowestinccme group, investment appears to rise with income but at a
decreasing rate. The skewed investment figure for the lowest
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income group cannot be fully explained. It is known that theCaja compensated a number of families with incomes under
P$1,000/mth with type C units. These families were not requiredto make down payments or to meet the scheduled rates. This
allows them to channel most of their household expenditure intodirect capital improvements similar to the way owners did in LaManuelita. Still this does not account for everything. When an
expected investment is computed for each income group based uponimputed capital accumulation (see Table 3.14), known mortgageterms, estimated residency of 18 months and housing allowances,
the observed trend in Table 3.16 seems to indicate that the
lowest income families are still spending more than expected
while the highest income families are spending less.
Income/Mth Investment
500 11257
1250 3928
1750 8500
2300 15020
3300 20050
4500 21090
6000 21288
8500 21958
Table 3.16 Income and Household
Investments in Las Guacamayas
The lowest income groups are the ones that sites-and-services is
supposed to benefit most and the skewed investment can't be
dismissed. Families earning under P$2,000/Mth simply can't be
investing P$10,000 and P$30,000 in a house plus making mortgage
payments without having access to much more capital than they
reported to the Caja. Although it's difficult to test income,
the Caja took great care to check each applicant. One
possibility is that some families are being backed by other
investors or their extended family. Not only are the high
investments suspect, the fact that the Caja's 50% sample of
occupied lots only found 139 owners living on type A lots when
more than 600 vacant lots were assigned to applicants also
indicates that many owners are not building at all. This could
mean that they have insufficient funds or simply that they are
speculating on the land.
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The survey seems to have uncovered several exceptional types of
owners: 1) low-income owners who make no investment at all, 2)
low-income owners who make much more than expected and 3)
high-income owners who make significantly less investment than
expected. Owners of vacant lots that invested nothing could be
simply speculating on the land or they might not be able to make
investments because they are paying double rent. The sudden
demand for second-hand materials in Las Guacamayas dramatically
increased the cost of building a provisional shack. Owners
reported that they now had to pay between P$12,000 and P$15,000
to build a small bamboo and plastic sheet dwelling. Bogota's
high altitude cold and continuous rain won't permit more modest
shelters. Thus the inability to pay double rent is a likely
reason for their not building. Yet other families have made very
significant investments - more than their income and accumulated
savings would have predicted. Owners might have undeclared
capital, be backed by extended family or speculators who maintain
the owner as a front or have no mortgage down payment to meet
because they received the house as compensation. Although field
data shows that important investment exceptions exist, the lack
of systematic record keeping prevents one from knowing the
causes. Families that invest more than expected are the most
difficult to trace but they also are less important. The most
problematic are the low-income families that are not building at
all because corrective policies tend to be mutually exclusive.
One policy approach could be to require all families to build.
This would reduce the speculation on vacant land but, the same
policy would also tend to eliminate desireable families with
legitimate double rent problems. Another policy approach could
be to lower the housing expenditures for the lowest income group
in some way. This would reduce double rent and allow families to
invest more in construction. But the same policy also tends to
increase speculator's profits because it lowers their investment.
CONSTRUCTION RATES
Although the variance was large, the overall figures show that
substantial private investment had taken place in the first two
years of occupation. Yet there were also signs that the initial
surge would rapidly subside. More than 83% of the 341 families
who responded, said that they were stopping all construction;
almost all (96%) said they had exhausted their capital and could
not get further financing.
One of the main reasons for construction stopage was an
unprecedented inflation rate of 31% that was met with only a 12%
increase in real income. In terms of construction, the Colombian
Chamber of Construction (Camara Colombiana de la
Construccion-CAMACOL) showed a 71% overall price increase for
labor and basic materials in Bogota during the first two years of
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the project (1) (2) Prices for several key items were even
higher. Brick had more than doubled in cost while cement and
labor were almost twice as expensive by the end of the second
year. Not only had construction slowed dramatically in the first
sector, but the Caja was forced to substantially increase the
prices for the second sector units. This decision led to open
confrontation between families who were promised units on the
basis of their original application but were now being asked to
pay more. Solutions A, B, B1 and C which sold for P$18,400,
P$27,580, P$31,500 and P$46,000 in 1976 would be sold for
P$22,000, P$39,000, P$45,000 and P$75,000 in 1978. While vacant
plots only increased 9% in price each year, the planned B, the
planned B1 and C solutions that had brick core units went up 17%,
18% and 25% each year as a result of inflation. Although the
Caja intended to reduce subsidies in Guacamayas, even the planned
increases did not keep pace with the reported CAMACOL figures.
The composite index for labor and basic materials shows that from
1975 to 1976 (the year the Caja completed the first sector)
prices rose 20% only to increase 28% the next year and 34% the
year after that. (3) The policy decision to eliminate type A and
B1 units in the project's second sector only increased the Caja's
losses. Virtually all the planned solutions would require brick
construction and be totally subject to the price increases.
SUMMARY
The cluster design used in La Manuelita achieved high densities
and low utility requirements per lot yet it maximized revenue
producing land without overcrowding. The plan for Las Guacamayas
was much less successful, however. Hexagonal clusters, gridiron
blocks and small square lots lowered the net density 34% and
almost doubled the infrastructure per lot over the previous
design.
Construction patterns in Las Guacamayas show that owners do not
build most of their homes themselves; they basically manage their
construction. This pattern appears to have been operating in
earlier Caja projects too. Labor costs tend to be much less than
(1) Some caution must be exercised when using CAMACOL indices.
Its financial and membership support comes from trade
associations and materials vendors who have a vested interest in
keeping prices as high as they can.
(2) Camara Colombiana de la Construccion. "Indice de Costos de
las Insumos Basicos de la Industria de la Construccion en Bogota,
D.E." (Bogota: Camera Colombiana de la Construccion, Seccional
Cundinamarca, 1978)
(3) Ibid., calculated from CAMACOL chart Index "Indice de Costos
de Construccion 1969-1978 Seccional Cundinamarca.
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for permanent materials, thus owners stockpile materials when
prices are right, contract and supervise the major structural
pieces and then finish the lighter interior work themselves.
Despite considerable investment, technical assistance to train
owners to build has not been successful. Owners generally do not
report technical problems; rather, material transportation to the
site and adjusting dwellings to the small lots are the main
obstacles.
Data show that significant investment is taking place.
Investment generally increases with owner income but at a
decreasing rate. Three exceptional investment cases appear to be
operating simultaneously: very low-income owners of type A lots
who either make no investment, low-income families who make
substantially more than expected (based on income and savings)
and high-income owners who make much less of an investment-than
expected. The low-income cases are the most troublesome because
policy solutions tend to be mutually exclusive. Requiring
families to build forces owners to invest who might otherwise
speculate on the land, but the same policy eliminates desirable
families with legitimate double rent problems. Subsidies that
attempt to help families overcome double rent also tend to
increase speculator profits. Owners generally report that they
are stopping further construction because high inflation has
exhausted their capital resources sooner than they had expected.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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INTRODUCTION
The case studies in the previous chapter described a housing
process that differed considerably from what the Caja or District
Planning had anticipated. The most serious differences were the
objectives that families had for building their homes, the way
they choose to build and finance them, and the effects that
subdivision design had on decreasing their incomes and increasing
their household expenditures. The "unexpected" results of recent
projects and legislation are less surprising now because the
investments that home owners make appear to be rational economic
responses to a combined shelter and income need. The project
uncertainties that administrators have experienced stem from the
fact that owners have various objectives in projects and the
costs and benefits that regulate owner's investment choice only
partially overlap with those currently anticipated and influenced
by project administrators.
The most effective uses of the case data will be to clarify the
owner's housing objective, to array his investment choices and to
see where policy can reduce cost and increase benefits in futureprojects. The case studies show that the interrelationships
between lot sizes, income earnings, rental units, ability to pay,
subdivision layout and technical assistance are more complex than
administrators had previously believed. The proposed policy
changes for new sites-and-services projects are unlikely to
reduce overall costs per household, make wider use of the policy,
reduce loan risks or reach lower income groups simply by reducing
initial utilities again, by decreasing plot sizes still further
or by eliminating on-plot core units.
This chapter will review the main features of the observed
housing process and formulate a new set of policy recommendations
that are more likely to achieve the goals of sites-and-services.
Reducing the risk in future projects and deciding how best to
implement these recommendations will depend on having systematic
information on market conditions and investment responses in
previous projects as well as families' current needs and
resources. The procedures necessary to insure that the proper
information is obtained depends on the way individual agencies
are organized and make decisions but a general framework fordetermining what should be gathered and how it should be
organized can and will be formulated as policy recommendations.
INVESTMENT PATTERNS IN PROJECTS
The main differences between what District Planning and the Caja
had anticipated and what actually occured in their projects can
be traced to incorrect assumptions about the objectives of
homebuilding, the way self-help processes work, the ability of
families to pay for housing and the impact of subdivision design
on owners income and housing expenditures. The following
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summaries detail the differences.
1. BUILDING FOR INCOME EARNINGS
The analysis of dwelling usage in Las Colinas, La Manuelita and
Las Guacamayas shows that home investments for the purpose of
earning income through the dwelling are at least as important as
investments made for sheltering the owner himself. The upgrade
case and one sites-and-services case show that between 20% and
30% of the owners have deliberately planned the construction of
their homes to permit renting of rooms, apartments, store fronts
and operating of small warehouses or manufacturing concerns. It
is hypothesized that the failure of authorities to sell all the
plots in the latest sites-and-services project is due in part to
excessively small lot sizes and zoning restrictions for
multi-family dwellings that reduce income earnings potential.
Renting rooms and apartments is the most common form of income
earnings for owners. The additional rental units are housing up
to 30% more families in projects. Although owners often rent
their shacks, the main decision to design a dwelling for these
uses occurs at the point that families begin to build in
permanent materials. At this point foundations, bearing walls,
separate entrances, stairwells and individual utilities and
services must be anticipated. It is difficult to discriminate
families who have not yet built but who are accumulating the
additional capital to build for income earnings from families who
are speculating on vacant land or who are unable to afford any
improvements. Only when construction begins can they be
separated.
Building for income earnings generally delays construction while
owners stockpile the additional materials and accumulate more
capital. Once construction starts, owners tend to rent out units
as soon as they have minimal space for themselves. Although they
change frequently, there will always be at least one family or
individual renting from the time the owner begins the service.
Second and third renters appear much later in the life cycle of
the owner's family and tend to occupy space left by departing
children. Renters are definitely younger and have smaller
families than owners and they generally become owners themselves
before the age of 35. Aside from their age and family size,
renters are not as significantly different from owners as
commonly. believed. Migration, employment and income
distributions are almost identical. For the cases surveyed at
least, projects cannot claim to be indirectly reaching lower
income groups through renting. In fact, it is likely that
renters are better off because they have the same incomes as
owners at an earlier point in their lives. It can be expected
that their permanent life time incomes will be corespondingly
higher too.
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Rents charged, housing sales prices and construction planning
demonstrate that owners by and large make rational investment
decisions. No family interviewed was aware that rents were
related to land values or to housing sales prices yet there was
widespread and consistent knowledge of what market prices should
be. The present value of the stream of future rents generated
from a dwelling closely approximates the value of the dwelling.
When owners build rental property, their willingness to postpone
current consumption to make the necessary investments in their
dwelling can be described as an interest rate or time preference
that they expect that investment to yield. Interviews show that
low-income families have very high time preferences, between 15%
and 21%, 'and that it is inversely proportional to income.
Although self-help construction has produced dwellings -with four
and five stories of rentable units, owners will build only to the
extent that marginal revenues from rents (at their time
preference) exceed the marginal costs for adding additional
units.
The high time preference that families exhibit makes the owners
of rental property very vulnerable to any policy that affects
that stream of income. Rent freezes or roll backs, changes in
multi-family zoning or limits on "tenant at will" leases will
tend to disproportionately affect lower income groups and lead to
overcrowding of existing dwellings, decreased maintenance, and
the suspension of new apartment construction.
The failure of renting to reach lower income groups is
disappointing but the surprisingly high housing multiplier shows
that projects are more successful than project administrators
have believed. The scope of renting and other forms of income
earnings through the dwelling has been overlooked because project
records only monitor mortgage holders -- the original beneficiary
-- and not dwelling occupants as census data bases do.
2. SELF-HELP CONSTRUCTION
Each of the projects surveyed showed a consistent building
pattern. Although owners generally build their provisional
shacks, they do not do the major portions of their permanent
dwellings themselves. Only the very lowest income families show
exceptions. Owners build their own provisional shacks because
the materials are relatively cheap when compared to labor costs.
Light weight materials like bamboo, wood and cardboard are easily
assembled with common hand tools. Structures tend to be simple
post and beam systems and do not need foundations. Poor
construction rarely results in a total collapse. Once
construction begins in permanent materials, the process reverses.
Owners consider income earnings potential and stockpile material.
When enough material is at hand, they contract the next
structural piece like masonry walls, columns, tie beams or a
slab. They then complete the interior painting, partitioning and
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carpentry themselves. Labor is a much smaller portion of
construction costs when permanent materials are used. Materials
are not generally reclaimable if construction must be redone and
collapse of a brick and concrete slab building is usually fatal.
Unless the owner already has construction experience, he will
contract the structural pieces as a form of insurance against
doing a poor job himself. Although self-help construction
implies that owners build their homes themselves, it is more
accurate to say they are managing its building.
It is argued that when owners contract it is because they hav. Z,
hiigh opportunity cost for doing it themselves -- that is --
owners will continue working at their jobs and hire someone to
work simply because it is cheaper to do so than to forego wages
by doing it themselves. This reasoning falsely attributes
contracting to wage trade-offs. Owners do not use written
contracts, specifications or house plans and therefore must be
present at the job site during construction anyway to insure that
the contractor does not steal materials, delay the work or build
something he does not want. Interviews suggest that the
propensity to contract is related to the kind of income stream
that owners have. Owners with salaried 'incomes show higher
tendencies to hire contractors and build quickly than owners
whose income is on an hourly or piece work basis. Salaried
owners can reduce their work without seriously affecting their
income but hourly workers decrease their incomes directly.
The observed construction processes have several consequences for
project design and monitoring. The level of construction skills
is not a reliable measure of families' potential to benefit from
self-help type housing. Technical assistance should not expect
to stimulate building by improving the construction skills of
project beneficiaries, instead programs that increase competition
among contractors, assist owners in purchasing and transporting
materials and protect disadvantaged families headed by the
elderly, the sick or women appear to be more appropriate. More
reliable measures of self-help participation seem to be
managerial skills and wage type (salaried or hourly).
3. ABILITY TO PAY FOR HOUSING
The housing expenditure patterns in all three projects suggest
that the eventual housing cost is not as important as as the form
of payment and that family income is not a dependable indication
of beneficiaries' ability to pay for housing. Financial terms
for mortgages generally estimate that families can pay between
25% to 35% of their income for mortgage payments. There is a
tendency not to require substantial down payments for the lowest
income groups because they have no savings, worker's benefits and
may be admitted to projects as compensation for property losses
due to eviction by public works projects or upgrading in slums.
Housing investment in projects tends to increase with income but
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at a decreasing rate. The cases show three significant
exceptions: 1) low-income families that invest nothing, 2)
low-income families who invest more than could possibly be
accounted for using income and savings estimates or 3) relatively
high income families who invest much less than expected.
Low-income families that do not invest tend to be speculating or
paying double rent. Families that invest more than expected tend
to accumulate capital from extended family. Owners say that some
of these kinds of families are fronts for speculators who use the
family to develop the property in exchange for the housing they
produce and income support. Non-investing low-income families
are the most worrisome. Double rent occurs when families are
already paying their maximum expenditure just to meet mortgage
payments. They cannot get enough capital surplus to begin
construction and thus they continue living elsewhere paying rent
along with their payments.
Inflation is exacerbating double rent. Large sites-and-services
projects suddenly increase the demand for provisional materials.
Accelerated construction in other sectors is also increasing the
demand for and the cost of bamboo, asphalt paper, wood and
plastic. At one time, these materials were the mainstays of
shacks; presently they are being used for scaffolding, and
formwork in multi-floor office and apartment buildings. Owners
claim that a non-permanent shack that can withstand Bogota's cold
and rainy climate costs only about 20% less than building a
single multi-purpose room directly in brick. When families can
not obtain a plot with a habitable core unit, they now tend to
bypass building a shack and will pay double rent while
accumulating the additional capital to build directly in brick.
The double rent phenomenon complicates project administration
because corrective policies tend to be mutually exclusive, that
is, requiring families to build forces owners to invest who might
otherwise speculate on the land, but the same policy eliminates
desirable families with legitimate double rent problems.
Policies that subsidize household expenditures to alleviate the
double rent problem will also increase speculator profits
accordingly.
No systematic review of mortgage arrears was done but social
workers report that families that use their homes for income
earnings have better repayment records. Owners report that they
do not depend exclusively on their homes for income; presumably
the better repayment is due to some stabilizing effect that
diversified income sources have. With the exception of the
highest income groups, income shows no systematic relationship
with dwelling use. A more accurate indication of families'
ability to pay, therefore, appears to be differences in wage type
(salaried or hourly) and tendencies to use the home for income
earnings. It is likely that lower income families with income
earnings potential can be admitted to projects without seriously
increasing the risk of mortgage arrears.
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4. SUBDIVISION DESIGN
The dramatic surge to build minimum standards housing
developments which began in 1971 with new physical design
legislation has largely subsided. Despite the lower capital
requirements to initiate projects, pirate settlements appear to
be increasing their share of low-income housing starts. The
failure of this legislation to make more of an impact was due in
part to overestimations in the amount of low-cost vacant land
that is within the sewered perimeter of the city, unrealistically
high forecasts for public utility extensions and an
underestimation of the costs of developing projects even to
minimum standards. Although initial environmental quality is
low, lot sizes in the pirate barrios just beyond the city limits
are almost twice the size of lots in authorized projects and are
selling for less.
The most recent sites-and-services project in Bogota encountered
difficulty in selling its vacant lot solutions despite a city
deficit estimated in 1971 to be near 135,000 units. The demand
for solutions that had at least a one room core unit were more
than fifteen applications for every unit built at that time.
Double rent and income earnings through the dwelling polarize
demand. Homebuilders choose between smaller government plots
with a habitable core unit that eliminates the need to pay double
rent or large illegal plots in pirate barrios that offer income
earnings potential.
Little attempt has been made to lower project costs and increase
revenue producing land uses by increasing the efficiency of
infrastructure layouts and land parcelling. Agreement20 and
subsequent legislation have only lowered initial requirements.
Pressure to improve legislation by including criteria for overall
design and layout is decreasing as fewer projects are possible in
the remaining sewered land and agencies react to recent project
failures by shifting back to total design and build approaches..
CONCLUSIONS
The observed housing process describes a.set of market conditions
and owner responses that are significantly different from what
agencies had expected. The cases show that the demand and
investments that owners make is far more rational and predictable
than planners had believed. The unexpected results of past
projects show that the implicit self-help model that agencies
were using was inappropriate and, perhaps more important, that
their experience with three projects and new legislation did not
accumulate over time to form a better model.
The case studies show that the interrelationships between lot
sizes, income earnings, rental units, ability to pay, subdivision
layout and technical assistance are far more complex than
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believed. The cases also show that the policy changes they are
proposing are unlikely to reduce overall costs per household,
make wider use of the policy, reduce loan risks to beneficiaries
or reach lower income groups by simply reducing initial
utilities, decreasing plot sizes and eliminating on-plot core
units. These policies will not make future projects more
effective because they tend to reduce families' income and
increase their housing expenditures. Instead, the observed
housing process suggests an alternative set of capital programs
that can still achieve the objectives of sites-and-services if
different capital programs are used.
The continued increase in pirate barrios and the high demand for
plots with habitable core units suggests that new projects can
better obtain their objectives if plot offerings are polarized,
assignment-income practices are reversed and project scale is
reduced. Projects should offer only two kinds of solutions: 1)
small plots with habitable core units and 2) large vacant lots
with high potential for income earnings. Double rent,
speculation and the propensity of owners with salaried incomes to
contract indicates that the small lots with cores should be
targeted to the lower income families while the large vacant lots
be targeted to the higher income families. This policy is the
opposite of current practices that assign higher solution levels
to higher income groups.
Rent levels in invasion and pirate barrios indicate that small
plots with cores are affordable by low income groups that
normally fail to build because of double rent. The cases show
that this group is not likely to overcome double rent or make
high investments in permanent construction until later in their
lifecycle when their incomes are more stable and higher. This
group can be expected to pay near the maximum affordable amount
because their mortgage payment more closely approximates their
total housing expenditures. Large vacant lots with sites that
favor income earnings through the dwelling should be targeted to
the higher income groups with salaried incomes and construction
management skills. The profile of this investor is similar to
the entrepreneur found in Las Colinas that built rapidly once
tenure was guaranteed. This group is likely to be able to
overcome the short term double rent problem that starting off
with a vacant lot implies and still make the higher initial
investments required when building for income earnings. By
polarizing plot sizes, increases in land values that result from
public investments will affect the large plot holders more than
the smaller ones. Owners will capitalize on this increase by
tending to build quickly, construct in permanent materials and
invest in rentable units. Requiring families to build will avoid
land speculation without the undesirable side effects of
eliminating low income families with double rent problems because
this latter group is now allocated to habitable core units.
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Building small lots with core units for lower income families and
targeting large vacant lots to higher income families is the
opposite of what agencies are now proposing. Agencies argue that
costs per household are best reduced by eliminating the highest
cost items -- land and on-plot construction. This policy was
used to some degree in Las Guacamayas and it resulted in
decreased income earnings through the dwelling and double rent
expenditures for the lowest income groups. This policy might be
appropriate under different market conditions but, in Bogota,
there is an active private market for illegal building sites and
the difference between building a provisional shack and a
permanent habitable core is not much. If these conditions did
not exist, the proposed change might lead to more effective
projects.
Technical assistance in new projects must focus on increasing
access to low-cost materials and increase utility service levels
to vacant lots. Programs that obtain lower cost materials by
purchasing them in large quantities and services that transport
materials to building sites are appropriate. The increased
emphasis on income earnings implies higher demands for service
connections and street paving. Technical assistance should
increase competition among contractors, encourage building
cooperatives and help small construction related businesses such
as materials depots.
The new policy approach requires two different kinds of lots.
Cluster subdivision layouts offer a hierarchy of plot locations
suitable for integrating small lots with larger ones. This
cannot be achieved with the current gridiron designs. The exact
mix of small and large lots is determined by the level of cross
subsidy required to finance the additional on-plot construction
that is not covered by their mortgage financing. Cluster designs
tend to maximize revenue producing land. They are inherently more
efficient than traditional designs and offer more flexibility in
lowering development costs by allowing network extensions to more
closely approximate the capital recovery rate. Minimum standards
are already low and it is unlikely that project costs can be
lowered any more by affecting initial utility levels. The
appendices to Agreement 20 legislation should include criteria
that reduces infrastructure costs because more efficient designs
are being used.
The decline of Agreement 20 projects and the in1l2 tionary effect
that large projects have had on construction costs suggest that
smaller projects like La Manuelita are more appropriate.
Relaxing legislation that requires sites to be within the sewered
perimeter will increase the number of elgible sites, lower the
amount spent for land and increase the chances of finding sites
near employment sources
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THE BUYERS' MARKET
The above recommendations stem from the observation that
low-income families generally make rational economic investments
in their homes. Many of the recommendations are attempting to
make new sites-and-services projects more competitive with pirate
barrios because this approach offers the potential of lowering
the housing costs for the lowest income families through cross
subsidies. In order to make new projects self-financing, the
larger vacant lots must be allocated to families who can make
higher payments. These lots are intrinsically worth more because
they are larger, have higher income earnings potential and are
more likely to increase in value from public investment in
infrastructure. The family who can best use this lot and afford
the payments is similar to the kind of family who would normally
buy into one of Bogota's numerous pirate barrios. The
characteristics of these families and how they would compare new
sites-and-services projects to pirate alternatives is very
important in planning new projects.
Several recent studies of Bogota's pirate barrios (1) have found
that household heads tend to be older (over 25 years old) and
have larger families (5.6 persons average) than families who
invade or who traditionally apply for sites-and-services
projects. More than half of the households interviewed in the
Losada and Gomez study said that they had monthly family incomes
under P$1,250 per month and that only 10% earned more than
P$2,500 in 1975 pesos. About half of these families had stable
salaried incomes and 75% had at least one member working full
time; 19% had two or more. While these income ranges are only
slightly above those for recent sites-and-services projects, the
main difference is higher income stability -- more families have
(1 ) Rodrigo Losada Lora and Hernando Gomez Buendia. La Tierra en
el Mercado Pirata de Bogota. (Bogota: Fundacion para~la EducaciEn
Superior y el Desarrollo, FEDESARROLLO, Junio 1.976)
Georges Vernez. "Bogota's Pirate Settlements: An Opportunity for
Metropolitan Development." (Berkeley, California: Ph.D.
Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1973)
Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Distrital. "El Mercado
de Tierras en Barrios Clandestinos de Bogota." (Bogota:
Departamenta Administrativo de Planeacion Distrital, 1972)
Fundacion para la Educacion Superior y el Desarrollo. Derecho y
Desarrollo Urbano Configuraciones Juridicas Sobre Relaciones de
Propiedad de Terrenos en las Urbanizaciones Piratas de Bogota.(Bogota: Tundacion para~~a Educacion Superior y el 1Yisarrollo,
Augosto 1974)
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salaried jobs in pirate barrios. (1)
Although there is considerable variation in lot sizes in pirate
barrios, they are consistently two to three times larger than
what's currently offered in sites-and-services projects. Most
lots average 150 square meters while recent sites-and-services
projects average only 65 square meters. While lot sizes are
definitely higher in pirate barrios, initial public utilities are
much lower. For example, most of the surveyed lots had
electrical connections (legal or contraband) but less than 20%
had the more expensive water or sewer connections that
sites-and-services generally start off with. Buyers in pirate
barrios generally expect to have to coerce the promised services
from the city. Small barrios are sometimes successful in
organizing families against subdividers who do not deliver what
they promised. Larger barrios generally imply community
representatives and have been more successful at getting the city
to install the services than they are at getting developers to do
it.
Land costs in pirate barrios are very inconsistent but they are
usually below the prices in sites-and-services projects. In
1972, lots measuring from 130 to 170 square meters were selling
for between P$6,000 and P$14,500. Some of this extreme variation
is due to differences in lot size, location and service levels.
But research shows that even equal size lots, in the same barrio
and sold on the same day still have extreme price variances. On
one hand this indicates that there is high market flexibility in
pirate barrios but it also suggests that potential buyers must
spend considerable time searching for bargains and negotiating
terms.
The most significant difference between pirate barrios and
government projects are the financial terms. Families in pirate
barrios make significantly higher down payments and have fewer
years to pay off the balance. Down payments may be as hig as
25% of the total value of the lot but few owners pay more than
20% of their income for monthly payments even though the
remaining debt is amortized in only 18 to 48 months. Although
developers advertize "no interest" financing, there is an
implicit interest charge because they tend to give 10% discounts
to families making a single cash payment. Less than 10% of the
buyers ever pay cash.
(1) Losada and Gomez found that 25% of the owners in the pirate
barrios were using their homes for income earnings (op. cit.
p.93) and that between 22% and 33% of the families living in
these barrios were renters (op. cit. p.9). Both of these
findings are consistent with the survey results from Las Colinas
and La Manuelita.
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Financial terms in government projects are much more generous
than in pirate barrios. If a down payment is required at all, it
will rarely exceed 15% of the value of the lot and on-site
construction. Mortgages are typically amortized over 10 to 20
years instead of just 2 to 4. Interest rates are typically 5%
below conventional mortgages or about 15% but families are
generally expected to pay as high as 30% of their income for
initial monthly installments.
Pirate barrios are illegal and surveys show that residents have a
high degree of understanding of the legal system as well as
confidence in its outcome. Most families are aware that the lack
of title means that they do not have to pay taxes and that the
subdivider does. Buyers know that a person who has lived on a
lot without ownership papers for at least a year would be
protected by the law against efforts of the actual owner to
repossess the property. About 60% of the families interviewed by
Losada and Gomez thought that they could sell their properties
based on the strength of their papers and payment recipts but
only 26% believed that they could use their documents for a
conventional bank loan. Most banks will deny a loan even if the
owner has a legal title simply because the property is located in
a pirate barrio. Even though pirate barrios are illegal, the
relationship between buyers and subdividers is relatively good
despite some conflicts over the final price of the lot (1) the
payment conditions, the delivery of promised utilities
(especially water and sewerage) and the actual title transfer.
At the present time, Bogota has relatively few sites-and-services
projects that are even semi-competitive with barrio piratas.
Prospective buyers are faced with a series of trade-offs. Barrio
piratas are easier to get into but they entail risk and can
require considerable search time to find low-cost lots.
Government projects have much more favorable financing although
monthly payments typically take more of the family income than in
pirate barrios. Down payments are lower and loans are paid over
many more years than in pirate barrios. Although down payments
are higher in pirate barrios, owners pay less of their monthly
income to amortize their debt to the developer. Currently,
pirate barrios are offering significantly more land at a lower
price than government projects. Government projects, however,
have higher levels of initial infrastructure, guaranteed tenure
and properties can be sold or used as collateral for additional
loans at any time; this is not always possible in a pirate
barrio.
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(1) According to the Losada and Gomez survey, very few families
report significant price changes once they have made an agreement
with the owner. The biggest difference is between the first
quotation and the actual contract price.
PLANNING NEW PROJECTS
The case studies drew on only a small fraction of the same data
that was routinely collected and available to the Caja and
District Planning yet it shows that the self-help model they were
using was inappropriate for the pervailing conditions. Their
model may have been valid at one time but it clearly was not
working in Bogota today. Their failure to detect changing
conditions that undermined their investment programs also
questions their real ability to learn from their own projects and
to apply what is learned to the next one.
The subdivision design, beneficiary selection and technical
assistance recommendations above form a new model based on how
owners have been investing in past projects. Their investment
decisions were subject to marketconditions like rents, labor and
material costs, and to the owner's own shelter needs and
financial resources. These conditions are likely to change for
future projects and, in turn, imply other changes to government
investment strategies. Detecting these changes and learning
their policy consequences will be an important part of planning
projects. But if housing agencies have not learned from the
information they already had, adding more information, per se,
will hardly reduce the risks or change the outcomes 'of7 new
projects. Insufficient information will not be the main problem;
it will be the processing capacity of these agencies to attend to
what's collected and effectively use it in evolving investment
strategies. Therefore, an important extension of this research
will be to formulate a set of decision rules for each
recommendation that will increase that capacity. Without these
rules, superfluous data will accumulate. Attention will again
become the chief bottleneck and it will get narrower. and narrower
as higher level investment decisions are made.
Every project takes place in an information-rich environment.
The building process that families describe and the way they use
their homes for income earnings are extremenly rich and necessary
information. It's also information that originates outside of
agencies and in forms and quantities beyond their control. In
new projects, agencies will have to have an "interface" for
selectively obtaining and transfering this kind of information
into formats supportive to its decision making. Otherinformation will come from within the agency itself. It has full
control over its project records and they are, in effect, its
ongoing memory of what it wanted to achieve, what investments it
made and what the responses were. The fact that agencies can
exert control over their own project records is a formidable head
start in insuring that the proper information flow results.
An investment model can conserve attention and reduce project
risk only if it has clear and testable decision rules. The
policies recommended by this research depend on a specific set of
conditions. These conditions dictate the content or the kind of
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information that will be needed, but the way agencies are
organized and interface with their information sources will
dictate the form that an actual system will take. A real
institutional client is not necessary to lay the basic framework
for a system though the case studies suggest who the clients
might be. The problems that the case studies identify are not
problems of departmentalization or coordination of operating
units. They are problems of deciding what investments to make
and obtaining the information to insure that the proper choices
are made. The organizational problems of implementing an
information system are best dealt with, in the first
approximation at least, by examining it in abstraction from
specific agencies and individual department structures.
DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK
The three most important decisions in new projects will be
subdivision design, selecting beneficiaries and readjusting
technical assistance once projects begin. Only a few of these
decisions currently have clear decision rules and adequate
information support. The framework that is developed here
recognizes that each policy recommendation is a unique class of
decision problems. Not all the investment decisions in new
projects will have the same consequences, have the same deadlines
attached or be made in the same way. Some decisions will be
repetitive in nature while others will occur infrequently. Some
will reduce future options while others will increase the
alternatives. These differences are the basis for categorizing:
1) the sources, scope, detail, currency, accuracy, and frequency
of use of information, 2) the way the information is packaged
into specific services, 3) t costs and benefits of using better
information, and 4) the kinds of problems that are likely to
arise when implementing a system. The object in developing a
framework is to recognize these differences and to show how a
system ought to be determined from them and not to design one
around institutional practices which the case studies already
demonstrate are grossly inadequate.
SUBDIVISION LAYOUT
Subdivision design will be the single most important decision in
new projects because it is here that the basic costs and benefits
for both the agency and the owners are established. These costs
and benefits will determine the kind of demand a project can
meet, the impact that it will have on pirate barrios and the
kinds of investments that the agency expects owners to make.
Land, infrastructure and on-plot construction are approximately
equal capital investments and are from 60%-80% of the total cost
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to agencies. (1) The basic objective of subdivision design is to
maximize the amount of land that can be turned over to
beneficiaries and to minimize the amount of utilities needed to
service that area. Both objectives are subject to a number of
constraints and tradeoffs. Families have minimum requirements in
order to build their homes and income earnings through the
dwelling will impose further constraints. Agencies also want to
maximize revenue producing land uses and minimize the longer term
costs of maintaining services.
Layout decisions are relatively permanent and investments in
infrastructure can not be easily changed once they are in place.
Usually there isn't detailed knowledge of who the final
beneficiaries will actually be when project planning starts.
Beneficiaries are selected during the final design stages only
when the location of the project, the mix of solution offerings
and the financial terms can be announced. At this point, project
administrators have a clearer idea of who should be admitted to
the project and on what basis applicants will be screened.
Subdivision design begins with basic assumptions about the
characteristics of the intended beneficiaries and the housing
options that they have outside of the project. The overall
housing market and especially the illegal ones like invasions,
pirate barrios and inquilinatos determine the market conditions
that projects must meet. There are essentially three steps in
deciding what subdivision layout is best for a given site. The
first step is to estimate the maximum possible gross density that
can be achieved by the project. The gross density will be a
function of the following variables:
1) characteristics of the target households like income,
housing expenditures, possible down payments, current rent
levels families are paying, and expenditures for
transportation and utilities
2) financial terms like interest rates, down payments and
recovery period
3) total capital costs that the agency can expect to recover
from households
4) distribution of capital costs to households like land,
infrastructure, on-plot structures and shared communal
facilities
5) utility standards and unit costs like land,
infrastructure, on-plot construction and communal
facilities
Each of the above variables can be expressed in terms of the
others. The choice of the dependent variable is stricltly a
matter of convenience. The second step is to use the gross
(1) See Chapter 2 section PROJECT CO8T COMPONENTS for detailed
cost breakdowns.
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density found in the first step to estimate plot sizes and the
amount of land needed for semi-public and public uses like
vehicular circulation through the site, parks, open space and
community facilities. Only an overall land use distribution is
important at this point. Plot sizes will be a function of
shelter and income earnings needs as well as offerings in illegal
settlements.
The third step is to approximate an actual layout for the site by
establishing: 1) lot proportions, 2) vehicular street widths and
spacing, 3) block design and 4) lot access paths if they are not
already included in the lot area of clusters. The spatial
arrangement of these components is subject to the conditions of
an actual site although some general layouts can be made using
hypothetical ones. The efficiency of any layout can be measured
by using the Unit Circulation Length and R Factor techniques
described in Chapter 2.
The resulting layout is now the basis for estimating more
detailed infrastructure costs like paving, service networks and
site preparation costs if excavation is required. These three
steps are repeated for alternative designs for each of the sites
being considered. Essentially, the design process is an
iterative one in which a set of well defined procedures is used
to generate successively better plans. The housing processes
observed in past projects serves as a heuristic for determining
which plans are the most appropriate.
The subdivision layout procedure just described has several very
important decision characteristics. First, the procedure ishierarchical. It begins with a general set of basic assumptions
about the housing market, project costs, families' dwelling needs
and their ability to pay for housing. These assumptions are
initial parameters that have a predictable and cummulative effect
on the final subdivision design and, in turn, upon the conditions
and constraints that guide the selection of beneficiaries. The
second characteristic of the procedure is that it's highly
algorithmic, that is, mathematical cost accounting and measures
of layout efficiency can be applied. (1) Standardizing technique
and measurement increases the testability of each parameter in
the design process and affords a basis for comparing
alternatives. It is also likely that more alternatives can be
considered when the process is as standardized as this onebecause procedures can take advantage of various computational
aids.
(1) See Alan C. B3ertaud et al. "A Model for Analyzing
Alternatives in Urban Project Design" (Washington: International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Urban Projects Division,
August, 1978) and Horacio Caminos et. al. Urbanization Primer(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1979)
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The information required to make layout decisions has definite
characteristics. The primary sources of the information used in
the first step are largely external to the agency. If the actual
beneficiaries are not already defined when design begins, their
family sizes, income, savings and expenditures for rent and
transportation will have to be estimated. Samples from pirate
settlements will provide a basis for estimating the
characteristics of the families who will be allocated the large
vacant lots. Planning the exact mix of large and small lots,
establishing financial terms and selecting beneficiaries will
require more precise information about the families who are now
buying into pirate barrios. The most important information will
be their: 1) family size and life cycle, 2) total family income,
3) employment type (salaried or hourly), 4) financial terms of
their lots (down payment and monthly quotas), 5) lot size, 6)
initial infrastructure especially water, sewerage and street
paving, 7) financial sources (salary, cesantias, savings, loans
or bonus) and 8) accessibility to employment.
Samples of residents in invasion and inquilinatos will
approximate the characteristics of families receiving the smaller
lots with core units. The primary source for cost data will be
the agency itself. Records from previous projects provide the
basis for estimating construction, infrastructure and
administrative costs. Building codes like decrees 1259 and 1260
regulate the minimum. sizes of the small lots and the minimum
utility levels for the larger ones.
SELECTING BENEFICIARIES
The traditional criteria for selecting beneficiaries has been to
allocate solutions on the basis of ability to pay and income has
been the main measure of that ability. The analysis of La
Manuelita and Las Guacamayas, however, shows that this measure is
unreliable -- low-income families make much higher investments
than expected while higher income families make less -- and that
it compromises a major policy objective -- wealthier settlers are
creamed off passing over the poorer families that the policy
intends to help. The objective of selecting beneficiaries in the
past has been to minimize the public expenditure per household.
In new projects, the objective will be to maximize the number of
low-income families that can be admitted subject to a set of
constraints like the project budget, the total number of lots and
the maximum acceptable level of mortgage arrears.
Low-income families have the highest potential of benefiting from
projects but the agency's risks are higher too. These families
are not paying for the full value of their lots and core units
and the agency must recover part of their costs from the families
that are assigned to the larger lots. The assignment problem
does not have an obvious solution because the project budget will
not allow all the lots to be given to the lowest income families.
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The assignment procedure in new projects will differ from
traditional ones in other ways. Small lots with core units are
targeted to low-income families while larger vacant lots go to
wealthier ones. The subdivision design process that was
described earlier defines the number of these lots based on a
market analysis of what comparable rents and offerings are in
illegal settlements and what the required levels of cross-subsidy
will have to be to make the project as self-financing as
possible. New projects therefore, should not experience the
skewed demand that Las Guacamayas did but the demand for lots
will likely exceed what what agencies can provide. The
selection process essentially determines how many of these
applicants can be accommodated.
The first step in the selection process is to define the pool of
admissible families. The pool may be further subdivided into
types of families that the agency wishes to have differential
treatment. Legislation like Agreement 20 and bank lending
regulations impose elgibility conditions like age, income, health
or family size. Agencies may also require minimum residency to
avoid increasing rural to urban migration, require families to
demonstrate their ability to make regular payments by opening
savings accounts or not accept applications from families who
have been evicted from other projects or who already own land
elsewhere.
The second step in the selection process is to interpret the
constraints. Selection can not allocate more lots than were
built or allocate the same one to more than one family. The
total amount of subsidy for any set of allocations can not exceed
the budget. The subsidy is the difference between the solution's
cost and what can be recovered from the beneficiary. New
projects will attempt to reduce mortgage arrears by eliminating
double rent for low-income families and encouraging higher income
families to use their homes for income earnings. To keep
mortgage arrears within acceptable limits, the likelihood that a
particular type of family assigned to one of the two solutions
will default must be estimated. The cost to the agency of the
default will depend on the type of soultion that was allocated.
The third step will be to maximize the social benefit of the
project -- the number of low-income families admitted -- by
systematically allocating types of families to one of the two
solutions. First allocations are only to see which constraints
are binding. It may be possible to relax one or more of them to
increase the benefits still more. (1) Although the total number
(1) Mathematical programming can maximize an objective function
subject to a set of constraints. It is likely that only one or
two constraints bind or limit the maximum benefit of the project.
'Tie shadow price or the cost of relaxing a constraint can be
calculated and the selection policy be changed if appropriate.
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of lots was determined in a prior market analysis, it is possible
that, given an actual pool of applicants, higher social benefits
could be achieved if not every lot is assigned. This is unlikely
to happen if the market analysis was correctly done but it could
occur if subdivision design over-estimated the scale of the
project, did not achieve the proper ratio of large lots to small
ones or if the applicant pool differs significantly from what was
anticipated. For example, the inflationary effects of UPACS on
long term loanable funds or the defeat of the Paseo Bolivar
highway project could not have been anticipated two years ahead
of time but they contributed to the skewed demand for Las
Guacamayas. It will be politically infeasible to leave lots
unoccupied when there is high demand even if assigning all of
them means exceeding some of the constraints. Assigning these
"extra" lots to displaced families is a practical solution to
this problem.
Families that have been displaced by slum upgrading or public
works elsewhere are often compensated with solutions in
sites-and-services projects. There are two possible approaches.
In the first, displaced families can be assigned to lots before
the general applicant pool is considered. Admitting these
families will affect only the capacity constraint. There are
simply fewer lots to be assigne'd through the above procedures.
The second approach is to treat the total number of lots in the
project as an inequality, make the assignments from the general
pool and then assign the remaining lots to compensated families
if "extra" lots remain. (1) A combination of the two approaches
can be used if there are insufficient lots to meet compensation
requirements.
It is likely that the number of admissible families within any
type will still exceed the number of permissible allocations.
When this occurs, families can be rank ordered on secondary
variables which were not in the aggregate model (Las Guacamayas
gave final preferences to any employee of the Special District).
The final selection will always be a political choice but the
structured selection process will increase the likelihood that
choices will have minimum risks and tend to reach the lowest
income groups possible.
(1) If every lot must be assigned in the selection process then
the total number of lots is an equality constraint because the
total families assigned will equal the total lots available. But
it is possible that more low-income families could be admitted if
some lots were left unassigned. In this case, the total number
of lots is an inequality constraint on optimization, that is, any
assignment that maximizes the number of low-income families
admitted but uses less than the total lots available is
acceptable too. No assignment can ever assign more families than
there are available lots.
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The selection process just described has several important
decision characteristics. The most important is that the main
decision points are identified and the objectives of selection
are explicit and testable. An institutional client is needed to
determine the appropriate weights and measures for each
constraint but the kinds of information that will be needed and
its relationship to the selection decision is now established.
The applicants themselves are expected to supply the basic data
about their needs and resources. Establishing the validity of
this data is a traditional problem that new projects will have to
contend with too. Income alone is not enough to determine a
families ability to pay. Entrepreneural abilities and the
tendency of applicants to invest for income earnings through the
dwelling will be important too. The case studies indicate that
construction skills are not essential and that the family's life
cycle and employment type (salaried or hourly) are better
indicators but closer examination of the characteristics of
successful landlords and shop owners is required.
Deciding which assignments are best depends on having a measure
for risk. Mortgage records from previous projects are the best
sources of data for determining the probability that a particular
family and solution combination will default. Solution costs
determine what the extent of the liability is to the agency if
default occurs. The role of information in risk analysis is
clearly an actuarial one.
The data base that is created by the selection process will serve
additional purposes in project implementation. It is .the basis
for determining technical assistance and it is the only basis for
judging the eventual success of solution matches and the effects
of projects on owner investment.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
Unlike subd vision design and beneficiary selection, the
procedures ior technical assistance are difficult to establish a
priori. Each of the projects surveyed showed a consistenT
ui Tiiung pattern -- families did not build the major portions of
their permanent dwellings themselves -- they sub-contracted it.
The primary reason for owner-managed instead of owner-built
construction has been the relatively higher costs of materials
with respect to labor. Current market conditions in Bogota
suggest that sub-contracting will be an important part of
technical assistance in first projects. Under these conditions
programs should increase competition among contractors, increase
access to lower cost materials and increase owner's managerial
abilities.
But labor and materials conditions are subject to change. A
successful materials program, for instance, could make it less
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economical for owners to continue contracting because labor might
become the larger share of his costs. Owners might respond by
demanding a different kind of technical assistance like
construction training for themselves.
New projects depend on cross subsidies to remain self-financing.
Owners assigned to the larger lots are expected to derive
additional income by building rental units, stores or running
light manufacutring and warehousing operations. These owners are
paying more for their land and utilities than the lower income
families assigned to the smaller lots. Properties must continue
to be economically viable for the project to succeed financially.
But the income earnings potential of lots is subject to change
too. The case studies showed that rent freezes or roll backs,
changes in multi-family zoning or limits on "tenant at will"
leases not only decrease owner incomes, but also lead to
overcrowding, lower building maintainence and suspended
construction. Any of these conditions could undermine the
project. Monitoring the income earnings potential of the large
lots will be particularly important. The data system needed to
do this will be organized like census data bases, that is,
arround the occupants of the dwellings and not strictly through
the mortgage holder as before.
The major difficulty in planning technical assistance will be
predicting the future and the environment the agency works
within. Public rejection of the Paseo Bolivar highway, UPAC's
inflationary effect on construction costs in Bogota and the ICT's
sudden shift away from funding sites-and-services projects are
examples of unforseable events that undermined Caja programs.
Information of this kind tends to be external to the agency, be
very broad in scope, highly aggregate and generally historical.
The agency needs an "interface" for selectively obtaining it and
converting it to forms useful to its own purposes.
The information necessary to administer field programs is just
the opposite of planning them. Operations is the main contact
point between the agency and its clients. Project beneficiaries
almost exclusively interact with operations level staff. Entry
into projects. mortgage repayment, eviction and construction
bring beneficiaries into regular contact with some operations
staff. Operations' client transactions are often the only way
that administrators know how projects are going. Is wasn't until
the applications for Las Guacamayas were processed that
management realized that what had already been built was the
opposite to what the market was demanding.
The information characteristics of operations tend to be the
opposite of planning. Specific technical assistance like a
materials loan program imply well defined information that is
narrow in scope. The sources of information tend to be from
within the organization. Project records provide most of it and
agencies can exert control over the procedures used to gather and
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synthesize it. Accuracy and timeliness are important in running
a field program because data is very detailed and used
frequently. Neither is characteristic of planning information.
GENERALIZING THE EXPERIENCE
In the past 20 years, there has been a progressive evolution in
the treatment of squatter settlements and in building new housing
for low-income families. Early attempts to industrialize
low-cost housing or to organize families to build government
designed units have given way to newer sites-and-services and
upgrading approaches. This shift has completely reversed the way
governments intervene in the housing system. Instead of
physically eliminating slums altogether or building completed
housing units for families, agencies are now rehabilitating slums
and creating incentive programs with land and utilities to
encourage families to build their own homes.
The sites-and-services approach does not advocate building
housing directly; instead, it provides low-income families with
land, urban services, loans and technical assistance and depends
on the home owner to build the required housing. The shift from
total design-and-build policies -- where agencies essentially
delivered housing as a completed package -- to sites-and-services
-- where families build their own houses -- makes prediction
more important than before. Agencies now face higher risks in
projects because they are more open ended and leave more for the
home owner to do. Failure is more visible than before because
families may take as long as 15 or 20 years to replace their
shacks with permanent construction.
The development model behind sites-and-services is based on a
concept of how development took place in older squatter
settlements. There is an implicit prediction that families could
and would build their own housing if they were given the same
components -- land, utilities and technical assistance -- as in
upgrading projects.
Initial private and public sector sites-and-services were very
successful, but then applications to build new subdivisions
suddenly declined and construction in existing ones dramatically
slowed down. These unexpected results not only question the
assumptions behind the sites-and-services model but they question
the extent to which planners actually understood the conditions
that led to the redevelopment of older squatter -settlements.
In order to improve future projects, the development model behind
sites-and-services will have to be more explicit than it has
been. Without a testable model of how home owners invest and use
their homes, there is no way to tailor government programs to the
needs of beneficiaries, to anticipate changing market conditions
which might undermine government programs or to know - who can
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really benefit from the sites-and-services approach.
Implementation -- running a project well -- requires good data
and flows. Evaluation -- knowing which investments are best
under a set of market conditions -- also requires systematic
access to data. But more data will not change the outcome of
future projects unless it follows from a testable model of the
policy. Good information systems are parsimonious (do not need
excessive amounts of data) and they are powerful in prediction
and leverage because their model is good.
This research reviewed one upgrading and two sites-and-services
projects and found that the investments that families make are
economically rational. Families not only build their homes for
their own shelter, they build them to increase their income
earnings too. Families continuously decide what to build next,
how to use it, how to build it and how to finance it. Families
compare government pro jects to illegal alternatives in pirate
barrios, manage construction, and build rental units to the
extent that the marginal revenues from rent exceed their marginal
costs for doing so. Their investment decisions clearly reflect
their price options in the land, labor, materials, and rental
markets.
The fact that families are economically rational is an important
discovery because it forms a testable basis for tailoring capital
investments to client's shelter and income needs. It's possible
to anticipate demand, select beneficiaries and design technical
assistance programs with the market mechanism in mind. It's also
possible to anticipate the effects of changing market conditions
and to anticipate which ones might undermine project investments
because the investment decisions that families make are
predictable within the range of these observed case studies.
The policies recommended by this research are based on a model of
economic rationality because it best characterizes the observed
building process. The usefulness of the model depends on how
accurately it portrays housing investment and on the objectives
of the government agency carrying out the project. Even when
projects attempt to increase political consciousness or to form
communities, an investment model is useful because it points out
issues which could be used to mobelize and focus families.
An economic model simplifies the information requirements for
planning and monitoring new projects. The market place is now
the focus of attention. The investments that project
administrators can expect have an explicit and measurable
relationship to conditions such as labor and materials, land
available and time preferences. Gathering this data does not
require complex or elaborate systems; certaintly less than the
information currently gathered by most projects. This research
used a very small part of the same information that is routinely
available to project administrators yet the analysis sufficiently
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accounted for many of the "unexpected" outcomes of recent
projects.
The aim of the model is not to reproduce the reality of
implementing a project in all of its complexity. It is to
capture only what is essential to understanding the structure and
behavior of home builders. The goal is to increase the
effectiveness of housing policy by creating a testable view of
the larger housing system; a view which can incrementally change
and integrate with other views as new experience and evidence
accumulates.
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CONTINGENCY TABLES
All of the contingency or cross-tabulations were derived from the
computer program Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
(SPSS) or from author written programs for the Hewlett Packard 65
programmable calculator. (1) All table formats used in this
research follow the SPSS standard irregardless of how they were
derived. (2) Every contingency table shows the cross categorical
counts for two variables. There is one table row for each
category of the dependent variable and one table column for each
category of independent variable. The total observations and
percentages of the total observations for each row and column are
reported in the margins of the corresponding row and column. For
every combination of row and column category the following four
summary statistics are reported: 1) total observations for this
row-column combination, 2) percent of observations for this
combination within the row,.3) observations as a percent of the
total column, 4) observations as a percent of the total
observations in the table. Below each table the exact Chi Square
value, degrees of freedom (DF) and the level of significance of
the table is computed. For 2 X 2 tables, the Phi (O) statistic
of association is also reported. These statistics have the
following meaning and formulas.
CHI SQUARE
The Chi Square (x2 ) test is a general test that tests whether or
not frequencies which have been empirically obtained through
observation differ significantly from those that would be
expected if there was no systematic relationship between the two
variables. To measure the difference between the observed and
expected frequencies, the following value is derived:
.2
2 (fo - fe)
x =7 --- --
ifl
where fo and f, refer to the observed and expected frequencies
for each table row-column combination. The fo frequencies are
those that were observed or measured from the surveys. The
theoretically expected values are calculated as:
(1) Information Processing Services at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology supports Version 7.00 of the SPSS system maintained
and distributed by SPSS Inc.
(2) Norman Nie et al. SPSS Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 19757, p. 219.
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where Ci is the frequency in a respective column marginal, R1 is
the frequency in a respective row marginal and N is the total
number of observed cases. Essentially the larger the discrepancy
between the expected and the observed frequencies, the larger
Chi Square becomes. Note that Chi Square tests to see if two
variables are related or not. It does not measure their strength
of association.
DEGREES OF FREEDOM (DF)
To test for a systematic relationship between two variables, it
is necessary to measure the probability of having obtained a
Chi Square as large or larger than the one calculated for the
table. The Chi Square value itself -. partially dependent on the
number of observations and partially on the table size or the
number of rows and columns. The degrees of freedom is simply
computed by:
DF = (Rows - 1) (Columns - 1)
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL
The significance level is the probability of having obtained a
Chi Square as large as the one computed for a table with so many
degrees of freedom. Social scientists traditionally accept a
hypothesis that claims a systematic relationship between two
variables if the significance level is .05 or less. This means
that less than 5% of the time there would be a claim that there
was a relationship when in fact there was none. It is a measure
of probability of committing this kind of error. Since the
significance level is a measure of probability, its value can
range from no possibility, or 0, to complete certainty or 1.
PHI
For 2 X 2 tables, the Phi statistic measures the strength of
association between two variables. Phi corrects for the fact'
that the value of Chi Square is directly proportional to the
number of observations in the following way:
2 1/2(X )
Phi --------
N
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When Phi is 0 there is no relationship between the variables,
when it is 1 the- are perfectly related.
REPORT FORMAT
Count
Row %
Total % DWELLING
Column % MATERIALS
PERMANENCY
NON- ROW
ERMANENT PERMANENT TOTAL
TENANCY ----------------------
524 143 : 667
OWNER 78.6 21.4 61.2
59.5 68.4
48.1 13.1
+-------------------
356 66 422
RENTER 84.4 15.6 38.8
40.5 31.6 Total
32.7 6.1 Osrain
+-------------------
COLUMN 880 209 1089
TOTAL 80.8 19.2 100.0
CHI SQUARE =5.2377 DF = 1
PHI = 0.07175
SIGNIFICANCE = .02210
Tenancy by Dwelling Material Permanency
In the above contingency table example, 1089 households are
categorized by the kind of tenancy they have and the level of
permanency of their dwelling's materials. Owners comprise 667 or
61% of the 1089 households while 422 or 38.8% are renters. A
total of 880 dwellings are made of permanent materials and 209 in
non-permanent materials. Owners living in dwellings made of
permanent materials is the most frequent combination with 524
observed cases. This combination comprises 78.6% of all owners,
59.5% of all households with permanent dwellings and 48.1% of all
the households in the survey. If one hypothesizes that owners
are more likely to live in dwellings of permanent materials than
renters, the table would statistically support it. One would not
expect to see a Chi Square as large as 5.2377 for 1 degree of
freedom more than 2.21% of the time just by chance. The Phi
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value indicates that although there is a systematic relationship
between the row and column variables, their strength of
association is very low.
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LAS COLINAS HOME INTERVIEW SURVEY
In the summer of 1975, the Commercial Center Middle School
operated by the Catholic charity Social Work of Barrio Las
Colinas undertook a complete census of the barrio. Their
principal objective was to determine the future social and
educational requirements of the families living there. Although
the 1973 national population and housing census conducted by the
National Administrative Department of Statistics (Departamento
Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica-DANE) had included Barrio
Las Colinas, no barrio level tabulations were available in 1975
nor did it appear that DANE would publish results within the next
year or so.
At the suggestion of the middle school principal, six instructors
organized students from the fourth year secondary school
mathematics, sociology and geography courses into a team for
analyzing the changes that had taken place in Las Colinas since
the 1963 invasion. Several faculty members went to DANE to
solicit copies of the census form used in 1973 and advice on how
to conduct their own mini-census. A questionnaire with 42
questions covering demography, income, housing, education and
social services was drafted. The faculty updated the Caja's
platting maps to reflect the growth and recent re-invasion
construction that had taken place since the CCC base maps were
made. Since the faculty wanted to eventually compare their data
to Caja project records and to utility company files, they
carefully preserved all three house addressing schemes (water,
light and Caja block-lot scheme for recording property deeds).
Twenty six students were organized into interview and tabulation
teams. A single student typically interviewed at 20 to 25
addresses with an average of two households per address. Las
Colinas residents are very hostile to surveyors. Numerous groups
like the Caja, ICT, water and sewer companies, local
architectural and social work students, and several international
agencies like the World Health Organization, the World Bank and
the Ford Foundation have conducted surveys with limited degrees
of cooperation from residents. The fact that the neighborhood
residents had been deriving inexpensive instruction and medical
services for themselves and their children from the Social Work
dispensary and school greatly enhanced the cooperation between
residents and census takers.
Students were instructed to interview the head of the household
of every family living at an address and to return if necessary
to complete an interview. The surveyors quickly discovered that
there were many more families living in the barrio than had been
estimated; lots were averaging at least two families each.
Recording data for an average of six persons per household was
more time consuming than had been anticipated. To speed up the
process, twenty more students were used to help check the surveys
and to tabulate the counts. By January 1976 approximately 1120
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household interviews were completed and tabulated. Due to the
tedious process of counting, only basic frequencies for each
question response were done. In September of 1977, preliminary
tabulations were reported in an 18 page monograph entitled "El
Estudiantil" ("The Student Body"). (1) Grade school students
illustrated the history of the barrio by sketching scenes and
quoting their parents recollections of the invasion. The
tabulations used in this research were obtained by computerized
analysis of a machine readable version of the entire census.
EXAMPLE CENSUS FORM
Survey questions cluster into six general categories: 1) family
identification and migration, 2) age, sex, education and
employment of family members, 3) tenancy, dwelling size
construction and business uses, 4) family income and 5)
vocational training and social services.
The contingency table analysis in Chapter 3 was derived from
cross-tabulating the responses to the first 31 census questions.
No attempt was made to interpret questions 32 through 42 on
vocational training and social services. Unlike the first group
of questions, these later questions did not have systematic or
mutually exclusive response categories. Figure B.1 shows a copy
of the Social Work questionnaire; the questions are as follows:
Address of the dwelling and the corresponding Caja block
and lot number
Name of the household head (1)
Relationship of the head to the family members: father
(2), mother (3), and other (4).
Number of persons that currently live in the house (5).
Place of residency of household head before moving to Las
Colinas: urban (6), rural (7).
Interviewer observations
Sex (9), age (10), highest type (11) and years (12) of
education obtained and current type of employment (13).
Responses for up to 15 persons in addition to the
parents.
Interviewer observations
Household tenancy: owner/occupier (16) apartment renter
(17), room renter (18), and visitor (19).
Number of rooms occupied by the family (20).
Predominant construction material of the dwelling: brick
(21), bamboo (22), tin (23), wood (24) and
prefabricated (25).
(1) Centro Comercial de la Escuela Mediana, "El Estudiantil"
(Bogota: Obra Social del Barrio Las Colinas, Noviembre, 1977)
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Family business within the house or lot (26).
Family income per month including rent: P$100-P$1000
(27), P$1001-P$1500 (28), P$1501-P$2000 (29),
P$2001-P$2500 (30) and P$2501-UP (31).
Interviewer observations Sex, age, highest type and
number of years of education obtained (if any).
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(1)
ui ) Centro uomercial del la Escuea Mediana.
(Bogota: Obra Social del Barrio Las Colinas,
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"LAS GUACAMAYAS" PROGRAM EVALUATION
POPULAR HOUSING BANK
SPECIAL DISTRICT, BOGOTA [COLOMBIA]
(1)
HOUSEHOLD IDENTIFICATION
1. Type of Solution: A/ B! 1/ C
Household Head
Number of Families: 1/ 2/ 3
DEMOGRAPHY - ALL HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS
2. Person Number
3. Kinship: head/ spouse/ son/ other
4. Age: 0-4/ 5-9/ 10-11/ 12-14/ 15-19/
50-59/ 60 and more
5. Sex: M/ F
6. Civil Status: single/ married/
separated/ NI
20-29/ -30-39/ 40-49/
widow/ common law/
ECONOMIC DATA - ALL HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS
7. Occupation: salaried employee/ hourly worker/ in
construction/ self-employed business man/ artist/
traveling salesman/ domestic servant/ housewife/ student/
none of the above/ NI
8. Work Pattern: stable/ unstable/ NI/ NA
9. Monthly Family Income: up to 1000/ 1001-1500/ 1501-2000/
2001-2600/ 2601-4000/ 4001-5000/ 5001-7000/ 7001 and
above/ NI/ NA
10. Monthly Individual Income : - same as family income -
EDUCATION - ALL MEMBERS
11. Highest Level of Education Attended: primary/ secondary
professorial/ vocational/ other/ none/ NA! NI
12. Number of Years Attended at Highest Level: 1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/
6/ 7/ 8/ NI/ NA
13. Scholastic Assistance: yes/ no/ NI! NA
14. Educational Source: public/ private/ NI/ NA
MIGRATION - HOUSEHOLD HEAD ONLY
15. Residency prior to Bogota: city/ small town/ rural/ born
in Bogota/ NI
16. Years of Residency in Bogota: under 3/ 3 to 5/ 6 to 8/ 9
to 11/ 12 to 20/ 20 and more/ permanent/ NI
17. Residency Prior to Las Guacamayas: north/ south/ east/
west/ center city/ NI
PREVIOUS HOUSING
18. Type of Previous Housing: house/ apartment/ rooming
house/ illegal slum/ incomplete house with services/ room/
(1 ) Abbreviations: NI = No Information NA = Not AppTicable
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NI
19. Previous Tenancy: renter/ owner/ free use/ NI
20. Monthly Rent: under 200/ 201-400/ 401-600/ 601-800/
801-1000/ 1001-1500/ 1501 and above/ no rent paid/ NI
CURRENT HOUSING CONDITION
21. Years Resident: less than 1/ 1 to 2/ 3 or more/ NI
22. Tenancy: owner/ renter/ sub-renter/ other
22A. Monthly Rent (for renters and sub-renters only): up to
300/ 301-400/ 401-500/ 501-600/ 601-700/ 701-1000/
1001-1500/ 1501 and above NI
23. What do you use your dwelling for: housing only/
housing-commercial/ housing-industry/ housing-rental/
commercial only
24. If you rent out space, how much do you receive for rent:
up tp 200/ 201-400/ 401-600/ 601-800/ 801-1000/ 1001-1500/
above 1500/ NI
25. Why did you buy this house: location/ cost/ form of
payment/ design! other
26. Did you consult with your family before buying this house:
yes/ no/ NI
CURRENT HOUSING CONDITION - OWNERS ONLY
27. Purchasing this house has made family relations: better/
no change worse/ NI
28. Have you enlarged your house: yes/ no
29. If you havn't enlarged it, why: does not need enlarging/
no economic resources/ do not know how to build/ no help
from family/ other/ NI
30. Did you use Caja plans to enlarge the house: yes/ no/ NI
31. How did you enlarge your house: did it myself! did it with
my family and neighbors/ paid labor to do. it/ all the
previous
32. Have your neighbors helped you to build: yes/ no
33. Have you helped your neighbors to build: yes/ no/ NI
34. Housing problems are easier solved: by yourself/ by
neighborhood groups/ NI
35. What was the main problem you encountered while enlarging
your house: lack of technical knowledge/ problems
obtaining materials/ transporting materals/ fitting the
construction to the lot/ conflicts with neighbor's
construction
36. As a result of purchasing this house, you experienced:
more satisfaction than problems/ more problems than
satisfaction/ indifferent
37. Have you stopped construction: yes/ no
38. If so, why have you stopped: lack of economic resources/
labor shortages/ no time/ material shortages
39. State the area of both permanent and provisional
construction for the following spaces: bedrooms/ kitchen/
bathrooms/ dining room/ shops/ fencing/ foundations
40. State the total investment for additions thus far: up to
2000/ 2001-5000/ 5001-10000/ 10001-20000/ 20001-30000/
176
30001-50000/ 5001-100000/ above 100000
41. How do you consider your house: too small/ sufficient
size/ too large
42. How does it compare with your previous home: better/
equal/ worse
43. Are you thinking of continuing enlarging your home: yes/
no/ NI
44. Will you: continue to improve your house/ move to another
barrio
45. Do you think more housing like this should be built in
Bogota: yes/ no
PUBLIC SERVICES DATA
46. For the following services, state their monthly cost and
rank their quality either good, fair or poor: 1) sewers
(solution C only), 2) electricity, 3) public
transportation, 4) sewers, 5) public telephones, 6) police
protection, 7) commercial facilities, 8) pedestrian paths,
9) vehicular roads and 10) parks and open space
47. The location of water stations are: acceptable/ fair/
unacceptable/ NI
48. Water stations: serve their purpose/ serve the neighbors
only/ have caused difficulties with the neighbors/ other
PENDING SERVICES
49. What additional utilities are you considering: water/
electricity/ telephone
50. What difficulties have you encountered installing 1)
water, 2) electricity and 3) telephone
GENERAL
51. Indicate by order what you consider to be the most
important for your family: better education/ better
housing/ better nutrition/ higher security
52. Which do you consider the most profitable level of
education for your children: primary school/ secondary
school/ higher levels of education
53. Have there been births in this family since you have lived
here: yes - how many/ no
54. Adapting to this barrio has been: difficult/ difficult but
improving/ easy
55. Has the Community Action Group contributed to the
development of the barrio: yes/ no/ NI
56. Do you participate in the Community Action Group: yes/ no
57. Does your family participate in: barrio work groups/
barrio sports groups/ other organizations/ none of the
above
58. What do you consider is the best way to improve the
barrio: through government entities/ through the
community/ through both
59. Do you use the services of any of these agencies: Popular
Housing Bank (Caja de la Vivienda Popular-CVP)/ Colombian
Institute for Family Welfare (Instituto Colombiano de
177
Beinestar Familiar-ICBF)/ Pro Family (Pro Familia)
60. Do you or you family participate in vocational training
courses from SENA: yes/ no
61. The SENA courses taught in the barrio: are useful/
somewhat useful/ aren't useful
62. How do you consider the technical assistance rendered by
the Caja in the barrio: good/ fair/ poor/ NI
63. Have you received social assistance during you residency
here: yes/ no
64. State in order of importance, the services that you
consider the barrio needs.
OBSERVATIONS
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